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ABSTRACT 
This thesis shows that oil price increases and supply threats associated with the 
Cold War and the OPEC Crisis caused the Alberta and Canadian governments to 
prioritize the development of the oil sands industry. By taking equity in the Syncrude 
project the Alberta government emerged with conflicting mandates as both developer and 
regulator of the resource. By the mid 1970s, the Alberta government' s position produced 
a policy dynamic that contributed to the marginalization of government concern for the 
environmental impacts of oil sands development. Oil sands development physically 
colonized Indigenous land and had significant adverse environmental impacts on 
proximate ecosystems. The degradation of natural resources relied on by fndigenous 
peoples made affected communities increasingly desperate for employment in the oil 
sands economy from which they were largely excluded. Indigenous peoples were forced 
to fight for environmental protection and employment in the industry. 
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TERMINOLOGY 
The Woodland Cree term for the Athabasca bitumen deposits is 'asiniw pikow,' 
which translates approximately as 'rock or stone (asiniw) sap or gum (pikow).' 1 In Dene 
languages, (Chipewyan, Slave and Dogrib) the deposits are refered to as ' kles ke,' which 
translates approximately as 'place of(ke) oil (kles).' 2 Indigenous knowledge ofthe 
bitumen deposits dates back centuries, as it is found throughout the Athabasca River 
va lley and flows like molasses on hot days. Indigenous peoples used the material to seal 
canoes, though other uses are unknown.3 
Two terms most commonly used to reference the Alberta bitumen deposits and 
synthetic oil industry in mainstream Canada, 'oil sands ' and ' tar sands,' have become 
incredibly loaded words that reflect debate between those who promote the industry and 
those who oppose it. The first Euro-Canadian explorers at the turn of the 18th century 
described the deposits as the ' tar sands.' In the 19th century the deposits were identified 
as bitumen, a black v iscous form of organic hydrocarbons, and were referenced more 
widely as the ' bituminous sands ' until roughly the 1960s. In the early decades of the 20th 
century the International Bitumen Company was founded to excavate the bitumen 
deposits to supply asphalt as road surfacing, so this may be referred to as the 'bitumen 
industry. ' Yet the term ' tar sands ' was widely used from the late 19th century until about 
the mid-1980s by the public, government, and industry. The term 'o il sands' gradually 
emerged in the 1920s and 1930s as the deposits were mined to produce synthetic crude 
1 Matthew Whitehead, Traditional Knowledge Coordinator, Mikisew C ree First Nation, 20 12. 
2 John Rigney, Specia l Projects, Athabasca Chipewyan First Nation, 2012. 
3 Ibid. 
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oil (rather than asphalt), and became more common as the oi l sands industry emerged. 
Throughout the 20th century, these terms were used interchangeably. 
By about the mid-late 1980s the term ' tar sands' became much less common in 
industry and government. With a rise in awareness of the major environmental 
consequences of bitumen extraction and refining, especially during the post-1997 
development phase, the terms ' oil' and ' tar' have become highly politicized. The Alberta 
government and the oil sands industry have sought to rescind use of the word ' tar ' and to 
establish the term 'oi l' as the exclusive reference.4 Meanwhile, those opposed to the 
industry and those seeking to highlight the environmental consequences of development, 
have sought to make ' tar' the exclusive term of reference in an effort to brand the 
industry as ' dirty.' 5 There have been many resultant debates and antagonisms that revolve 
closely around the application of these terms. Authors, politicians, speakers and the 
public tend to be categorized and subjected to major presumptions based on the terms of 
reference they adopt. 
This semantic debate has distracted from very important and real issues that 
surround the legacy of bitumen extraction in north-eastern Alberta. In this thesis, I hope 
to avoid this debate by apply ing the most objective terms possible based on the changing 
historical contexts to which I refer. My central terms of reference will be ' bitumen' in 
reference to the deposit, and 'synthetic oi l' in reference to the product. Given that the 
focus of the industry is the production of o il , I will refer to the industry as either the 
' synthetic o il industry,' or the ' oil sands industry.' 
4 For example: "A lberta' s O il Sands: Opportunity. Balance," (Government of A lberta, 2008). 
5 Andrew ikiforuk, Tar Sands: Dirty Oil and the Future of a Continent (Vancouver: Greystone Books, 
20 10). 
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INTRODUCTION 
Since the late 1990s, the Alberta oil sands industry has become an economic 
powerhouse that employs thousands of people, generates billions of dollars of economic 
activity, and produces over two million barrels of oil per day. However, it is also the 
source of massive controversy and disputes over environmental impacts that include wide 
scale landscape disturbance and w ildlife habitat destruction, atmospheric po llution, 
carbon dioxide emissions, and watershed pollution that may be the cause of cancer 
outbreaks in downstream communities, and other public health and environmental 
issues. 1 Indigenous peoples have viewed government regulators as neg ligent in 
considering how their traditional lands, Treaty rights and lives are directly impacted by 
oil sands development? Opponents of oil sands development argue that by failing to 
adequately regulate and monitor the industry's environmental effects and by co llecting 
disproportionately small royalties, the Alberta government has allowed the oil sands 
industry to privatize benefits and soc ia lize the negative impacts of development.3 
A lthough scientific and community based research, and popular writing has examined 
these problems, very little historical research exists that evaluates the environmental, 
1 Certain examples of this debate inc lude : "Joint Community Update 2008 Report ing our Environmental 
Activ ities to the Community" , (Fort McM urray, AB, Canada: Regiona l Aquatics Monitoring Program 
(RAM P) Wood Buffalo Environmental Asso- c iation (WBEA), (Cumul ative Environmenta l Management 
Association) (CEMA), 2008); "Wood Buffalo Environmental Association Human Exposure Mon itoring 
Program (HEMP) Methods report and 2005 monitoring year results," (Fort McMurray, AB, Canada: Wood 
Buffa lo Environmental Monitoring Association, 2007); "Alberta Oil Sands Community Exposure and 
Health Effects Assessment Program (HEAP) Summary report," (Edmonton, AB, Canada: Health 
Surveillance, A lberta Health and Wellness, Government of Alberta, 2000)., Y Chen, "Cancer Incidence in 
Fort Chipewyan, A lberta 1995-2006," (Edmonton, A lberta: Alberta Cancer Board, Division of Population 
Health and Information Surveillance, Alberta Health Services, 2009). and Erin N. Kelly et al. , "Oil sands 
development contributes e lements toxic at low concentrations to the Athabasca River and its tributaries," 
PNAS Environmental Sciences (20 1 0). 
2 Bob Weber, "Court denies aborig ina l bid to block ru ling on Jackpine expansion," The Ottawa Citi::en, 26 
November 20 12. 
3 N iki fo ruk, Tar Sands: Dirty Oil and the Future of a Continent. 
social and economic consequences of the development of the oi l sands industry.4 In 
response to this historiographical void, this thesis investigates three socio-political 
aspects of the first major commercial phase of oil sands development, which took place 
between the mid-1960s and the mid-1980s. First, it considers the role of the Alberta 
government in the political and economic evo lution of the industry. Second, it examines 
the environmental policies and programs that evolved to research and regulate the 
environmental impacts of the industry. And third, it outlines the environmental, social 
and economic consequences of development for the Athabasca region and proximate 
Indigenous communities. 
The Albet1a bitumen deposits are large depositions of unconsolidated fine-grained 
sands that contain up to eighteen per cent by weight of bitumen, a heavy viscous 
hydrocarbon mixture, that cover approximate ly 50,000 square kilometres of north-eastern 
Alberta.5 The Athabasca is the biggest known deposit, followed by Cold Lake, Peace 
River, and Wabasca. In the 1970s, the Athabasca deposit was thought to contain 
approximately 153 billion tonnes of bitumen in-situ, or approximately 964 billion barrels 
of oil. Of this deposit, twelve billion tonnes are covered by less than forty-six metres of 
what the industry refers to as 'overburden': muskeg, trees, vegetation, and soil. The 
Alberta government estimated that about thirty-eight billion barrels of oil could be 
recovered with strip mining technology. Bitumen reservoirs are found at various levels in 
the Manville Group and in the Lower Cretaceous strata of north-eastern Alberta. These 
4 The oil sands industry is a sparsely studied area of history, and the work that exi sts does not address 
environmental impacon Indigenous peoples, Paul Chastko, Developing Alberta's Oil Sands: From Karl 
Clark to Kyoto (Calgary : Uniersity of Calgary Press, 2004), xvi. 
5 C. W. Bowman, Chairman, Alberta Oil Sands Technology and Research Authority, and G. W. Govier, 
Chief Deputy Minister, Department of Energy and atural Resources, "Status and C hallenges in the 
Recovery of Hydrocarbons from the Oil Sands of Alberta, Canada," Conference Presentation, Tenth World 
Energy Conference. 19-24 September 1977, in R 1526 vol. 267 file no.5 file.243-1 4, Library and Archives 
Canada (LAC). 
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stratigraphic units are known as the McMurray (Gething), Clearwater (Blue Sky), Lower 
Grand Rapids, and Upper Grand Rapids Formations. The Athabasca deposits are part of 
the McMurray formation. The bitumen accumulation in the deposit is thick, rich and 
discontinuous. The sand occurs in a wide range of grain sizes, with quartz being the 
predominant mineral , along with smaller amounts of feldspar, mica and kaolinite. 
Interbedded are thin beds of silt, shale and coal, and some mineral grains are cemented by 
nodules of marcasite and siderite.6 
The region's Indigenous population consists of two ethnoliguistic groups: 
Chipewyan Dene and Woodland Cree. Within the population are Treaty signatories, non-
signatories and Metis. The Athabasca bitumen deposits have been known to the region ' s 
Cree and Chipewyan inhabitants since their settlement in the area, and Euro-Canadians 
have been aware of the deposits since Alexander Mackenzie described them in 1789. 
Historically, the Athabasca oil sands region was populated by the Cree, although it is 
unclear how long the Cree had been in the area, or if they had even populated the region 
much prior to the fur trade. 7 By the mid-1800s, the Chipewyan migrated to the Wabasca-
Desmarais and Birch River area to occupy the Anzac and Fort McMurray region. At Fort 
McKay and Fort Chipewyan the Cree and Chipewyan occupied adjacent territories. There 
were also substantial Metis communities in each of these settlements. 8 
6 C urrently it is thought that there is about 1.5 - 2.5 trillion barrels of oil in the Athabasca deposits, about 
170 billion barrels of which are recoverable with 201 2 oil prices. C. W. Bowman, C hairman, Alberta Oil 
Sands Technology and Research Authority, and G . W. Govier, Chief Deputy Minister, Department of 
Energy and Natura l Resources, "Status and Challenges in the Recovery of Hydrocarbons from the Oil 
Sands of Alberta, Canada," Conference Presentation, Tenth World Energy Conf erence, 19-24 September 
1977, in R 1526 vol. 267 file no .5 fil e.243-1 4, LAC. 
7 Patricia A. McCormack, Fort ChipeJVyan and the Shaping of Canadian Hist01y, 1788-1920s: "We like to 
be free in this count1y" (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 20 I 0), 20-27. 
8 J.M. Parker, "Athabasca Oil Sands Historical Research Project," Alberta Oil Sands Environmental 
Research Program ( 1979): xxi . 
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Figure I: The Athabasca River north of Fort McM urray, in what would become the Athabasca oil sands 
region. Unknown Photographer, " ERCB photos of the Athabasca Tar Sands, 1960-63," GA. Used with 
permission. 
The beginnings of the development of the oil sands industry date to the explorations 
of the Geological and Natural History Survey of Canada in the 1880s, and the sign ing of 
Treaty 8 in 1899. Surveys and efforts to extract bitumen for asphalt began in the early 
20th century, and the synthetic oil production process was developed during the interwar 
period. Before the 1970s, synthetic oi l production operated on the margins of the A lberta 
o il industry, lacking the logistical potential to attract substantia l private investment. The 
process of commercialization began in the mid-1950s, prompted by Cold War confl icts, 
chronic instability in the Middle East, and declining conventional oil reserves in the 
Un ited States. The Sun Oil Company of Philadelphia became the first major U.S . oi l 
company to invest in the development of Athabasca bitumen. By the late 1960s, as 
4 
conventional oil reserves in Alberta declined, the Alberta government positioned the 
development of the o il sands industry as the province' s main strategy for economic 
growth. In the early 1970s the Organization of the Petro leum Exporting Countries 
(OPEC) rapidly increased oil prices and threatened Canadian and North American access 
to oil. T he crisis gave synthetic oil a national and continental importance that prompted 
major U.S. oil companies and three Canadian governments to work to rapidly expand the 
oil sands industry. 
By the mid-1970s, the development of the o il sands industry and other industria l 
deve lopment in northwest Canada had rapidly transformed north-eastern Alberta from a 
relatively quiet fur trade and subsistence hunting, fishing and trapping-based Indigenous 
reg ion into a locus of industrialization. Change began with the establishment of Fort 
McMurray as a major transport site during the 1930s and World War Two.9 The uranium 
mining boom at Uranium City, Saskatchewan from the late 1940s to the early 1960s had 
both environmenta l impacts and soc ial impacts on Indigenous peoples in the region. 10 
Many res idents of Fort Chipewyan were drawn away from traditional practices to more 
inconsistent forms of wage labour. 11 The construction of theW. A. C. Bennett Dam on 
the Peace River in British Columbia from 1961-68 had drastic impacts on water levels in 
the Peace-Athabasca Delta that affected fish and wildlife.12 The establishment of 
commercial fi sheries at Lake Athabasca between the 1920s and the 1960s linked the 
9 Liza Piper, The Industrial Transformation a/Subarctic Canada (Va ncouver: University of British 
Columbia Press, 2009), a nd Ken Coates and William Morrison, Forgotten North. A History of Canada's 
Provincial Norths (To ronto: James Lorimer & Company , 1992). 
10 Arn Keeling, '"Born in an atom ic test tube': landscapes of cyclon ic deve lopme nt at Uranium C ity, 
Saskatchewan," The Canadian Geographer 54, no . 2 (20 10 ): 228-52. 
11 McCorm ack, Fort Chipe111yan and the Shaping of Canadian f-list01y , !788-1920s: "We like to be free in 
this counliy ." 
12 Ti na Loo, "Disturbing the Peace: Environmental C hange and the Scales of Justice on a Northern River," 
Environmental Histmy 12 (October 2007): 895-9 19. 
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exploitation of a resource relied on by Indigenous peoples in Fort Chipewyen to fo reign 
markets.13 Synthetic o il production was an extremely energy and capital- intensive 
process that had adverse impacts on proximate ecosystems and Indigenous communities 
caused by large-scale strip mining, atmospheric emissions, watershed contamination, and 
massive population increases from incoming workers and support industries. This thesis 
argues that economic dependence on the o il industry in Alberta and energy security 
concerns in the rest of Canada and North America prompted s ignificant government 
investments in the mid- I 970s that made the federal government, and especia lly the 
Alberta government, financially committed to the successfu l establishment and operation 
of the o il sands industry. This commitment had significant impacts on environmental 
policy during the period in question which can be attributed to a conflict of mandates 
produced by the emergence of the government of Alberta as both developer and regulator 
of the resource. 14 In this dynamic, development priorities consistently trumped the 
recognition and resolution of the adverse impacts of the industry on the o il sands region 
and Indigeno us communities. 
The first chapter focuses on the colonization of the Athabasca o il sands region and 
the political economy of o il sands development, assessing the triangu lar relationship 
between the federal and provincial governments and the oi l industry within the broader 
context of global o il production. The chapter traces changi ng fiscal po licies designed to 
aid the o il sands industry: royalty reductio ns by the Alberta government beginning in the 
late 1960s to Great Canadian Oil Sands Limited (GCOS), tax write-offs and rem issions 
from the federa l government beginning in 197 I, and the taking of equity stakes in 
13 Piper, The Indus/rial Transformation of Subarctic Canada. 
14 Although the Alberta government had a long-standing commitment to o il and gas development, the 
mass ive financial investments made during the 1970s were unprecedented. 
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Syncrude in 1975. The period was marked by tense relations between the federal and 
provincial governments arising from Alberta ' s priority of increased provincial rights, and 
the federal priority of increased national energy security in the context of a global energy 
crisis. Oil price collapse ended the first development phase of the o il sands industry in 
1982 with the notable fa ilure of the Alsands megaproject. 
The second chapter focuses on the emergence of federal and provincial 
environmental regulation, research and monitoring in the early 1970s with the creation of 
the federal Department of Environment in 197 1, Alberta Environment in 1971 and the 
Alberta Oil Sands Environmental Research Program (AOSERP) in 1975. It analyses the 
evolution and structure ofthese agencies and programs in the context of o il sands 
development po licy. I a rgue that the Alberta government' s efforts to address 
environmental issues in oi l sands deve lopment were marked by progressive action in the 
first half of the decade and passivity and ineffective regulation thereafter, a pattern which 
may be traced to the Alberta government' s increasing fi nancia l commitments to oi l sands 
development. T his section focuses particularly on the A lberta Oil Sands Environmental 
Research Program, examining its formation in 1975 , reorganization in 1977 and eventual 
dismantling in 1980, arguing that structural changes constrained the independence of the 
program and re-purposed it towards an enabl ing and legitimating role that more closely 
addressed the needs of government and industry. Although the government took steps to 
protect the Athabasca environment, bitumen extraction had a large footprint on the land 
from strip mining and the construction of tai lings ponds. The upgrading process and the 
large operational power generation emitted thousands of kilograms of gaseous and 
particulate atmospheric pollutants. The massive influx of people and the rap id expansion 
7 
of Fort McMurray resulted in the dumping of raw sewage into the Athabasca River that 
caused further watershed contamination. 
The third chapter addresses the environmental, socia l and economic impacts of 
the fi rst deve lopment phase of the oil sands industry on proximate Indigenous 
communities. The Alberta government largely dismissed the presence and well being of 
Indigenous communities as a federal responsibility, and assumed that they would benefit 
from employment in the industry. The combination of environmental impacts on land, a ir 
and water devastated the natura l resource base of the Fort McKay community. The 
degradation of subsistence resources made the community desperate for employment in 
the industria l economy from which they were largely excluded. The influx of settler 
hunters, goods and services further damaged wildlife populations, and challenged the 
socia l structures of the community. Regiona l Indigenous communities formed a strategic 
alliance as the Athabasca Tribal Council (ATC) to oppose environmenta l degradation and 
pursue employment and partic ipat ion to cope with the crisis. In the concluding chapter l 
synthesize and evaluate the findings of my research. 
Methodology 
The research base of this thesis consists of diverse archival materia l, court 
decis ions and one oral history interview. The archival record is particularly reve latory of 
the role of the federal and Alberta government in o il sands development and regulation. 
The archival research of this proj ect is based on records from Library and Archives 
Canada (LAC), The Provinc ial Archives of Alberta (PAA), The G lenbow Archives (GA) 
and the Energy Resources Conservation Board Archives (ERCB). However, the ro le of 
8 
the oil industry and the voice of Indigenous peoples are not prominent in government 
records. Records from LAC on the early development of the oil sands industry are mostly 
re lated to projects of federal-provincial collaboration. They are primarily compilations of 
correspondence between the federal and provincial governments, the federal government 
and industry, or communications within government agencies. They also contain reports, 
agreements, and studies conducted by industry and government agencies. RG 19, 
Department of Finance, holds key information about federal financial invo lvement in o il 
sands development including tax remiss ions, fiscal policy and investments. RG22, Indian 
and Northern Affairs, contains financia l information on Great Canadian Oil Sands 
Limited. RG39, Forestry, holds federal government records on the AOSERP program. 
RG I 08, Environment Canada, holds records on oil sands environmental policy. 
The PAA records a re primarily intra-provincial agency records, correspondence 
w ith industry, and communications with the federal government. As jurisdiction over 
resources and environmental policy is mostly intra-provincia l, much arch ival ev idence 
for this thesis is in the PAA. The PAA Alberta Environment records hold information on 
the evo lution of o il sands environmental policy. Significant record ho ldings of 
correspondence between provincial government agencies and the maj or o il companies 
show the changing relationship between the provincial government and industry. 
Many industry publications are accessible, but the perspectives and inner workings 
of the o il sands industry remain buried as archival records of major producers such as 
Suncor and Syncrude are c losed to the public. The GA has some of the largest col lections 
of non-government records in Canada. The Canadian Petroleum Association fonds 
conta ins records on a di vers ity of topics such as fiscal strategies, government 
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negotiations, and environmental and Indigenous policy . The Imperial Oil fonds contains 
some valuable records, although the Imperial Oil archive is closed to the public. Unless 
oil companies open their archives to the public, their operational history and decision-
making processes will remain unknown. 
I made extensive efforts to arrange oral history interviews with po litical , industry 
and Indigenous leaders, and communities to supplement archival material. However, my 
requests for partic ipation were largely unheard, ignored or decl ined. This is because I am 
not from the Athabasca region, I did not have pre-existing contacts, and because I lacked 
the necessary time to build relationships during the short time period of a one-year MA. 
This also may be attributed to the on-going expansion of o il sands developments, and 
increas ing controversy associated with the industry. I was able to conduct only one 
interv iew with former energy minister Marc Lalonde, with ethics approval from the 
ICEHR. Without the participation of Indigenous communities it is difficult to adequately 
incorporate the voices of Indigenous peoples. However, I was able to find significant 
Indigenous perspectives in archival materia l from the Glenbow Archives and the ERCB. 
In the GA I found extensive newspaper clippings from the late 1970s and early 1980s that 
specifica lly address controversies invo lving Indigenous peoples and o il sands 
development. These articles directly quote Indigenous peoples and provide a voice where 
much of the archival record is s ilent. The ERCB archive holds records of a ll proposals, 
challenges and compla ints associated w ith energy and resource development in A lberta. 
Records of project proposal hearings contain statements from interveners, inc luding 
Indigenous communities, that show the impact of o il sands development on proximate 
communities. ERCB hearing interventions provide detailed Indigenous perspectives on 
10 
oil sands development. The ERCB Library contains some ofthe only copies of extensive 
environmenta l impact assessments on the Fort Mc Kay community in the 1980s. I a lso 
found valuable information on the position of the Athabasca Tribal Council in rulings on 
an affirmati ve action hiring case from 1983. 
Historiography 
As an environmental history of the first commercial development phase of the o il 
sands industry, this thesis endeavours to contribute a focus on environmenta l and 
Indigenous history to a literature on hydrocarbon development in Western Canada that 
has focused predominantly on political, economic, techno log ical and regulatory issues. 
Although the oil sands industry was separated from the many of the regulations of the 
conventional o il industry in the 1950s and 60s, consideration of the history of 
conventional oil development in A lberta and the ro le of the Petro leum and Natural Gas 
Conservation Board (precursor to the Energy and Resources Conservation Board) is 
essentia l to understanding the regulatory enviro nment fro m which the oil sands industry 
emerged. Dav id Breen's maj or wo rk Alberta 's Petroleum industry and the Conservation 
Board traces the history of hydrocarbon extraction in Alberta focus ing on the 
deve lopment of conservation regulation and the influence of the Petro leum and Natural 
Gas Conservation Board on the deve lopment of the industry. 15 Breen identifies the origin 
of conservation as the emergence of the need for regulation of wasteful and haphazard o il 
production, and burning of natura l gas that defined the fi rst boom period that began in the 
Turner Va lley in the 19 1 Os and lasted until the formation of the Conservation Board in 
15 David H. Breen, Alberta 's Petroleum !ndustty and the Conservation Board (Edmonton: University of 
Alberta Press, 1993). 
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1938. He demonstrates that the Board's conservation mandate emerged from a belief that 
hydrocarbon development needed to be carefully managed to combat the free-enterprise 
mentality of the first boom and ensure that development proceeded in the public interest. 
However, the Board' s mandate did not include administrative responsibility of related 
areas including surface rights arbitration, natural gas utility pricing and the collection of 
royalties.16 The Board 's focus on conservation contributed to the development inertia that 
prioritized the public over the individual good and justified approvals that had significant 
adverse public hea lth and environmental consequences for lands and communities c lose 
to hydrocarbon extraction operations. 
Larry Pratt's Tar Sands: Syncrude and the Politics of Oil was one of the first 
academic appraisals of the political-economic dimensions of the prioritization of the oil 
sands industry during the early 1970s. Pratt 's book presented an analysis of the Syncrude 
deal based on leaked documents which he used to illustrate the seemingly limitless power 
of the o il industry to access and influence the Alberta government. 17 Pratt' s work on the 
oil sands industry continued in Prairie Capitalism: Power and Influence in the New West 
( 1979), co-authored with John Richards as a response to the impact of the international 
oil crisis on western Canada in prompting o il and gas producing provinces to exercise 
significant control over their natural resources. Their book focuses on the Alberta and 
Saskatchewan provincial governments and their policies in the post-World War Two era 
developing o il, natural gas and potash industries in western Canada. The theme of their 
study is "the gradual, if uneven, emergence of the provincial state as an entrepreneurial 
actor in staple-led economic development," arguing that th rough the 1970s Alberta and 
16 Breen, Alberta ·s Petroleum lndus/Jy and the Conservation Board. 544. 
17 Larry Pratt, The Tar Sands: Syncrude and the Politics of Oil (Edmonton: Hurtig Publishers, 1976), 9-10. 
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Saskatchewan took " the first steps towards the ultimate 'provincialization' of their 
respective resource sectors." 18 Richards and Pratt argue that in taking direct ownership 
stakes in the Syncrude project, and with the creation of the Alberta Heritage Savings 
Trust Fund, the provincial government of Alberta became an entrepreneurial actor, a 
partner of the business community. In advancing this argument Richards and Pratt posit 
that government entrepreneurship corrupts the ability of governments to adequately 
regulate industries of which they are a part. 
I build on the work of Richards and Pratt, arguing that Peter Lougheed ' s 
Conservative government regarded the development of the oil sands industry as an 
opportunity to break the cycle of corporate dominance of Canadian resource industries. 
Although the Social Credit government had deep-seated connections with the 
international oil industry, and may be characterized as anti-democratic and driven by 
capital, the Social Credit government operated as a facilitator and regulator of the 
industry without being financially involved. 19 Lougheed recognized the historical 
importance of primary resource production to the Alberta economy. His government saw 
the development of the oil sands industry as a means of economic development and 
diversification. Lougheed' s vis ion resonates with Diefenbaker's Roads to Resources 
transport infrastructure plan of the 1950s and 1960s which encouraged industria l 
development by building roads to remote areas of the Canadian north. In the early 1970s 
Lougheed adopted a policy of rational planning to carefully regulate industry to secure 
Albe1ta's benefit and minimize negative impacts. Fo llowing the OPEC price increases, 
18 John Richards and Larry Pratt, Prairie Capitalism: Power and Influence in the New West. (Toronto: 
McClelland and Stewart Limited, 1979), 3-11 . 
19 Alv in Finkel. The Social Credit Phenomenon in Alberta (Toronto: Univers ity of Toro nto Press, 1989), 
2 17, C. B . Macpherson, Democracy in Alberta; the The01y and Practice of a Quasi-Party System (Toronto: 
University of Toronto, 1953), 158, and Breen, Alberta's Petroleum lndustty and the Conservation Board. 
545. 
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Alberta took equity in the Syncrude project to fill the void left by Atlantic Richfield 
Canada's withdrawal. By taking equity in the oil sands industry, the Lougheed 
government blurred the line between business and government and emerged as an 
industrial developer of the oi l sands industry by the mid-1970s. 
This study directly overlaps with the only prominent historical study of oil sands 
development, Paul Chastko's 2004 book Developing Alberta 's Oil Sands: From Karl 
Clark to Kyoto, which analyses the political economic development of the oil sands 
industry. Chastko 's book builds on the work of Pratt and Richards but was primarily a 
study of energy security and international re lations. The book was prompted by the I I 
September 200 I attacks on the United States, an event that Chastko argues gave energy 
supply a security dimension and reinforced the importance of North American o il supply 
alternatives. Chastko argues that the collaboration between the state and the private sector 
backed sustai ned sc ientific research and technological development that facilitated the 
evolution of the oil sands industry from a marginal source operating on the periphery to a 
viable non-conventiona l supply .2° Chastko connects the oi l sands more broadly to g loba l 
histories of o il as an example of the depletion of conventional reserves and the shift 
towards unconventional sources of petro leum.21 While Chastko' s book can be seen as 
part of a relatively well-established historiography on resource development in the 
Canadian north, his book does not engage with this literature. Further, Chastko a lso does 
not discuss the environmenta l, socia l, and economic impacts of the development of the 
oi l sands industry on the ecosystems and people of north-eastern Alberta. An analysis that 
2° Chastko, Developing Alberta's Oil Sands: From Karl Clark to Kyoto: xvi. 
21 Daniel Yergin, The Pri:::e: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money, and Power (New York: Free Press, 199 1). 
14 
addresses the major environmental and Indigenous dimensions of oil sands development 
is essential to understanding the history of this industry. 
The political, economic and legal histories of resource development are essential 
to understanding the impacts and effects of the oil industry. Paul Sabin ' s Crude Politics: 
The California Oil Market 1900-1940 focuses on California law and politics in the 
opening decades of the 20th century to examine the making of California automobile-
based transportation networks? 2 In his 2005 article " Rooting Around in Search of 
Causality," Paul Sabin writes that in hi s study of the pre-World War Two Californ ia o il 
market he found institutional and political factors the most useful for explaining U.S . 
dependence on o il and advocates such an approach fo r the examination of major resource 
development questions.23 He writes that " if environmental historians want to identify the 
root causes of historical environmental change, they may have to forsake fields and 
streams fo r industria l po litics and business competition."24 Economic and po litical forces 
were central to shaping the phys ical construction of the o il sands industry and the ways in 
which environmental impacts were managed. 
Within the literature on hydrocarbon development in Alberta, there is a shortage 
of research into social and environmental impacts and conflicts. Andrew Nikiforuk' s 
Saboteurs, a study of the environmental impacts of the Sour Gas Industry on Peace River, 
A lberta, assessed the conflict between Wiebo Ludwig, the Alberta Government and the 
Energy Resources Conservation Board.25 Nikiforuk suggests that in operating on the 
premise that hydrocarbon development is almost a lways a public good, the ERCB 
22 Paul Sabin, Crude Politics: The California Oil Market 1900-1940 (Berkley and Los Angeles: University 
of Califo rnia Press, 2005). 
23 Paul Sabin , "Rooting Around in Search of Causali ty ," Environmental History 10, no. I (2005): 85-88. 
24 Sabin, "Rooting Around in Search of Causality," 84. 
25 Andrew N iki foruk, Saboteurs: Wiebo LudJVig 's War against Big Oil (Toronto: Macfarlane Walter and 
Ross, 200 I ). 
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subordinates the public health and environmental consequences of sour gas development. 
Arn Keeling ' s research into public challenges to the lax environmental regulation of the 
sour gas industry also addresses the impacts of the ERCB' s systematic approval of 
hydrocarbon projects deemed to be in the public interest of economic development.26 
Although Nikiforuk ' s recent book Tar Sands: Dirty Oil and the Future of a Continent 
provides an in-depth assessment of many ofthe social, environmental, political and 
economic dimensions of the contemporary oil sands industry, there is a dearth of 
historical research that has examined the initial commercial development phase and 
environmental policy framework that informed it, and there is no literature that analyses 
the emergence of the oil sands industry as a manifestation of intra-provincial 
colonization, or the impacts of the industry on Indigenous communities.27 
In structuring my general approach to the environmental impacts ofthe 
development of the oil sands industry I have found ins ights from historical political 
ecology particularly useful.28 Historica l political ecology focuses on land and resource 
contl icts by integrating narratives of environmental change with an examination of the 
economic and political aspects of resource extraction and injustice. Christian Brannstrom 
has advocated that historical po litical ecology be applied to integrate studies of "evidence 
for biophysical change with political-economic causes."29 Arn Keeling and John Sandlos 
have advocated a historica l political ecology approach to studies of mining and industrial 
26 Arn Keeling, "The Rancher and the Regulator: Public Challenges to Sour-Gas Industry Regulation in 
Alberta 1970-1 994," in Writing Off the Rural West: Globali=ation, Governments and the Transformation of 
Rural Communities, ed. Roger Epp and Dave Whitson (University of Alberta Press, 200 I): 279-300. 
17 ikiforuk, Tar Sands. Dirty Oil and the Future of a Continent. 
28 The approach can be traced to Piers M. Blaikie and Harold C. Brookfield, Land Degradation and Society 
(London: Methuen, 1987) and has been recently advocated by Christian Brannstrom, "What Kind of 
History for What Kind of Poli tical Ecology?," Historical Geography 32 (2004): 71- 88, and Arn Keeling 
and John Sandlos, "Environmental Justice Goes Underground? Historical Notes from Canada's Northern 
Mining Frontier," Environmenta/Justice 2, no. 3 (2009): 11 7- 125. 
29 Brannstrom, "What Kind of History for What Kind of Political Ecology?": 85 . 
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development in northern Canada.30 This study assesses the political and economic forces 
that shaped and powered the establishment of the oil sands industry to prov ide causal 
explanation for the environmental, social and economic impacts of the industry on nature 
and indigenous people in the region. 
The development of the oil sands industry was part of a larger process of internal 
colonization of Indigenous territory by Canada, specifically the Alberta and federal 
governments, and the oil sands industry. 31 It involved appropriating Indigenous land, 
occupying it with settlers and exploiting its resources for economic gain.32 Sub-arctic 
Canada was legally obtained by the transfer of Rupert's Land to the Dom inion of Canada 
from the Hudson ' s Bay Company in 1870. Following the transfer, the Canadian 
government began looking to resource extraction and industrial development as new 
strategies of economic development. T he reports ofthe Geological and Natural History 
Survey in the 1880s mentioned vast resources throughout the north. The Klondike go ld 
rush in the late 1890s c larified the importance of resource extraction to the federal 
government and prompted the signing ofTreaty 8 in 1899, and the oil rush in Norman 
Wells prompted the signing of Treaty II in 1921. The Treaties were signed with 
Indigenous peoples in northern Alberta and the Northwest Territories to secure resource 
rights to the region. Fo llowing the signing of the treaties, vast and diverse extraction 
3° Keeling and Sandlos, "Environmental Justice Goes Underground? Historical Notes from Canada ' s 
Northern Mining Frontier." 
31 Coloniali sm is a te rm historically used to define the taking of political control of one country by another, 
its exploitation for economic gain, and subsequent population by settlers. In northern Canada colonialism 
constitutes the process of taking of legal and political control over northern Indigenous territory by 
southern governments, populating it with settlers, and exploiting its resources. McCormack, Fort 
Chipewyan and the Shaping of Canadian History, 1788- !920s: "We like to be f ree in this countty ." 
32 Kerry Abe l and KenS. Coates, "The North and the Nation," in Northern Visions: New Perspectives on 
the North in Canadian History, ed . Kerry Abel and Ken S. Coates (Peterborough, Ontario: Broadview 
Press, 200 I ): 7-2 1. 
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activities ranging from mining, to oil production, to commercial fishing were pursued 
across sub-arctic Canada. 
Coates and Morrison first called for a shift in the emphasis of northern history to 
the northerly areas of the provinces, arguing that the northern regions of the provinces 
have become internal colonies of southern centres of power, characterized by massive 
transfers of wealth out of northern regions and with comparatively little attention to 
Indigenous or settler local populations.33 Jim Mochoruk's work on post-Confederation 
resource development in Northern Manitoba revealed a process of industrialization that 
was characterized by disregard for the region ' s ecosystems and inhabitants by extractive 
industries. The process caused significant ecosystem and social degradation, and a 
subordination of the provincial government by business interests.34 David Quiring's study 
ofthe Cooperative Commonwealth Federation (CCF) government's policies in northern 
Saskatchewan revealed government activities that worked to augment the li ves of 
Indigenous peoples based on a belief that indigenous peoples needed to adopt a settler 
worldview and way of life in order to survive.35 He argued that paternalistic government 
policies to promote social policies ultimately failed and perpetuated an economic duality 
in which Indigenous peoples were left behind. Keeling has examined Uranium City, 
Saskatchewan as a case study on the impacts of boom and bust uranium mining in the 
construction and abandonment of northern industrial developments.36 Liza Piper has 
33 Coates and Morrison, Forgo/ten North: A Hist01y of Canada's Provincial Norths. Thi s approach is also 
advocated by Abe l, "History and the Provincial Norths: An Ontario Example," in Norlhern Visions: New 
Perspectives on !he Norlh in Canadian Hist01y, edited by Kerry Abel and Ken Coates, (Peterborough, 
Ontario: Broadview Press, 200 I), 127-40. 
34 Mochoruk, Formidable Heritage: Manitoba's Norlh and !he Cost of Development, 1870 to 1930: xii . 
35 David Quiring, CCF Colonialism in Nor/hem Saskatchewan: Ballling Parish Priests, Boolleggers. and 
Fur Sharks (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2004), xii . 
36 Keeling, "'Born in an atomic test tube': landscapes of cyclonic development at Uranium C ity, 
Saskatchewan." 
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argued that industrialization in sub-arctic Canada was a process of assimilation in which 
nature, economy and society were forced to adapt to one another and create new forms of 
phys ical and cultural relationsh ips that bound natural systems to industria l economies.37 
Piper demonstrated that post-World War Two industrialists in the northern great lakes 
region s ignificantly degraded communities and ecosystems with their decisions regarding 
waste disposal and the use of toxic chemicals.38 The process of industrial colonization in 
no rth-eastern Alberta is more reminiscent of that described by Mochoruk and Piper than 
that described by Quiring. The Alberta government and the o il sands industry had 
minimal regard for Indigenous peoples during the founding of the industry. The concern 
was for the rapid production of oil, and Indigenous peoples were considered to be a 
federal responsibility. T he industrial colonization of the oil sands region was a process 
that involved the legal acquisition of Indigenous land with Treaty 8, the construction of 
oil sands plants on lands relied on by Indigenous peoples, and the degradation of natural 
resources by synthetic o il production activities. This process compounded the effects of 
the broader industria lization of the Peace-Athabasca Delta, and Indigenous peoples 
sought further participation in the new industrial economy as their subsistence practices 
became unviable. 
Applying theory from historical cartography and resource geography to the work 
of the Geological and Natural History Survey of Canada and the Department of Mines 
between 1875 and 1945 in north-eastern Alberta reveals a process of cognitive 
co lonization that re-inscribed the area in the image ofthe bitumen deposits. In his 2001 
paper " Resource Triumphal ism: Postindustrial Narratives of Primary Commodity 
37 Piper, The Industrial Transformation of Subarctic Canada, I 0. 
38 1bid., 13. 
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Production," Gavin Bridge shows how "extractive spaces are constructed through a 
discursive dialectic which simultaneously erases socioecological histories and reinscribes 
space in the image of the commodity."39 The purpose of the paper is to emphasize the 
role of primary commodity supply zones in narratives of modernity and social life, 
despite their underrepresentation in popular accounts of post-industrial society, but 
Bridge's insights into the social construction of extractive spaces resonate with themes in 
critical cartography and studies of visual representation. Critical cartography stemming 
from those including Brian Harley and David Woodward has complicated the notion of 
the self-evident map as a statement of geographic fact.4° Critical cartography has revealed 
maps as living, purposed texts, a fundamental application of which is in colonization. 
Matthew Edney writes that " the mapping by one polity, within its own spatial discourses, 
of the territory of another establishes a geography of the mind, within which empire can 
be conceptualized and advocated, and a geography of power within which empire can be 
physically constructed."4 1 The colonial applications of cartography can also be seen in 
other visual sources such as landscape art and illustration. John Crowley has shown how 
British surveyors mapped and artistically represented post-conquest New France "as part 
of the creation of a g lobal British landscape, with Canada as a distinctive part," and Greg 
Gillespie has examined narratives by rich Britons of pre-confederation sport hunting in 
39 Gavin Bridge, "Resource triumphalism: postindustri a l narratives of primary commodity production," 
Environment and Planning 33 (200 I ): 2 149-73 . 
40 J. Brian Harley and David Woodward, The Histaty of Cartography : Cartography in Prehistoric, Ancient 
and Medieval Europe and the Mediterranean, vol. I (Chicago: Univers ity of Chicago Press, 1987), and J. 
Brian Harley, "Rereading the Maps of the Columbian Encounter," Annals ofthe Association of American 
Geographers 82, no. 3 (September 1992): 522-36. 
41 Matthew H. Edney, "The Irony of Imperial Mapping, " in The Imperial Map: Cartography and the 
lvlastety of Empire, ed. James R. Akerman (Chicago : Univers ity of Chicago Press, 2009), 45. 
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Rupert ' s Land, as colonial texts that worked to domesticate exotic colonial spaces.42 
Maps, images, and narratives are powerful tools of representation that can colonize space 
through the production of purposed geographic knowledge. In north-eastern A lberta, 
maps informed by the work of the Geological Survey were used by the Dominion of 
Canada to reserve prime bitumen deposits for industrial development long before the 
phys ical construction of the industry took place. 
Rene Fumoleau's 1975 book As Long as this Land Shall Last: A History of Treaty 
8 and Treaty 11, 1870-1939, focused on the po licy and development conditions that 
informed Treaty 8 and Treaty II , and how the treaties were understood by the Indigenous 
peoples who signed them. He connected the push of resource development with the move 
to sign Treaties 8 and I I in the western provinces and the Northwest Territories. He 
demonstrated that the discovery of gold in the Klondike sh ifted the Canadian 
government's exclusive focus on the fur trade towards settlement and resource 
development. He argued that these treaties were fraudulently obta ined by the Dominion 
of Canada to extinguish Indigenous title to the region. He focused specifica lly on the 
meaning and impact of these treaties on the Indigenous communities that signed them. 
The Indigenous communities, he argued, signed the treaties w ithout understanding a ll the 
terms and implications, as the ir primary concerns were about protecting traditiona l ways 
of life and ensuring their freedom to live from the land. Under the Royal Proclamation of 
1763 the British Crown ensured that no British government would take native lands by 
force .43 A longside Fumoleau, The Spirit of the Alberta Indian Treaties provides essentia l 
42 John E. C rowley, "Taken on the Spot': The Visual Appropriation of New France for the Global British 
Landscape," The Canadian Historical Revie\11 86, no. I (March 2005), and Greg Gillespie, Hunting for 
empire narrative of sport in Rupert's Land, 1840-70 (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2007): 1-28. 
43 Rene Fumoleau, As Long as this Land Shall Last.· A l-listo1y of Treaty 8 and Treaty II , 1870-
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archival material and oral history interviews on the Treaty making process and 
Indigenous interpretations of the Treaties in the context of the Indigenous rights 
movement of the 1970s.44 
Mel Watkins ' s Dene Nation, The Colony Within and Robert Page ' s Northern 
Development: The Canadian Dilemma specifically addressed Indigenous peoples and 
northern development in response to the Mackenzie Valley Pipeline lnquiry.45 The 
Mackenzie Valley Pipeline was a scheme to bui ld a natural gas pipeline from the 
Beaufort Sea to northeastern Alberta to supply natural gas to western Canada, especially 
the oil sands region. Published in 1977, The Colony Within directly fo llowed the 
conclusion of the MVPI and the publication of Justice Thomas Berger' s report.46 The 
book included the Dene Declaration, a statement by the Dene people that affirmed the 
Indigenous right to self determination as a universal human right, and that they should be 
allowed to pursue their own society on a base of renewable resources. Watkins argued 
that the Dene had been robbed of their land by the Crown, looking back to the Hudson ' s 
Bay Company ' s sale of Dene land to the Canadian government, a sale that justified 
Crown ownership and endeavoured to turn the Dene from land bound people to landless 
wage s laves.47 Watkins advocated for a Canadian divergence from a staples economy and 
a lternative forms of economic development. Published nine years later, Northern 
Development was Robert Page ' s response to the approach taken by the federal 
1939 (Calgary : University of Calgary Press, 2004). 
44 Richard Price ed. , The Spirit of the A Iberia Indian Trealies (Montreal: Institute fo r Research on Public 
Policy, 1979). 
~ 5 Mel Watkins, Dene Nation: Colony Within (Toronto and Buffa lo: University o f Toronto Press, 1977), 
and Robert J. D. Page, Northern Development: The Canadian Dilemma (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 
1986). 
46 T homas R. Berger, Northern frontier. northern homeland: the report of the Macken::ie Valley Pipeline 
lnquity (Toronto: J. Lorimer in association with Publishing Centre, Supply and Services Canada, 1977). 
47 Watkins, Dene Nalion: Colony Within, 88. 
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government and business interests to the north that he described as a mixed attitude of 
romanticism and greed.48 He argued that the proceedings of the MVPI were relevant to 
all northern resource projects of the 1980s as they emphasized the significance of land to 
Indigenous peoples, issues with unsettled land claims, perceptions of the treaties, and 
Indigenous skepticism of relations with the federal government. He advocated for a 
changed philosophy of northern development that prioritized social and environmental 
considerations. The Inquiry was revisited in the 1990s by Paul Sabin in his 1995 article, 
" Voices from the Hydrocarbon Frontier: Canada's Mackenzie Valley Pipeline Inquiry 
( 197 4-1977)" which questioned the notion that indigenous peoples are " stock characters, 
locked within a traditional world or devastated by their exposure to modern society ."49 
He argued that looking closely at the testimonies of the Berger inquiry revealed that few 
opposed development, while most advocated for local control, revenue sharing, 
participation and strict assurances of minimal environmental impact. 
The application of Harold Innis ' s staples theory of Canadian economic 
development is essential to understanding the development of the oil sands industry in 
that it signifies Canada' s on-going prioritization of staple production.50 Innis argued that 
Canada' s economic growth has been directed towards the exploitation of staple products, 
which he defined as semi-processed raw materials for export. He argued that the process 
was cyclical, highly responsive to booms and busts in commodity markets, but that 
resource economies would be progressively dependent on extraction. He maintained that 
48 Page, Northern Development.· The Canadian Dilemma, 2. 
49 Paul Sabin, "Vo ices from the Hydrocarbon Frontier: Canada's Mackenzie Valley Pipe line Inquiry, 1974-
1977," Environmental History Review 18, no. I (Spring, 1995): 18. 
50 Harold Adams Innis, The Fur Trade in Canada: An Introduction to Canadian Economic History 
(Toronto: Univers ity of Toronto Press, 1999), Harold Adams Innis, Danie l Drache, ed. Staples. markets, 
and cultural change selected essays (Montreal, Que.: MeG ill-Queen's Univers ity Press, 1995), and Harold 
Innis, Settlement and the Mining Frontier, Canadian Frontiers of Settlement Vol. 9 (Toronto: MacMi llan, 
1936). 
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Canada' s foundation and economic growth was dependent on the demands of external 
markets for primary resource exp01ts. The extraction and transportation of staples 
generated minimal domestic production of other value added goods and did not 
significantly contribute to Canadian industrial production. He argued that industry, 
transportation, trade, finance and governmental activities would increasingly become 
subordi nate to the production of the staple rather than a more specialized manufacturing 
• 5 1 
commumty. 
Henry Vi van Nel les applied Innis' s theories in a study of the relationships 
between government and industry in staple production. He demonstrated that the Ontario 
prov incial government had played a major ro le in col laborating with private interests to 
faci litate the development of Ontario's natural resource economy. Ne lles concluded that 
by the early twentieth century the process of natural resource development in Ontario had 
reduced the state to a c lient of the business community.52 Nel les ' s book is fundamental to 
this thes is not just for his analys is of the po litical effect and societal implications of the 
narrowing divide between business and government, but because of its critique of the 
ramifications of prov incial resource ownership. He demonstrated that from the outset 
Ontario ' s natura l resources were destined for American markets, an arrangement that 
produced a three-way struggle between the province, Ottawa, and industry over the 
degree of processing of exports. Nelles was a major influence on many scholars studying 
northern resource dependency. Geographer John Bradbury examined Canadian resource 
extraction towns in the 1960s and 1970s as direct subordinates of the multinational 
corporations that funded and abandoned the industries that supported them through the 
51 Innis, The Fur Trade in Canada: An Introduction to Canadian Economic Hist01y, 385. 
52 Henry Vivian Nelles, The Politics of Development: Forests. Mines and Hydro-Electric PoJVer in 
Ontario. 18-19-194 1 (Montreal and Kingsto n: MeG ill-Queen ' s University Press, 2005), 494. 
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increasing internationalization of capital.53 His work also addressed the Quebec state-
based resource corporations in impelling resource development in that province.54 
Geographers Roger Hayter and Trevor Barnes have recently affirmed the persistence of 
primary resources in Canadian economic development. They have argued that following 
Fordism, the increasing collapse of trade barriers, and increasing foreign ownership, the 
notion of the staples trap is still a relevant critique of the Canadian economy.55 Jim 
Mochoruk' s book on resource development in Manitoba examines resource extraction as 
a root of a narrowing divide between business and government in that province. 56 In this 
analysis of the oil sands industry, 1 do not focus directly on the staples trap and the 
capture of demand linkages. Instead, my focus is on the effects of resource dependence 
on environmental regulation . I argue that Alberta' s increased reliance on the profitability 
of the oil sands industry caused by inflation and the OPEC crisis from the early 1970s to 
the early 1980s, combined with the Lougheed government' s emphasis on securing 
maximum domestic socio-economic benefits and demand linkages contributed to a 
regulatory condition that prioritized development and marg inalized the environmental 
impacts of oil sands development. 
Assessing the environmental impacts of the o il sands industry requires examining 
the technology and production process it used to produce synthetic oil from the 
Athabasca bitumen deposits. Unlike convent iona l oil, which can be pumped out of the 
53 John H. Bradbury, "Towards and Alternative Theory of Resource-Based Town Development in Canada," 
Economic Geography 55, no. 2 (April , 1979): 147-66. 
54 John H. Bradbury, "State Corporations and Resource Based Development in Quebec, Canada: 1960-
1980," Economic Geography 58, no. I (January, 1982): 45-6 1. 
55 Roger Hayter and Trevor Barnes, "I nnis' Staple Theory, Exports, and Recession: British Co lumbia, 198 1-
86," Economic Geography 66, no. 2 (A pril 1990): 156-73, and Roger Hayter and Trevor J . Barnes, 
"Canada's Resource Economy," The Canadian Geographer 45, no. I (200 I): 36-4 1. 
56 Jim Mochoruk, Formidable Heritage: Manitoba's North and the Cost of Development, 1870 to 1930 
(Winnipeg: University of Manitoba Press, 2004). 
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ground and refined into a marketable product, bitumen must be strip-mined, boiled to 
extract it from the sand, and upgraded into synthetic crude oil through a process that 
removes excess nitrogen and sulphur before it is refined. The resource can only be 
commercially viable when developed in massive quantities by exploiting economies of 
scale and high energy prices. The oil sands industry in the 1970s was to oi l what Daniel 
Jackling's copper mines were to copper. In the 1920s United States as rich copper 
deposits declined and prices increased, Daniel Jackling began exploiting massive low-
grade ore bodies in Bingham Canyon, Utah by revolutionizing open-pit mining 
techniques and large scale rock-crushing extraction processes. Tim LeCain equates what 
he refers to as Danie l Jackling ' s techniques of ' mass destruction' with Henry Ford' s 
techniques of mass production, using economies of scale and modem technology to make 
large profits by producing huge quantities at lower costs. 57 For Jackling, this approach 
was dictated by the low concentrations of copper in the porphyry copper deposits he 
sought to explo it. Similarly, the composition of bituminous sand, a low-grade 
hydrocarbon, requires large-scale extraction and high-energy processing with complex 
and expensive equipment to be profitable. To produce synthetic oi l, the industry has 
stripped thousands of hectares of north-eastern Alberta's boreal forests and muskeg, 
destroying ecosystems and wildlife habitats, and has had significant adverse impacts on 
air and water quality . A lthough the environmenta l impacts of oil sands activities have 
been poorly monitored and hotly debated by industry and government, communities have 
observed a diversity of negative impacts and recent peer rev iewed research from Kurek et 
al. has demonstrated that "oil sands lake ecosystems have entered new ecological states 
57 Tim LeCain, Mass Destruction: The Men and Giant Mines that Wired America and Scarred the Planet 
(New Brunswick, New Jersey and London: Rutgers University Press, 2009). 
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completely distinct from those of previous centuries" because of major increases in 
polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs) and dibenzothiophenes from by oil sands 
operations. 58 
The development of the oil sands industry coincided with the birth of 
environmental policy in Canada. Environmental policy emerged in response to local 
political movements and continental developments in environmental politics. Canadian 
movements took significant inspiration from U.S. movements such as the widely 
referenced opposition to DDT use mobilized in part by Rachel Carson ' s Silent Spring. 59 
Keeling has shown that the pollution of English Bay in Vancouver in the 1960s was a 
paramount concern of the early environmental movement in British Columbia.60 Jennifer 
Read has looked to public campaigns against water pollution from detergents in 1960s 
Ontario as early environmental concerns that prompted the formation of Pollution Probe, 
and later the Ontario Department of the Environment in 1971 .61 Morris Zaslow has 
written that, as environmental groups began to gain attention of media in the 1960s and 
70s, Canadian governments began forming specific environment departments, which 
conflicted with development priorities. The emergence of this new obligation left 
governments in the 1970s with contradictory mandates struggling to reconcile opposing 
policies. They sought at once to enhance environmental regulation, and also to increase 
58 Joshua Kurek, JaneL. Kirk, Derek C. G. Muir, Xiaowa Wang, Marlene S. Evans, and John P. Smol, 
"Legacy of a Ha lf Century of Athabasca Oil Sands Development Recorded by Lake Ecosystems," 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (20 13), and Kelly et al., "Oil Sands Development 
Contributes Elements Tox ic at Low Concentrations to the Athabasca River and Its Tributaries." 
59 Rachel Carson, Silent Spring (Boston: Houghton M iftlin, 1962). 
60 Arn Keeling, "Sink or Swim : Water Pollution and Environmental Politics in Vancouver, 1889- 1975," BC 
Studies, no. 1421143 (Summer/ Autumn 2004): 69- 10 I. 
6 1 Jennifer Read, ""Let us heed the vo ice of youth": Laundry Detergents, Phosphates and the Emergence of 
the Environmental Movement in Ontario," Journal of the Canadian Historical Association I Revue de Ia 
Societe historique du Canada 7, no. I ( 1996): 227-50. 
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financial and administrative aids to promote development.62 The regulatory paradox of 
conflicting mandates emerged as a significant problem for Alberta by the mid-1970s as 
the government established the Department of Environment and the Alberta Oil Sands 
Environmental Research Program concurrent to taking equity in the Syncrude project. 
The experience of AOSERP reveals efforts of government and industry to co-opt 
environmental research to suit a partial development agenda, a process described by 
Shelia Jasanoff in her study of regulatory science in the U .S.63 The sc ience of regulation 
in Alberta echoed Jasanoffs observation of U.S. regulatory science, as Alberta 
environmenta l po licy was not objective verifiable truth that balanced development would 
adequately protect the environment and enable econom ic growth, but rather, " a state of 
knowledge that satisfies tests of scientific acceptability and supports reasoned decision 
making, but a lso assures those exposed to risk that their interests have not been sacrificed 
on the a ltar of an impossible scientific certainty."64 The Alberta government' s 
commitment to the success of the o il sands industry and the ERCB' s mandate to facilitate 
deve lopment in the public interest undermined the prospect of meaningful env ironmenta l 
protection in Alberta. 
Scholars evaluating the impacts of industrial resource developments on and 
actions of Indigenous communities often invoke Indigenous agency, the subject of heated 
debate in the mid-1990s. The article by Robin Brownlie and Mary-El len Keirn 
·'Desperately Seeking Absolution : Native Agency as Co lonialist A libi?" critic ized studies 
which they argued marginalized the adverse impacts of colonia lism on Ind igenous 
62 Morris Zaslow, The North1vard txpansion ofCanada 1914- 1967 (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 
1988), 370. 
63 She ila Jasanoff, The Fifih Branch: Science Advisers as Policymakers (Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
Harvard University Press, 1990), v ii . 
64 Jasanoff, The Fifih Branch: Science Advisers as Policymakers, 250. 
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peoples by emphasizing their power to shape their lives and land within the colonial 
space.65 They advocate a dual approach that addresses both impact and agency . In 1997 
Frank Tough advocated the study of economic impacts on Indigenous peoples. In his 
book on northern Manitoba he wrote that even when Indigenous people were successfully 
employed they were not masters of their destiny, as Indigenous peoples ' s ability make 
certain choices was not a significant measure of power.66 Tough argued that Indigenous 
peoples had little choice but to participate in the market economy, and that though they 
were able to adapt to employment in the resource economy, were ultimately dependent on 
a narrow range of economic activities and vulnerable to the booms and busts of g lobal 
commodity markets. Recent Indigenous histories of resource development in sub-arctic 
Canada carefully examine both the impacts on and cultural adaptations of Indigenous 
peoples living with resource development projects.67 
The approach of this thesis was largely informed by political economy and 
historical political ecology literatures that address the role of business and politics in 
extractive resource development. The specific focus on the efforts of the Alberta 
government to try to benefit from and control resource development driven by forei gn 
markets is drawn from Nelles 's examination of the Ontario government in The Politics of 
Development, and Richards and Pratt' s critique of the Lougheed government in Prairie 
Capitalism, as well as the hypothesis advanced by Sabin that po litical and economic 
factors must be carefully examined to evaluate the causes of environmental change. I use 
65 Robin Brownlie and Mary-Ellen Keirn, "Desperately Seeking Absolution: Native Agency as Colonialist 
Alibi?," Canadian Historical RevieJV (December 1994): 543-56. 
66 Frank Tough, As Their Natural Resources Fail: Native People and the Economic J-list01y of Northern 
Manitoba. 1870-193() (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1997), 305. 
67 Lianne Leddy, "Cold War Colonialism: The Serpent River First Nation and Uranium Mining, 1953-
1988" (Ph.D Thesis, Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University, 20 II ), Hans Carlson, Home is the f-lltnter: The 
James Bay Cree and Their Land (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2008) and Quiring, 
CCF Colonialism in Northern Saskatche JVan: Battling Parish Priests, Bootleggers, and Fur Sharks . 
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Zaslow' s observation that Canadian governments struggled to balance conflicting 
mandates of development and environmental protection following the introduction of 
environmental policy to assess the efforts of the Alberta government to prevent and 
monitor the environmental dimensions of oil sands development. For evidence of 
biophysical change I have sought to examine results of environmental research as well as 
the observations of proximate Indigenous peoples to present a culturally balanced 
assessment of environmental change in the oil sands region. Drawing from current 
themes in Indigenous history, I have investigated the environmental, social and economic 
impacts of industrial development on proximate communities, as well as the responses of 
communities to the colonizing force of oil sands development. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
Bitumen Economy: 
The Establishment of the Oil Sands Industry and the Rise of Corporate 
Government 
The industria lization of the oil sands region began in the late 19th century through 
processes of legal and cognitive colonization, by which the region was appropriated as an 
industrial zone by the development ambitions of southern Canada, prior to the physical 
construction of commercial industry . The Dominion of Canada extended Anglo-Canadian 
legalism over the region w ith purchase of the Hudson' s Bay Company lands in 1870, and 
through signing Treaty 8 with the region ' s Indigenous inhabitants in 1899. In the early 
20th century, the Department of M ines sent representative surveyor and geologist Sidney 
C. Ells to the region to locate the richest bitumen deposits. His results formed the basis of 
maps that defined the region by bitumen extractio n, settlement and industria lization. 
Process research and development began on a large scale follow ing World War One at 
the University of A lberta and at the Abasand plant near Fort McMurray that operated 
between 1930 and 1945. However, the discovery of large reserves of conventional oi l in 
Alberta in 1947 discouraged major private investment in the immediate post-war period. 
The beginning of commercia l synthetic oi l production was marked by the open ing 
of the Great Canadian Oil Sands Limited plant in 1967, funded by a Sun O il investment 
following the Suez C ris is in 1956. In 1975, after the w ithdrawal of Atlant ic Richfie ld 
Canada from the Syncrude consortium, the federa l government a long with the 
governments of A lberta and Ontario took equity in the consortium to ensure the surv ival 
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of the project. For the government of Alberta, investment in the oil sands industry 
resulted in its emergence by the mid-1970s as an entrepreneurial actor, functionally a 
member of the oil sands industry, occupying a liminal position as both deve loper and 
regulator of the resource. The persistence of the Alberta government's dual position 
through the 1970s and 80s bolstered political and economic dependence on the success of 
the oil sands industry, and significantly influenced environmental and social aspects of 
oil sands development policy and thereby shaped the form of environmental change in 
the Athabasca oil sands reg ion. 
Law and geographic knowledge 
Prior to Confederation in 1867, the Hudson's Bay Company sought to restrict 
settlement in the S lave and Athabasca Lakes reg ion to maximize fur production by 
minimiz ing disturbance of the region's Indigenous communities from excessive contact 
with Europeans. 1 In the years following the transfer of Rupert's land, the fu r trade 
remained strong and expanded until the end of the Second World War despite the decline 
of the Hudson's Bay Company ' s dominance.2 By the 1890s, the government of Canada 
had extens ive knowledge of the potential mineral wealth of the Peace, Athabasca and 
Mackenz ie districts that prompted the initiation of serious plans to sign treaties.3 
Fumoleau has show that the abundance of petro leum was a significant factor in impelling 
the signing of Treaty 8 and T reaty II . Reports from the Geological and Natural History 
1 Arthur J. Ray, Indians in the Fur Trade: Their Role as Trappers, Hunters and Middlemen in the Lands 
SouthJVest of Hudson Bay . 1660-1870 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1974), and Rene Fumoleau, 
As Long as this Land Shall Last: A f-listmy of Treaty 8 and Treaty I I, 1870-1939 (Calgary: Univers ity of 
Calgary Press, 2004 ), xxvi. 
2 Arthur J. Ray, The Canadian Fur Trade in the Industrial Age (Toronto: University ofToronto Press, 
1990). 
3 Richard Daniel, "The Spirit and Terms of Treaty Eight," in Price, The Spirit of the Alberta Indian 
Treaties. 60. 
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Survey of Canada, including from Robert Bell in 1882-83, that repeatedly mentioned the 
presence of "petroleum bearing sandstone," "petroleum impregnated marl," "flowing 
asphalt," " petroleum strata," and " free petroleum," created a perception in the south that 
the north was " floating" on oil.4 In 1888 Robert McConnell reported that, " the Devonian 
rocks throughout the Mackenzie Valley are everywhere more or less petroliferous and 
over large areas afford promising indications of the presence of oil in workable 
quantities."5 The news of such reserves of oil drastically changed southern imaginings of 
the northwest. Fumoleau cited Senator John C. Schultz of Manitoba who created a Senate 
Select Committee, the third report of which stated that "The evidence submitted to your 
committee points to the existence in the Athabasca and Mackenzie Valleys of the most 
extensive petroleum field in America, if not the World." The report envisioned a future 
importance for this resource: 
The uses of petroleum and consequently the demand for it by all Nations 
are increasing at such a rapid ratio, that it is probable that this great 
petroleum field will assume an enormous value in the near future and will 
rank among the chief assets comprised in the Crown Domain of the 
Dominions.6 
Fumoleau wrote that "with the discovery of ' immense quantities of petroleum,' the 
expense and obligation of a treaty with the Indians began to look minimal when 
compared to the enormous wealth to be acquired from them."7 Fumoleau cited a Privy 
Council Report from 1891 , which outlined the importance of a treaty: 
On a report dated i 11 of January 1891 , from the Superintendent General of 
Indian Affairs, stating that the discovery in the District of Athabaska and 
4 Robert Bell , Report on Part of the Basin of the Athabasca River. N. W. T. , Geological and Natural History 
Survey of Canada (Montrea l: Dawson Brothers, 1884), in ibid., 24. 
5 Robert G. McConne ll , Report on an Exploration in the Yukon and the Macken::.ie Basins, N. W. T.. 
Geological and Natura l His tory Survey o f Canada, Annual Report, 1888-1889 (Montreal: Will iam Foster 
Brown and Co., 1890), in ibid., 25 . 
6 Jo hn C. Schultz, in Canada Senate, Journals, 27 March 1888, p . 65-66, in ibid., 26 . 
7 Ibid., 27. 
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in the MacKenzie River Country, that immense quantities of petroleum 
exist within certain areas of those regions, as well as the belief that other 
minerals and substances of economic value ... are to be found therein, the 
development of which may add materially to the public wealth, and the 
further consideration that several Railway projects, in connection with this 
portion of the Dominion, may be given effect to at no such remote date as 
might be supposed, appear to render it advisable that a treaty or treaties 
should be made with the Indians who claim those regions as their hunting 
grounds, with a view to the extinguishment of the Indian title in such 
portions of the same, as it may be considered in the interest of the public 
to open up for settlement.8 
While the foundations ofTreaty 8 were laid in the early 1890s, the government ofCanada 
did not pursue its signing until the discovery of gold in the Klondike and the political 
stability brought by the election of Prime Minister Sir Wilfrid Laurier.9 Treaty 11 was not 
signed until 1921 during the conventional oil boom at Norman Wells, Northwest 
Territories. 
In signing Treaties 8 and II Indigenous signatories gave up their rights to the land 
in exchange for hunting rights, reserve lands and various material benefits. Fumoleau 
argues that Treaties 8 and I I were fraudulently obtained by the Dominion of Canada. The 
signatories signed without understanding all the terms and implications, as their primary 
concerns were about protecting traditional ways of life and ensuring their freedom to live 
from the land . The treaties were largely interpreted as peace and friendship treaties that 
did not entail total land ownership. The commissioners who obtained the treaties had 
illiterate signatories sign an ' X,' and the Treaty Commissioners are accused of forg ing 
seventy-two ' X ' s ignatures of the total seventy-five. Fumoleau wrote that, 
By Treaties 8 and I I , the Canadian government intended to extinguish the 
Indian title to the immense Athabasca-Mackenz ie District. The Indian 
8 Government of Canada, Privy Council Report, 1891 , in Fumoleau, As Long as this Land Shall Last: A 
Hisloty ofTreaty 8 and Treaty II , 1870-1939, 30. 
9 Daniel, "The Spirit and Terms of Treaty Eight," in Price, The Spirit of the Alberta Indian Treaties, 66, and 
Fumoleau, As Long as this Land Shall Last: A !-listoty a,[ Treaty 8 and Treaty II. 1870- 1939. 30. 
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people intended to sign friendship treaties ... In spite of the hands clasped 
in agreement as depicted on the treaty medal , it is very probable that the 
two parties neither understood each other nor agreed on what the treaty 
meant. 10 
Richard Daniels has suggested that Treaty 8 was a complex deal fo r Indigenous peoples 
that was only made possible by a significant degree of trust between parties and the 
mutual need for an agreement. 11 Through the sale of HBC terri tory to the Dominion of 
Canada and the signing of Treaty 8, southern Canada gained legal ownership of the oil 
sands region. 
In 191 2, Canada imported 93% of its petroleum at a cost of $89 million. 12 Such 
expenditures impe lled searches for domestic supplies. The career of Sidney C. Ells as 
senior engineer and Athabasca representative of the Department of Mines aptly 
demonstrates the power of commodity-based representations of space to reshape and 
colonize a region prior to the large-scale physical construction of an industry. Born in 
1878, Sidney Ells grew up in Montreal and received a B.A. from McGill University in 
190 I , and a B.Sc. in earth sciences in 1908. In 191 2 he took a job w ith the Mines Branch 
as assistant to the Director. Between 191 3 and 1945 Ells conducted exploration, 
surveying, prospecting, documentation, photography and experimentation that widely 
expanded Euro-Canadian knowledge of the region, specifically in terms of bitumen and 
its potential extract ion and value. In 191 3, El ls was tasked by the Department of Mines to 
do an inquiry into the extent of the Athabasca bitumen deposits. While completing the 
project he became enthralled by the same 1883 reports from Robert Bell that prompted 
1
° Fumoleau, As Long as this Land Shall Last: A HistOIJI of Treaty 8 and Treaty I I. 1870-1939, xxvi . 
11 Daniel, "The Spirit and Terms of Treaty Eight," in Price, The Spirit of the Alberta Indian Treaties, 99. 
12 Sidney C. Ells, Recollections of the Development of the Athabasca Oil Sands (Ottawa: Department of 
Mi nes and Technical Surveys, 1962), 2. 
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Treaty 8, by the embellished testaments and illustrations of boosters, and by encouraging 
C' • h 13 re.erences m t e press. 
Fig ure 2: Sidney C. Ells, "Exposure of bituminous sand on the east s ide of the Steepbank River, illustrati ng 
the massive structure and cleavage typical of the richer grades of bituminous sand," ( I October 1920), in 
Photographs Illustrating Certain Activities in the McMurray Area During Parts of 1942. 1943 and 1945 
lVith introductmy comments on previous operations by S.C. Ells, MG30 A 14 vol. 6, LAC. Used with 
permission. 
In the spring of 19 13, Ells loaded up a 30-foot scow at Athabasca Landing with 
four men and three months of supplies, and floated downstream towards Fort McM urray. 
13 Ells, Recollections of the Development of the Athabasca Oil Sands, 2. 
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That summer Ells conducted reconnaissance surveys I 00 miles north of Fort McMurray 
along the Athabasca River, and I 00 miles down each the Clearwater, Firebag and 
Christina Rivers, none of which had been previously surveyed. He made maps, took 
extensive notes, and photographed major outcroppings of bitumen. On his return to 
Ontario, his report of the first trip emphasized the abundance of bitumen outcrops, 
advocating an extensive core drilling program to indicate "the true value of any 
subsurface area," the demonstration and testing of the material for paving, and research 
into a separation process with which to produce synthetic crude oil. 14 On orders of the 
Director of the Parks Branch, he secured a 580-acre bitumen deposit close to Fort 
McMurray, which came to be known as the Horse River Reserve. Between 1920 and 
1945 the deposit was used for extracting bitumen to pave Jasper National Park and for oil 
production efforts. Between 1922 and 1923 Ells conducted extensive topographical 
surveying and surface profiling. The survey covered over 2000 square kilometres, and 
focused on a general classification of bituminous sand areas, mainly based on outcrops 
along various streams, grouped according to possible commercial value, thickness and 
character of overburden, the difficulty of overburden removal , and the apparent quality 
and estimated quantity of bitumen available. 15 He specifically highlighted the importance 
of the Mildred-Ruth lake area. The Syncrude Mildred Lake Mine is currently one of the 
largest mines in the region. 
By mapping the region specifically for the location of bitumen deposits, El ls 
overlaid the history ofthe region ' s Indigenous people. His maps have no mention of the 
settlements, traplines and trails relied on by Indigenous peoples for subsistence and 
14 Ells, Recollections of the Development of the Athabasca Oil Sands, 14. 
15 Ibid., 59. 
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commercial hunting, gathering and trapping activities. In his mapping process he named 
many features himself, such as Patterson and Forrest Lakes after two of his canoe men. 
The survey information provided by Ells was used by the government of Canada to rope 
off the most valuable bitumen deposits as mine sites (Figure 3). Ells conducted further 
surveying and exploration, some limited drilling in 1931 , and a significant geological 
survey in 1942-47 of 6500 square kilometres south of Lake Athabasca. 
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Figure 3 : Northern Affairs Program, " Lands reserved by Order in Council of2/7/20 coloured in Red . Lands 
Mr. Ells recommends reserved hatched in Black." (5 October 1920) RG-85 voL 180 I fil e.42594 (pt. 1.2), 
LAC. Used with permission. 
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The efforts of Sidney Ells are significant for colonizing the region by building on law to 
re-imagine place in Euro-Canadian perceptions of the Athabasca region. In 1962, 
recalling over thirty years of work in north-eastern Alberta, Ells reaffirmed his vision for 
the oil sands region: 
In 1913 a great and potentially valuable natural resource in the northern 
part of the province of Alberta lay dormant and unknown while even the 
surface of the country was unsurveyed. Yet as a result of investigations in 
the field and in the laboratory, the outcome may ultimately be reflected in 
important commercial development. Where now the almost unbroken 
wilderness holds sway, industrial plants may arise and tall stacks dominate 
the landscape. Few will then pause to consider what these developments 
represent, but success wi II be the reward of those who had a part in the 
undertaking. 16 
As the scale of the deposits were appreciated, the oil sands region was conceptualized by 
Alberta and the federal government as an industrial heartland of oil production, wealth 
and sustenance. Legal colonization through treaty-making accompanied prospecting, 
surveying and mapping as cognitive processes that extended Euro-Canadian design over 
the oil sands region, colonizing through ownership and knowledge long before the 
physical construction of the oil sands industry took place. 
Research and development 
In its natural state bitumen has a high viscosity and is generally less dense than 
water only above the temperature range of 311 o to 294° K. The mineral grains are water 
wetted, meaning that the grain of sand is separated from the bitumen by a layer of water, 
a key feature of the deposits, which enables the separation process. 17 That bitumen could 
16 Ells, Recollections ofthe Development o.fthe Athabasca Oil Sands, 100. 
17 C. W. Bowman, Chairman, A lberta Oil Sands Technology and Research Authority, and G . W. Gov ier, 
Chief Deputy Minister, Department of Energy and Natural Resources, "Status and Challenges in the 
Recovery of Hydrocarbons from the Oil Sands of Alberta, Canada," Conference Presentation, Tenth World 
Energy Conference. 19-24 September 1977, in Rl526 vol. 267 file no.5 file.243-14, LAC. 
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be upgraded into synthetic crude oil was known by the mid 191h century, but production 
techniques were limited and extremely expensive. Historically, upgraded bitumen has 
been a crisis fuel, as most significant research and development efforts to establish the 
industry have come in response to shortages of conventional crude oil. World War One 
demonstrated the superiority of internal combustion over steam and livestock as a means 
of power, and its importance to industrialization. 18 Then lacking a significant domestic 
supply of conventional oil, the Alberta government moved to exploit the bitumen 
deposits by funding a research program headed by Karl Clark at the University of 
Alberta. Between 1922 and 1925 Karl Clark discovered that when hot water was added to 
bituminous sand, it caused the bitumen to retract, separate from the sand, and float to the 
surface ofthe water. The sand would sink, and the bitumen could be skimmed from the 
surface. The process was named as the hot water separation process or the aqueous 
recovery process. The technique was first used in the experimental Abasand Oils Plant 
near Fort McMurray between 1930 and 1945.19 
During World War Two, oil cemented its dominance in the conduct of modern 
warfare.2° Following the bombing of Pearl Harbour in December 1941 and the torpedoing 
of two Canadian tankers in February 1942, federal oi l controller George Cotrelle called 
for Abasand to be upgraded to process I 0,000 tons per day from 19,000 tons/year, despite 
unresolved technical problems.21 The federal government moved to improve bitumen 
extraction with a re-evaluation of the Abasand Oils Plant and by requesting the financial 
involvement of the Alberta government. The agreement between the Federal Minister of 
18 Yergin, The Pri::e: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money, and Power. 
19 C hastko, Developing Alberta's Oil Sands: f"''rom Karl Clark to Kyoto, I . 
='
0 Daniel Yergin has argued that oi I determined the outcome of numerous pivotal battles and s ing ly shaped 
the outcome of the six-year confli ct. Yergin, The Pri::e: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money , and Power. 
:' I Chastko, Developing Alberta ·sOil Sands: From Karl Clark to Kyoto, 35. 
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Munitions and Supply C. D. Howe and Alberta Premier William Aberhart, requi red the 
two governments to share risks in the Abasand plant.22 
~ 
Fig ure 4: Unknown photographer, "Abasand Refinery Boiler Plant ( 1942)," image 85-22-008, University of 
Alberta Archives (UAA). Used with permission . 
In re-evaluating the Abasand plant Karl C lark found that the mechanical shovels cou ld 
not dig when the temperature sank below 7° C, because the bits would wear out or break, 
among other technical problems that hampered and frequently stopped productio n.23 The 
federal government pledged $500,000 to rehabilitate the Abasand plant in 1942, and in 
1943 took full contro l, breaking ties with the Alberta Research Counc il. In 1945 the 
Abasand plant burnt to the ground and the federal government abandoned efforts to 
produce o il from bitumen for the next three decades. 
22 Chastko, Developing Alberta 's Oil Sands: From Karl Clark to Kyoto, 43. 
23 Ibid ., 52. 
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Following the departure of the federal government from efforts to produce 
synthetic oil from the Athabasca bitumen deposits at the end of World War Two, the 
Alberta government worked unilaterally to salvage the industry as conventional oil wells 
produced only twelve per cent of Alberta consumption in 1946.24 Construction of the Oil 
Sands Limited Plant commenced in 1946 at Bitumount, jointly financed by the province 
and a $250,000 contribution from private investor Lloyd Champion.25 As the Bitumount 
plant reached completion in 1947, the oil market became flooded with conventional oil 
supplies. Between 1949 and 1972 proven world oil reserves increased from 62 to 534 
billion barrels and no new oil sands plants came online until 1967.26 During the Second 
World War the United States had won significant influence in the Middle East through 
diplomatic pressure and covert operations such as installing the Shah of Iran, and 
succeeded the British as the dominant foreign power in the region, gaining access to the 
world's largest supplies of conventional crude oi1.27 But more significantly, in 1947, 
Imperial Oil struck oil at the Leduc oil field near Edmonton, Alberta, and was pumping 
3500 barrels per day from thirty different wells by the end of that year. In 1948 more oil 
was found at Redwater, and the total reserves of the two fields amounted to more that 900 
million barrels of oil , which created a level of supply security that eliminated the demand 
for synthetic oil.28 Despite the abundance of conventional oil, the Alberta government 
maintained the Bitumount plant as a strategic reserve.29 
24 Chastko, Developing Alberta 's Oil Sands: From Karl Clark to Kyoto, 57. 
25 Ibid., 59. 
26 Yergin, The Pri=e: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money. and Power, 72. 
27 Ibid ., 4 10 . 
28 Breen. Alberta 's Petroleum lndus/ly and the Conservation Board, 245-46. 
29 C hastko, Developing Alberta ·sOil Sands: From Karl Clark to Kyoto, 72. 
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Following the Leduc and Redwater discoveries, conventional oi l production in 
Alberta became a bonanza, with new reserves discovered faster than older reserves 
consumed. Demand was overtaken by supply in 1949 and industry began pushing for a 
Figure 5 : Unknown Photographer, "Bitumount Plant, ( 1949)," image 91-137-172, UAA. Used with 
permission. 
pro-rationing system to salvage plummeting prices. Despite the sma ll scale of the 
Bitumount plant, conventional producers felt threatened by any oi l supply contribution to 
an a lready overflowing market. To protect the experimental project, the A lberta Social 
Credit government led by Premier Ernest Manning passed An Act relating to Statutes 
Affecting Bituminous Sands Operations, on 6 April 1955, w hich exempted the o il sands 
industry from the 1950 Oil and Gas Resources Conservation Act, and thus from the 
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Energy Resources Conservation Board's pro-rationing system.30 The two priorities of the 
board were conservation and equity: to prevent the wasteful exploitation of oil and gas, 
such as preventing the flaring and venting of natural gas by oil producers, and to devise 
mechanisms for the equitable sharing of production. 31 David Breen describes the purpose 
of the ERCB as to ensure the " maximum efficient but equitable production."32 
Commercialization 
The first big investment from a major oi l company from the United States was by 
the Sun Oil Company of Philadelphia. Sun took interest in the oil sands as early as 1951 
at the suggestion of Calgary employee Ned Gilbert, and took a majority position in Great 
Canadian Oil Sands Limited fol lowing the nationalization of the Suez Canal by Egyptian 
President Gamal Abdel Nasser and the subsequent Suez Crisis in 1956. The crisis 
compromised the company's supply security in the Middle East and affirmed the needs of 
major oi l companies to establish a diversity of oi l supply sources amidst the increasingly 
vo latile Cold War. GCOS took over Abasand to develop bituminous sands leases 4 and 
14.33 As GCOS began submitting proposals for a 35,000 bbl./day synthetic oi l plant, the 
company lobbied for tax and royalty reductions to increase the potential profitability of 
the project. In early 1959, GCOS Managing Director T.P. Clarke wrote to Alvin 
Hamilton, federal Minister for Northern Affairs and National Resources seeking 
classification as a mine, which would include a three-year tax holiday, a 33 Y:J% depletion 
allowance, and an exemption from import and sales tax. He wrote that these conditions 
30 Province of Alberta, 1955, Chapter 57, "An Act relating to Statues Affecti ng Bituminous Sands 
Operations," (6 April 1955), RG22 vol. 1334 file 40-3-36 vol. I, LAC. 
31 Breen, Alberta ·s Petroleum Industry and the Conservation Board: xiv. 
32 Ibid ., 537. 
33 Parker, "Athabasca Oil Sands Historical Research Project," xxi. 
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were ·'the on ly basis that makes our project economically feasible.'' 34 Hamilton granted 
approval to change classification and depletion allowance in 1959, but did not agree to 
exempt the project from import and sales taxes, as this concession would have greatly 
reduced potential federal revenue from the construction and operation of the industry. 
Following the 1955 exemption of the oil sands from the ERCB pro-rationing system, the 
tax holiday and depletion allowance granted to GCOS in 1959 marked the second major 
policy shift adopted to bolster the economic viability of synthetic oil production, and 
worked to separate the oil sands from the tax and regulatory environment of the 
conventional oi I industry. 35 
Though the GCOS proposal process went smoothly, the conventional oil supply 
glut worsened, and by 1962, in response to pressures from industry lobbyists, Premier 
Manning threatened to indefinitely suspend synthetic oi l plant approvals . In 1963 the 
ERCB approved the GCOS proposal and construction of the plant started later that year. 
As construction progressed on the GCOS lease, the U.S. oil industry majors Cities 
Service, Imperial Oil, Royalite, and Atlantic-Richfield formed the Syncrude consortium 
in 1966 and began planning a second commercial oi l sands plant. The move by these 
majors to form Syncrude Canada Limited was a response to the depletion of conventional 
supplies in Alberta, global tensions and conflicts associated with the Cold War, and 
increasing demand for oil.36 
34 A depletion a llowance in this case is a tax concess ion to an oil company whose business activities of oil 
extraction reduce the value of its assets. T .P. C larke, Managing Director, GCOS, to Alvi n Ham il ton, federal 
Mi nister for orthern Affairs and ational Resources, 19 February 1959, RG22 vol. 1334 file 40-3-36 vol. 
I , LAC. 
35 T.P. C larke, Manag ing Director, GCOS, to Alvin Hamilton, federal Minister for orthern Affairs and 
ational Resources, 19 February 1959, RG22 vol. 1334 file 40-3-36 vol. I , LAC 
36 Chastko, Developing ,..l lberta ·s Oil Sands: From Karl Clark to Kyoto, 90. 
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The GCOS plant came on line in 1967 as Alberta conventional oil production began 
to decline. GCOS worked one of the richest surface deposits in the Athabasca region. The 
project required the removal of an average twenty metres of overburden by bucket wheel 
extractors supplemented by trucks and front-end loaders. The same machines wou ld then 
excavate the bitumen and transport it to a separation and upgrading faci li ty. The GCOS 
plant was designed to process 6 100 tonnes of bitumen per day, expanding to over 7,000 
tonnes by the end of the 1970s. The GCOS project was capable of mining 80% of the 
bitumen on the lease and separating and recovering 90% of crude bitumen contained in 
the mined sand and effected a 65 weight or 78 volume per cent conversion of the 
recovered bitumen into synthetic crude oi l. The overall result was a recovery in the form 
of synthetic crude oil of about 4 7 weight per cent of bitumen in place. 37 
To extract bitumen, thousands of hectares of land were stripped, dug up and 
boiled. The process emitted huge amounts of atmospheric and watershed contaminants 
that had a significant impact on the immediate area, specifically on the Fort McKay 
community.38 The GCOS plant emitted 3 18 tonnes per day of sulphur dioxide. The hot 
water separation process requi red 10.7 tonnes ofwater per tonne of synthetic crude oil 
production, only 60% of which could be obtained from recyc ling. The process produced a 
massive amount of tailings. The GCOS tai lings pond covered over nine square kilometres 
by the mid-1970s. The GCOS upgrading process used three delayed cokers each 
process ing 4300 tonnes per day of raw bitumen. The approximate liquid coke yield from 
the operation was 70 weight per cent of coker feed, most of which was used as fue l for 
37 C. W. Bowman, Chairman, Alberta Oil Sands Technology and Research Authority, and G. W. Govier, 
Chief Deputy Minister, Department of Energy and Natural Resources, "Status and C ha llenges in the 
Recovery of Hydrocarbons from the Oil Sands of Alberta, Canada," Conference Presentation, Tenth World 
Energy Conference, 19-24 September 1977, in R 1526 vo l. 267 fil e no.5 file.243-14, LAC. 
38 Kurek et a l. , "Legacy o f a Half Century of Athabasca Oil Sands Deve lopment Recorded by Lake 
Ecosystems." 
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steam and power generation. Coker yield products were fractioned to yield naphtha and 
distillate fractions which were then recombined to produce a stable synthetic crude oil. 
The bitumen upgrading process had to be relatively complete to make the product 
economical for long-range travel to market. Further, because of high sulphur, nitrogen, 
vanadium and nickel content, bitumen required extensive desulphurization and 
denitrogenation to be suitable for processing in the existing refineries of available market 
areas. The process was extremely expensive and energy intensive. The deposits were 
often thick and saturated but variable with little transmissibility because of the viscosity 
of bitumen.39 
In the twenty-two years from the burning down of the Abasand plant to the opening 
of the GCOS plant the glut of conventional oil stymied most private interest in synthetic 
o il production though geopolitical realities of g lobal oil supply had impelled investments 
from major U.S. companies. The Alberta and Canadian federal governments had omitted 
the synthetic oil industry from key regulations to increase the economic viability of Oil 
Sands Limited and GCOS in landmark decisions that would reduce the amount of 
revenue that would accrue to governments from future projects. At the close of the 1960s 
the o il boom that had fuelled Alberta since 1947 came to an end. In January 1968 the 
Un ited States discovered the mass ive Prudhoe Bay oil field on Alaska's North S lope. The 
Prudhoe Bay discovery accentuated the dependence of the Alberta economy on oi l 
production by revealing the potentia l for U.S. discoveries of domestic oil to displace 
39 C. W. Bowman, Chairman, Alberta Oi l Sands Techno logy and Research Authority, and G. W. Govier, 
Chief Deputy Minister, Department of Energy and Natural Resources, " Status and Cha llenges in the 
Recovery of Hydrocarbons from the Oil Sands of Alberta, Canada," Conference Presentation, Tenth World 
Energy Conference. 19-24 September 1977, in R 1526 vol. 267 fil e no.5 file.243-14, LAC. 
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imports from Alberta.40 The Prudhoe Bay oil field was initially estimated to contain ten 
billion barrels of oil and 740 billion cubic meters of natural gas, and was producing over 
one million barrels of oil per day by the 1970s.4 1 The decline of Alberta conventional oil 
increased the importance of the successful establishment of the oil sands industry. 
Figure 4 : Unknow n Photographer, "Construction at Great Canadian Oil Sands plant, near Fort McMurray, 
Alberta," (mid-1960s), PA-3672-5, GA. Used with permission. 
By 30 September 1970 the GCOS project, which cost $380 million to build, had a 
deficit of $75.5 million, and claimed losses of $46.5 million from I October 1968 to I 0 
September 1970.42 Armin Hetch of the Edmonton Journal reported from an industry 
.JO Richards and Pratt, Prairie Capitalism: Power and Influence in the New West. : 169. 
4 1 T he Prudhoe Bay o il fie ld is now thought to have tota lled 25 billion barre ls, "Estimated Speculative 
Recoverable Resources of Oil and Natural Gas in Alaska," (State of Alaska: Department of Natura l 
Resources, Division of Geological and Geophysical Surveys, January 1974) . 
.JZ T he figure of$380 million is the tota l cost of building the plant. The breakdown of costs was $256 
million in plant construction, $90 million in pre-production and deve lopment, $3 million in road 
construction to Fort McMurray, $2 million contribution to build a bridge over the Athabasca River, $13 
million in construction of employee housing in Fort McMurray , and $ 16 million to construct a pipeline to 
Edmonton. Harold Rea, Cha irman of the Board and K. F. Heddon, President, GCOS, to The Honourable E. 
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conference in 1967 that the GCOS plant might not exist had it not been classified as a 
mine in 1959: " many speakers noted the project may not have been possible without the 
three year tax holiday ... "43 The plant was running into major technical problems with 
machinery regularly breaking down, rapidly wearing out, and work fo rces turning over 
every two to three months because of the harsh work conditions in north-eastern 
Alberta.44 A key strategy used by GCOS to improve their financial situation was to 
appeal to ministers of both levels of government for royalty reductions, debt erasure, and 
tax remissions and holidays. In response to such pleas, Premier Manning ordered a 
production royalty reduction in 1970 from sixteen to e ight per cent starting I April of that 
year.45 The royalty reduction further reduced government revenue from synthetic o il 
production. For Alberta, economic dependence on oil production and the importance of 
job creation justified continued concessions to the oil sands industry. 
GCOS appealed in 1970 to the federal government for a remission of sales tax paid 
on machinery between 1964 and 1967. GCOS was approved in 1963, and began 
construction in 1964, under the federal government taxation regime established on 13 
June 1963, w hich repealed the application of sales tax exemptions on production 
equipment and building materia ls with an amendment of the Excise Tax Act.46 In June 
1967, however, taxes on production machinery and apparatus were removed. In response 
J. Benson, Minister of Finance, Ottawa, Canada, " Brief of Great Canadian Oi l Sands Limited in respect of 
sales taxes paid under the Excise Tax Act of Canada on its Athabasca Tar Sands plant," 18 November 
1970, RG 19 vol.5235 file 9628- 15-2 vol.l , LAC. 
43 Arm in Hecht, "New O il Sands Policy In Works: $235 Million Project Only Beginning of Development," 
The Edmonton Journal, 2 October 1967,76.356 box . 35 file. 845, PAA. 
44 Chastko, Developing Alberta ·sOil Sands: From Karl Clark to Kyoto, 90. 
45 GCOS was granted a reduction from the gross provincial royalty of 16% of value of produced synthetic 
crude to 8% of the first 900,000 bbl. Of monthly production and 20% ofthe remainder. Canadian 
Petroleum Association to Alastair Gillespie, Minister of Energy, Mines and Resources, government of 
Canada, "An Assessment of Royalty Treatment and Other Factors Impacting O il Sands Development." 
Rl526 vol.267 fi le no.6 file.243- 14, LAC. 
46 G.L. Bennett, Assistant Deputy Minister, Excise, to Mr. J.R. Brown, Sen ior Tax Adviser, Department of 
Finance, 9 December 1970, RG 19 vol.5235 file 9628- 15-2, vol.l , LAC. 
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to this change in taxation, GCOS asked for a remission of sales taxes paid under the 
Excise Tax Act, totalling $8.75 million, primarily based on the argument that because 
their plant was not formally delivered unti l I 0 August 1967, after the tax had been 
removed, they should rece ive a refund.47 GCOS also argued that the government should 
grant the tax remission on economic grounds citing the creation of jobs and benefits to 
Fort McMurray. GCOS Chairman W. H. Rea and President K.F. Heddon wrote to the 
federal Minister of Finance E.J. Benson in November 1970, 
The success of the GCOS project is of vita l importance to the people of 
Fort McMurray. Employment at the GCOS plant now tota ls about 700, 
plus abo ut another 650 who work for contract maintenance and service 
companies ... As a result of the GCOS operation, Fort McMurray has 
become a modern town . .. 48 
The GCOS remission request prompted a convoluted response from policy advisors and 
the minister. A tax remission of$6 million dollars was granted . While the final decision 
for approval was made at the ministerial level, policy advisors maintained that such a tax 
remission was unjustifiable and should not occur. One policy adv isor wrote to Finance 
Minister E. J. Benson, " there seems little legal basis for federal aid in the form of tax 
relief." He cited two previous concessions to GCOS already granted by the federa l 
government: an interest free deferral of payments on the $ 1.8 million Abasand debt, that 
GCOS took on in acquiring thei r lease, until 1978, and the three year tax holiday for 1968 
to 197 1 based on the project' s classification as a mine.49 In spite of sig nificant oppos ition 
47 Department of Finance, " Policy Paper on GCOS Tax Remission," 197 1, RG 19 vo1.5235 fi le 9628-1 5-2 
vol. l , LAC. 
48 W. Harold Rea, Chairman of the Board and K. F. Heddon, President, GCOS, to T he Honourable E. J. 
Benson, Minister of Finance, Ottawa, Canada, "Brief of Great Canadian Oil Sands Limited in respect of 
sales taxes paid under the Excise Tax Act of Canada on its Athabasca Tar Sands plant," 18 Novem ber 
1970, RG 19 vol.5235 file 9628-15-2 vol. l , LAC. 
49 T he Abasand debt was based on an agreement by the company to repurchase for $1.9 million the plant 
and property rights from the federal government in 1946, GCOS took on th is debt with the acquisition of 
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from within the ministries to reject the application, Benson approved the remission in 
-o August 1971 .) 
Financial concessions granted to GCOS in the late 1960s and early 1970s by the 
two levels of government undercut government revenue from oil sands development. 
Government involvement drastically increased through the following decade and would 
influence regulation of the industry. While understandable that governments would be 
willing to lower royalties on a new form of oil , to postpone debt payments on the 
Abasand plant, and grant a tax hol iday, the Finance Minister's legally dubious remission 
of $6 million dollars of sales tax set a new standard in what o il companies could conv ince 
governments to do. GCOS was at that point undoubtedly proving to be uneconomic, yet it 
seems unlike ly that Sun Oil would have turned its back on a $380 million investment so 
soon after starting commercial production. 
Rational planning and the Lougheed Conservatives 1970-71 
Peter Lougheed' s Conservative party came to power on 3 1 August 1971. 
Lougheed was a Calgary lawyer who was determined to revitalize the oil industry. He felt 
that the Social Credit government had acted spine lessly in encouraging resource 
development, that it had been inadequate in drafting po licy, and that it had not acted as an 
owner, despite becoming legal proprietor of natura l resources fo llowing the 1930 Natural 
Resources Transfer Agreement. 51 Before coming to power, Lougheed made a speech in 
the Abasand debt. Department of Finance, "Policy Paper on GCOS Tax Remission," 197 1, RG 19 vol.5235 
fil e 9628- 15-2 vol.l , LAC. 
5
° F.R. Irwin, Director, Personal, Commodity and Estate Tax Division, to J.R. Brown, Senior Tax Advisor, 
Mi nistry of Finance, 21 January 197 1. RG 19 vol.5235 file 9628- 15-2 vol.2, LAC., and F .R. Irwin, to G.L. 
Bennett, Assistant Deputy Minister (Excise), Department of National Revenue, 23 August 197 1. RG 19 
vol.5235 fil e 9628- 15-2 vol.2, LAC. 
51 The NRTA transferred ownership of natural resources from the federal to the provincial domain in 1930. 
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March 1971 to the Alberta Legislature in which he called for a " much higher priority to 
the field of industrial development."52 On taking office Lougheed immediately moved to 
expand the ro le of the province in national policy making, especially relating to energy 
issues. His stance was that " if A lberta poker chips are involved at the poker table, we will 
be at that table. '"53 Lougheed's government changed Alberta from being a passive 
regulator dependent on resource rents, to an aggressive entrepreneurial actor. Richards 
and Pratt wrote that Lougheed felt that the government itself " take the initiative," in 
effect, "giving notice that any Conservative government would consider itself an 
entrepreneurial actor in provinc ial economic development." 54 The corporatization of the 
Lougheed government developed from the Syncrude negotiations duri ng the OPEC crisis, 
and increased over the next decade. 
After be ing e lected, Lougheed's initial approach was one of rational planning. He 
advocated careful control of all aspects of the o il sands industry to maximize domestic 
benefits and minimize risk. In his first throne speech on 29 March 1972, Lougheed spoke 
of the importance of building a second o il sands plant and the importance of government 
investment. But he also expressed the financial implausibility of using a Crown 
corporation to fund the project, describing it as "$500 million of debt not available to the 
province," and compared it to committing to a risk venture, like building a ra ilroad, with 
crown money. 55 
52 Lougheed speech in the A lberta Legislature, March 12, 197 1, Text in provincial Legislative Library, 
Edmonton, in Richards and Pratt, Prairie Capitalism: Power and Influence in the New West. 169. 
53 Peter Lougheed, quoted in Peter Foster, Blue-Eyed Shieks: The Canadian Oil Establishment (Toronto : 
Totem Books, 1979), 47-48. 
54 Richards and Pratt, Prairie Capitalism: Power and Influence in the New West. 2 15-50. 
55 Peter Lougheed, Speech to the Throne, 29 March 1972, Alberta Hansard. 1972. vo1. 18, p.34, provincial 
Archives of Alberta (PAA). 
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Despite rising prices and the increasing pressures of energy security in the Cold 
War world, the oil sands industry remained extremely expensive and high risk. Syncrude 
submitted an amended proposal in 1971 that highlighted several major problems with oil 
sands development. First, as of 1972 only surface mining was possible as research on in-
situ extraction had not yet proved it a viable method. Second, the overhead costs were 
huge. The investment required for the processing of a single daily barrel of synthetic 
crude ranged from $4,000-$5,000, meaning that a plant capable of producing I 00,000-
125,000 bbl./d wou ld cost up to $500 million to build. Third, growing inflation meant 
that estimates of fina l construction, supply and labour costs would be inaccurate. And 
fourth, there were long start-up times, meaning that synthetic oi l wou ld not immediately 
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account for supply shortages.) 
In August 1972, the Alberta Conservation and Utilization Committee prepared a 
confidential policy paper for the Executive Council of the Alberta government. While the 
paper advocated rapidly increased natural resource development, it also emphasized the 
importance of government involvement to shape developments. The Committee 
maintained that the core principle must be that "Alberta should regulate and control the 
Athabasca Tar Sands development for the socio-economic benefit of Albertans."57 It was 
a strategy that envisioned a "much slower rate of development than suggested by forei gn 
markets."58 The approach taken towards the burgeoning oi l sands industry was largely 
informed by the prov ince' s experience with the conventional oil dating back to the 191 Os. 
56 Science Council Report, " Decision Making in the North: Oi l Sands Case Study, November 1974" 
(Vancouver: Canadian Resourcecon Limited, 1974), 22. And National Energy Board, " Potential 
Limitations of Canadian Petroleum Supplies," December 1972, GA CPA Box 44 File 534, in Chastko, 
Developing Alberta 's Oil Sands: From Karl Clark to Kyoto, 146. 
57 Conservation and Utilization Committee, "Fort McMurray Athabasca Tar Sands Development Strategy," 
Po licy Paper prepared for the Executive Council , government of A lberta, Edmonton, Aug ust 1972, 2, in 
RG 19 vol. 5238 fil e 9628-15- 1 pt. I , LAC. 
58 Ibid. 
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Many A lbertans considered the conventional o il boom as a squandered opportunity 
defined by overproduction and price collapse. Pro-rationing came too late, and major 
quantities of cheap exports rapid ly depleted reserves and limited the long term accrual of 
public benefits. Lougheed sought to prevent a repeat of the conventional boom 
experience in the oi l sands by carefully regulating the industry. The Conservation and 
Utilization Committee outlined the s ituation : 
On one hand we can continue the policies of the conventional crude o il 
developments creating tremendous and unregulated growth and 
developments resulting in short term benefits accruing to the Provi nce as 
well as the long term costs aris ing from exported energy, technology, job 
opportunities and environmental damages, in addition to the depletion of 
non-renewable resources ... Conversely we can regulate the orderly 
growth and development of the bituminous tar sands for the ultimate 
benefit of A lberta and Canada in order that Canadian energy techno logy 
will be expanded, A lbertans wi ll find beneficial and satisfying 
employment within its diversified economy, and o ur environment will be 
protected and enhanced for future use .. . But when the magnitude of the 
real, fi scal and manpower requirements and environmental consequences 
are v isualized, it becomes apparent that the latter course of action is 
imperative. 59 
The statement highlights the cross border economic forces that so often shape Canad ian 
resource extraction projects . The Committee wrote, "Alberta is not under any pressure to 
develop synthetic crude oi l from the bituminous tar sands for the purpose of meeting 
either Albertan or Canadian petroleum requirements." It asserted that the main pressure 
to develop the o il sands industry was from external markets, and therefore the long term 
benefits of synthetic o il production could be secured " if, and only if, the development is 
firmly contro lled in a manner wh ich complements and supplements the development 
requirements of A lberta and Canada." Early A lberta policy advocated careful regulation 
59 Conservation and Utilization Committee, " Fort McMurray Athabasca Tar Sands Development Strategy," 
Policy Paper prepared for the Executive Counci l, government of Alberta, Edmonton, August 1972, 2, in 
RG 19 vol. 5238 fil e 9628- 15- 1 pt.l , LAC. 
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of the oil sands industry to break reliance on foreign capital to fund Canadian resource 
extraction projects by limiting foreign investments and maximizing the domestic benefit 
of all aspects ofthe industry.60 
In Alberta in the early 1970s, Lougheed sought to ensure that the oil sands 
industry was developed with as much domestic labour, technology, and synthetic oil 
upgrading and refining facilities as possible to ensure the maximum accrual of economic 
benefits and control over the industry to Alberta. Lougheed saw that the " tar sands offers 
a unique opportun ity to change the historical trend of ever increasing foreign control of 
non-renewable resource development in Canada."61 In seeking to regulate the oi l sands 
industry, Lougheed' s government emerged as a participant within it, which increased 
A lberta' s economic dependence on its successfu l establishment, and ultimately 
compromised the Alberta government' s regulation of the industry. 
OPEC and the rise of corporate government 
The massive oi l price increases during the OPEC crisis created an imperative to 
rapidly produce oi l that challenged Lougheed' s rational planning approach to the oil 
sands industry and changed the Alberta government from acting as a cautious facilitator 
to an aggressive entrepreneurial developer. The OPEC price shocks began in 1970 in 
Libya when Colonel Mu ' ammer Muhammad ai-Gaddafi began raising oil prices after 
taking power in a 1969 coup.62 Other OPEC countries fo llowed and began using the price 
of o il to influence forei gn policy. The three-week long Yom Kippur War and The Arab-
6° Conservation and Util ization Committee, " Fort McMurray Athabasca Tar Sands Development Strategy," 
Po licy Paper prepared for the Executive Council , government of Alberta, Edmonton, August 1972, 2, in 
RG 19 vol. 5238 fil e 9628-15-1 pt. I, LAC. 
6 1 Ibid . 
62 Yergin, The Pri::.e: The Epic Quest f or Oil. Money , and Power: 580. 
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Israeli conflict in October 1973 exacerbated tensions between Western countries and 
OPEC, causing further price increases. The process led to price increases from $3.00 per 
barrel in 1972 to $10.50 in 1974.63 By increasing the price of o il , OPEC created an 
artificial supply crisis in Canada and throughout the Western World. In doing so, the 
crisis changed one of the fundamental premises of the Alberta government's development 
strategy, that the reason for oil sands development would primarily be to profit from 
serving foreign markets, and stimulated oil sands production to ensure domestic oi l 
supply security. The increased price of oil made the very expensive and technologically 
demanding process of producing synthetic crude oil from the Athabasca bitumen deposits 
more economica lly viable, and therefore more appealing to prospective investors. 
Lougheed spoke of the imperative in legislature: " As far as the international financial 
community is concerned, the [GCOS] project, to put it mildly, was a financial setback. 
The second plant [Syncrude] must succeed."64 The technical challenges and supply 
imperative would lead the federal and Alberta governments to take drastic measures to 
ensure the success of the Syncrude project. 
In September 1973, Lougheed signed an initia l agreement with the Syncrude 
Consortium. In a public address he emphas ized the importance of the oi l and gas industry 
to Alberta, and clearly spe lled out the province's dependence on primary resource 
production: 
We can ' t lose sight in Alberta of the fact that our prosperity and our 
growth has been dependent upon the vitality and strength of our two 
primary industries, agriculture and o il and gas . . . The o il and gas industry 
since we've discovered it and are producing it during the 1950s and 1960s 
63 Yergin, The Pri::e: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money, and P01ver, 607-8. 
64 Peter Lougheed, Speech to the Throne, 29 March 1972, Alberta Hansard, 1972, vol. l 8, p.34, PAA. 
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and in these early years in the 1970s have a tremendous amount to do with 
the prosperity of Alberta and Albertans.65 
Lougheed ' s address also revealed the temporal constraints on Alberta to mobilize the oil 
sands industry in light of supply alternatives. He maintained that if the Syncrude project 
did not proceed, " not only are there the lost jobs, but oil sands developments might be set 
back permanently, because there are alternatives, - the Colorado oil shales, nuclear 
energy,- and of course Canadian crude oil backup supply would be weakened 
considerably." Lougheed ma intained that it was a "hard bargain, but a good one" he had 
driven, and that he had established "some pretty tough environmental controls over the 
project to assure that there is adequate reclamation of the surface as the project moves 
along."66 T he Syncrude agreement set the groundwork for the establishment of the 
project, and reflected the new energy security priority of developing the oi l sands 
industry. 
ln response to the more than 300% increase in oil prices by 1974, the federal 
government froze oil prices at the pump to protect consumers, and subsidized the 
difference between import and pump prices. They funded the $3 billion per year oil 
import subsidy by increasing federal taxes on o il companies, by end ing the deduction of 
royalties from taxable income, by ra ising direct taxes to fifty per cent, and by reducing 
the depletion a llowance from thirty per cent to twenty-five per cent.67 This policy angered 
Alberta and created massive tensions between the fede ra l and provincial governments. 
Prime Minister Trudeau sought "Canadian self- suffic iency in oi l and oi l products" before 
6 5 
"Text of Premier Lougheed 's Address Tuesday," The Edmonton Journal, 9 September 1973, RG 19 vol. 
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the end of the decade.68 He worked to re-orient the oi l energy system east-west a long 
nationa l lines, rather than north-south along continental lines. His government created 
Petro-Canada, a national o il company and announced the future construction of an oil 
pipeline to Montreal to reduce dependence on imports. To reduce shortages, Ottawa cut 
exports to the U.S. by ten per cent over the winter of 1974, and created the Foreign 
Investment Review Agency (FIRA) and expanded the Canadian Development 
Corporation (C DC) to monitor U.S. investment in the Canadian oil industry. Trudeau also 
announced renewed federal commitment to the o il sands industry with a $40 mill ion 
investment.69 
The price freezes were devastating for GCOS and Syncrude, and inflation raised 
the projected capital costs of Syncrude from $650 million at the end of 1972 to $ 1 billion 
in 1973.7° Chastko writes that the requirement for the o il industry to adhere to the C DC 
and FIRA, "represented a slap in the faces of the multinational oil companies like Sun Oil 
who had invested much time, energy, and money in the oil sands."71 Lougheed described 
it as " the most discriminatory action taken by a federal government against a particular 
province in the entire history of confederation," and introduced new legislation, 
unilaterally declaring that royalty rates would rise with the price of oil.72 Chastko argues 
that the industry was not happy about Lougheed' s royalty reforms but that w ith the 
creation of Petro-Canada, Pierre Trudeau "drove the industry and province into the arms 
68 Prime Minister Pie rre Elliot T rudeau, in Canada Hansard December 7, 1974, I 51 session, 29'h Parliament, 
8479, In Chastko, Developing Alberta 's Oil Sands: From Karl Clark to Kyoto, 152. 
69 C hastko, Developing Alberta ·sOil Sands: From Karl Clark to Kyoto, 152. 
70 Science Council Report, " Decision Making in the North: O il Sands Case Study, November 1974" 
(Vancouver: Canad ian Resourcecon Limited, 1974), 22. And National Energy Board, " Potential 
Limitations of Canadian Petroleum Supplies," December 1972, GA C PA Box 44 File 534, in ibid., 146. 
71 Ibid ., 154. 
72 Premier Peter Lougheed, in Alberta Hansard, 1'1 Session, 29'11 Parliament, vol. 2, 7239. In ibid ., 155 . 
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of one another.''73 In Alberta, the industry that Lougheed had sought to c losely regulate 
and control became a closer ally than the federal government. Alberta's anger towards the 
federal government and budding intimacy with the U.S. oi l industry would in future 
ensure the continental, rather than national, orientation of the oi l sands industry. 
Trudeau's nationalization efforts polarized Canada and infuriated Albertans to the point 
where they launched the " Let the Eastern Bastards Freeze In the Dark!" bumper sticker 
campaign, a bold manifestation of federal-provincial and east-west rivalries. Lougheed 
invested further in the success of development, creating the Energy Breakthrough Project 
budgeted at $ 100 million and the Alberta Oil Sands Technology and Research Authority 
(AOSTRA), a crown corporation funded by the province that operated collaboratively 
with industry to promote the development oftechnology.74 
On 4 December 1974 Atlantic Richfield Canada (ARCAN) withdrew its 30% 
equity from the Syncrude consortium because its investments in Prudhoe Bay, a long with 
reductions of exports and ri s ing costs, inhibited its ab ility to support the A lberta synthetic 
oil project.75 The withdrawal pushed both governments into a corner. The pressures of 
rising fuel prices and energy security at the national level , and the threat to survival of the 
main hope for the oil sands industry at the provincial level impelled major investments 
from Canadian governments to bail out the Syncrude project. Previously on the margin of 
the oil industry, synthetic o il was again moved by crisis to the forefront of Canadian 
energy strategy. T he OPEC price shocks accelerated the Syncrude project and 
73 Chastko, Developing Alberta 's Oil Sands: From Karl Clark to Kyoto, 156. 
74 Alberta Department of federal and Intergovernmental Affairs, "The A lberta Oil Sands Story" (Edmonton: 
government Printer, 1974). 
75 Don R. Getty, Alberta Minister of Energy and atura l Resources, toW. A. Posehn, 30 May 1975, 
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marginalized regulatory details as oil supply security quickly trumped a ll e lse through the 
1970s. 
The withdrawal of ARCAN crippled the Syncrude project and prompted the 
Alberta government to canvass all Canadian provincial governments for investment, 
seeking a minimum 5% equity position. All provinces other than Ontario turned down the 
offer citing a lack of finances or a distrust of the project' s v iab ility.76 Following the 
negotiation of a memorandum of agreement in Winnipeg, Manitoba on 3 February 1975, 
the federal government invested in the estimated $2 billion project at 15% ($300 million), 
the government of Albe1ta at I 0% ($200 million), and the province of Ontario at 5% 
($1 00 million). The agreement freed Syncrude from any potential pro-rationing, and 
guaranteed international prices and access to markets. The government of Alberta also 
loaned Canada-Cities (Cities Service) and Gulf Canada $100 million each, and under 
paragraph (e) of clause 2 agreed to provide a ll infrastructure and financ ing of the 
Athabasca River Bridge up to $7.8 million.77 Alberta also agreed to complete ownership 
and operation of the Syncrude Utilities Plant by the Alberta Energy and Utilities 
Company. The Uti lities Plant was a 160 MW combined cycle steam gas fired generator 
that cost $225 million . Through equity, loans and infrastructure, the Alberta government 
initially invested over $537 mil lion in the Syncrude project. 
The Winnipeg agreement establ ished Syncrude Canada Ltd as the corporate shell 
to operate the lands and faci lities of leases No. 17 and No. 22, w ith a ll operating profits 
and losses managed by partner shareho lders. The signing of the Winnipeg Agreement 
76 Correspondence between the Alberta government and other Canadian provincia l governments, in 82 .1 65 
vol. 48 pt. I , PAA. 
77 Syncrude Proj ect, Winnipeg Agreement. Winnipeg Manitoba, 3 February 1975 , 82. 165 vol. 49 fi le 440, 
PAA 
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was met with widespread support in Alberta, and even Social Credit Opposition Leader 
Bob Clark commended the agreement. 78 The Winnipeg agreement financially committed 
the three governments, and especially the government of Alberta, to the success of the oil 
sands industry, as its 36% royalty was calculated on net profits.79 
Figure 7: Unknown Photographer, "Construction of the Syncrude plant," Alberta (Winter 1976), 35mm 
negative, Imperia l Oil Archives, IP 65, GA. Used w ith permission. 
Federal Energy Minister Donald Mac Donald touted the Winnipeg agreement as a 
success, stating "the surviva l of the troubled Syncrude project is, indeed, a milestone in 
the development of Canadian energy po lic ies. It made it possible for us to keep our 
options open by maintaining access to one of the world ' s richest o il deposits, the tar 
78 Bob Clark, Leader of the Opposition, government of A lberta, Alberta Hansard, 4 February 1975, 32 1. 
79 Net profit = gross revenue - operating costs, depreciation, and deemed interest expense. Canadian 
Petroleum Association to Alastair G illespie, Minister of Energy, Mines and Resources, government of 
Canada, "An Assessment of Royalty Treatment and Other Factors Impacting Oi l Sands Development." 
R 1526 vol.267 fi le no.6 file.243-1 4, LAC. 
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sands." 8° For Alberta, the Syncrude equity was a high-risk investment that invo lved the 
expenditure of significant public finances that would not be recovered if the project were 
to fail , that compromised cautious regulation of the environmental dimensions of the o il 
sands industry. Without investments, government would not be required to account for 
money spent, and would therefore be in a less committed position. 
Immediately on coming to power, the Lougheed government sought to maximize 
resource rents. The combination of rising prices, royalties and new exploration, raised o i I 
revenues from $5 I 6 million in 1973 to $2 .7 billion in 1977. The Alberta government 
formed the Alberta Heritage Savings Trust Fund in May 1976 with an initia l investment 
of $1.5 billion with an annual investment of 30% of the province's non-renewable 
resource revenues. In the first few years of the fund, the province's major investments 
were the Syncrude project, research investments in new oil sands extraction techno logies, 
creation of the Alberta Energy Company, irrigation infrastructure, the Alberta Housing 
Corporation, and medical research facilities. Lougheed also created the Oil Sands Study 
Group to consult with industry and guide provincial policy. The Heritage Fund was 
established by cabinet, in a government that Richards and Pratt argue was " run like a 
centralized business, with cabinet functioning as a board of directors." 81 The Alberta 
Energy Company was a collaboration between public and private interests, w ith 50% of 
its shares held by the provincial government and 50% he ld by private investors, for the 
purpose of direct participation in Syncrude and other natural gas projects. Lougheed 
wrote to a c itizen, David Mitchell , that his v ision was to introduce "substantia l direct 
citizen ownership" that would " provide added stimulus and accountability for resu lts that 
80 Statement to the Press, by Dona ld MacDonald, 27 February 1975 , in RG 19 vol.6693 file 4445- 15 pt.6, 
LAC. 
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are inherent in the private system."82 To get direct citizen ownership Albertans were sold 
AEC shares in November 1975, and within two weeks all 7.5 million ten-dollar shares 
had been sold.83 
Construction commenced on the Syncrude project in early 1976 and the plant was 
operational by 1978. The Syncrude plant used draglines in conjunction with bucket 
wheels to strip overburden and mine the deposit and processed 17,000 tonnes of bitumen 
per day. The Syncrude plant was marginally more effic ient than the GCOS plant, but 
neither plant could recover marketable liquid hydrocarbon products greatly exceeding 
60% of the total energy input, that is, of energy contained in all mined o il sand and in 
supplementary o il and natural gas supplies to the operation.84 The Syncrude project 
required a 28 square kilometre tailings pond over its life. The upgrader used two I 0,300 
tonne per day fluid cokers, designed to be a ten per cent improvement over the GCOS 
coker.85 
The Iranian Revolution and the National Energy Program 
Crisis again boosted the o il sands industry in 1978. The Iranian Revolution broke 
out w hen the U.S. backed Shah Reza Pahlavi was overthrown by Ayato llah Ruhollah 
Khomeini and the price of o il increased from $14 to $34 U.S. per barrel. High prices and 
feared supply shortages proved again the power of oi l markets to shape the Alberta 
82 Peter Lougheed to David Mitchell , October 9, 1974, in ibid. 
83 Chastko, Developing Alberta 's Oil Sands: From Karl Clark to Kyoto, 160. 
84 C. W. Bowman, Chairman, Alberta Oil Sands Techno logy and Research Authority, and G. W. Govier, 
Chief Deputy M inister, Department of Energy and Natural Resources, " Status and C hallenges in the 
Recovery of Hydrocarbons from the Oi l Sands of Alberta, Canada," Conference Presentation, Tenth World 
Energy Conference, 19-24 September 1977, in R I 526 vo l. 267 fil e no.5 fi le.243- 14, LAC. 
85 C. W. Bowman, Chairman, Alberta Oi l Sands Technology and Research Authority, and G . W. Govier, 
Chief Deputy Minister, Department of Energy and Natural Resources, " Status and Challenges in the 
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63 
synthetic oi l industry. Tensions raged between Edmonton and Ottawa, and the U.S. 
majors including Shell , Imperia l, and Gulf, began planning new oi l sands projects.86 
Though Trudeau ' s energy policies were briefly threatened during the short-l ived 
government of Progressive Conservative Prime M inister Joe Clark from June t 979 -
March t 980, Trudeau promptly returned to office and appointed Marc Lalonde as Energy 
Minister. Trudeau worked quickly to tower prices to what he catted a " made in Canada" 
price that was significantly tower than the world price, which fluctuated around $20 U.S. 
per barrel at that time. This enraged oil sands producers and the Alberta government, as 
oil sands production, when the technical difficulties were factored in, cost $30 per barrel 
in I 979.87 
Figure 5: Alan Orl ing, "Bucket rec laimer (fu ll view ) at Sy ncrude Facility in Alberta, Canada. Oil Sands 
operation," (Winter 1978), Large-format negative, Imperial Oil Archives, 82-1 020/002 (06), GA. Used 
with permission. 
86 Chastko, Developing rllberta 's Oil Sands: From Karl Clark to Kyoto: 168. 
87 1bid., 168. 
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Following the price increases and conventional supply shortages that came with 
the Iranian Revolution, oil sands projects became much more profitable and appealing to 
investors. The GCOS - Sun Oil merger formed Suncor in 1978, and after expanding its 
operations in 1979, Suncor claimed $259 million in profits in 1980.88 A policy brief in 
the federal finance ministry expressed that "continued access to international prices 
would yield substantial benefits to the company which significantly exceed those 
envisaged at the time the agreement was put in place."89 By late 1979, seventeen of the 
twenty-five largest oil and gas producers in Canada, accounting for 75% of production, 
were foreign owned and controlled. The finance ministry reported that this amounted to 
$3.7 billion dollars in capital outtlow.9° For the Trudeau government, the combination of 
major foreign ownership in the oil and gas industry, the near exclusive accrual of 
resource rents to provincial coffers, the rising price of oil , the rising cost of increasing oil 
imports, and general global threats to national supply prompted the creation of the 
National Energy Program shortly after returning to power in 1980.91 
In the introduction to the NEP, Lalonde stated that " In Canada, one provincial 
government- not all, and the national government- enjoys most of the windfalls under 
current policies," and that "these policies are no longer compatible with the national 
interest."92 T he N EP set out to achieve supply security and independence from the world 
market, and to generate national, rather than exclusive provincial , public benefit by 
88 
"Sunco r Profit," Ft. McMurray Express, 8 April 1980, Alsands Press Clippings, GA . 
89 Department of Finance "Suncor - Policy Brief," 6 November 1980, in RG 19 vol. 6004 file 4462-8-4 
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90 Department of Finance, Draft NEP brief, in RG 19 vol. 6004 fil e 4462-8-4 (fp.l ), LAC. 
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government by Bob Rae . And Marc Lalonde, "The Nationa l Energy Program," ed. Department of Energy 
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drawing greater federal revenue and creating incentives for Canadian exploration 
companies. Bruce Doern and Glen Toner argue that Lalonde crafted the NEP " to alter the 
structure of power between Ottawa and forei gn-owned energy interests in particular, and 
between Ottawa and Alberta."93 The NEP was essentially a high stakes bet on increasing 
oi l supply shortages and continually increasing prices through the 1990s. In a March 
20 12 interview, Marc Lalonde explained the certainty with which he perceived the 
increasing price of oil as a sound basis on which to build the NEP: 
If the price of o il and gas had continued accord ing to our expectations and 
forecasts, and these were not " pie-in-the-sky" forecasts, l remember the 
president of Occidental Petroleum talking about l 00 do llar o il by 1986, 
and he was not considered a fool, and I remember the economic council of 
Canada saying ' what is the government going to do with all that money 
that it will be getting?' So, everybody more or less expected a rapid 
escalation of prices, which didn ' t take place.94 
The program was enacted through massive intervention in Canada's economy by the 
increase of federal taxes to exert greater federal contro l over oil production, the 
elimination of depletion a llowances, the creation of the Consumer Price Index (CPI), 
Petroleum Incentive Payments (PIPs), and the granting to Petro-Canada the "back-in" 
clause that would give them an automatic 25% ownership stake in every new oi l 
9' development. ) 
It is difficult to overstate the po larizing effect of the N EP in Alberta. Chastko 
quotes an article from The Calgary Herald, which opined that the NEP was " incredibly 
93 G. Bruce Doern and G len B. Toner, The Politics of Energy: The Development and Implementation of the 
NEP (Methuen, 1985). 433. For broader analysis of the NEP see G. C. Watkins and M.A. Walker, ed . 
Reaction: The National Energy Program (Vancouver: Fraser Institute, 198 1 ), and Larry Pratt " Petro-
Canada" Privati::.ation. Public Policy and Public Corporations in Canada, ed. Allan Tupper and G. Bruce 
Doern (Hali fax: The Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1988). 
94 T he impact of the NEP is an incredibly controversial topic in A lberta. I sought an interview from Peter 
Lougheed, but my request was denied because of his decl ining health, and he passed away in September 
20 12. Marc Lalonde, Interview with Author, March 201 2. 
95 Lalonde, "The National Energy Program," 16-22. 
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lofty and patronizing for a government document in a democratic country."96 The TSE oil 
and gas index dropped over 800 points marking approximately $2.3 billion in capital 
flight. The announcement of the NEP resulted in diplomatic pressure from the U.S. and 
the threat of a capital strike from industry. 97 On 5 November L 980, William Daniel, 
President and CEO of Shell Canada Ltd, told the Edmonton Chamber of Commerce, " the 
announced new federal policies will require wrenching adjustments within the industry 
which I believe will seriously impair our hopes of developing the volume of new supply 
that will enable us to attain oil self-sufficiency in the foreseeable future."98 For Suncor, 
the response was even more negative, as spokesman R.A. Hennigar stated, the NEP 
"returns our oil sands operation to a marginal proposition and appears to run counter to 
National Policy goals."99 fn the United States, the federal government ind icated serious 
concern about the 25% Crown interest in all oil rights on Canada lands. The U.S. 
government wrote in a policy statement, "The implementation of this aspect of the 
Program will be viewed by the United States government in the context of international 
law and United States policy on expropriation." 100 A subcommittee of the Committee on 
Energy and Commerce reported that 
In the near term, one effect of the proposed NEP has been that U.S. 
companies have drastically lowered their exploration budgets in Canada. 
This will almost certainly reduce Canadian petroleum production in the 
years to come and, if world supplies again tighten, the absence of some 
96 Editorial , "The National Energy Program," The Calgary Herald, October 29, 1980, A20. In Chastko, 
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97 J.C. Philips, Cha irman of the Boards, Gulf Canada Limited, to Pierre Elliott Trudeau, 5 December 1980, 
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increment of Canadian production would tend to place upward pressure on 
. 101 pnces. 
Philip Wood, Executive Vice President, Finance and Administration, of Cities Service, 
speaking to the U.S. Congressional committee on Energy and Commerce referred to the 
NEP as a xenophobic piece of legislation that allowed Canada to expropriate U.S. energy 
firms. 102 The NEP had a profound impact on the oil and gas industry during the year it 
took to work out an agreement between the federal government and Alberta. Lalonde 
described it in this manner: " In a way the Industry was caught in a sandwich between the 
federal and provincial government for a year until we made a new deal , and no doubt the 
industry suffered at that time." 103 The NEP was an unprecedented intervention in any 
Canadian resource industry. Lougheed responded by announcing a fifteen per cent supply 
cut to the rest of Canada. 
In under a year, a Memorandum of Agreement was signed between the federal 
government and the government of Alberta on l September 1981 , which included a 
modification of PIPs to give Alberta greater control declared, 
The government of Alberta and the government of Canada believe that the 
combination of royalties and taxes described in this Agreement, coupled 
with the new Oil Reference Price for the products from the two projects, 
will generate adequate rates of return on investment for the large Canadian 
or forei gn companies participating in the Alsands and Cold Lake 
. 104 prOJeCtS . .. 
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The agreement became widely known as the ' Champagne Agreement' after a photo of 
Trudeau and Lougheed toasting champagne to the signing of the MOA was widely 
circulated in Canadian newspapers. Although Lougheed later said that allowing this 
photo to be taken was one of the worst mistakes of his political career, the agreement was 
a diplomatic success that may have had the potential to ease east-west tensions that 
dominated much of Canadian politics in the 1970s. 
The potentia l success of the N EP, and the mutual ly beneficial terms of the 
Champagne Agreement rested entirely on continuing long-term o il price increases. Marc 
Lalonde asserted that " if that forecast had material ized, I think everybody would have 
been happy, Mr. Lougheed would have been happy, with his increasing one third coming 
in, and the industry would have been wealthier than ever with its own one third which 
would be coming in from higher prices ... " 105 In September 1980, shortly after the signing 
of the Champagne Agreement, the Iran-Iraq war began, and non-OPEC producers moved 
to se ll below world prices. Demand for OPEC oil dropped twenty-seven per cent, and, in 
1982, g lobal oi l prices collapsed. In Canada, dwindling conventional supplies meant that 
creating domestic supply security was dependent on a synthetic oi l industry that was 
again sub-economic, or on imports that were becoming cheaper. Paul Chastko presents a 
view that is common in Alberta that the "N EP gutted the Alberta oil patch and severely 
jeopardized the country's future . .. " and resulted in a "counter-cyclical swing ... " that 
deprived the o il patch of"revenues necessary to sustain growth and expans ion, 
particularly in the oil sands." 106 The NEP prompted significant capital fli ght that 
threatened exploration and new projects, but the GCOS and Syncrude plants were sunk 
105 Marc Lalonde, Interview w ith Author, March 20 12. 
106 Chastko, Developing Alberta ·sOil Sands. From Karl Clark to Kyoto, 128. 
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costs for their investors and were not as compromised by the NEP price freezes as they 
were by world price collapse in 1982. The impact of the NEP, though not to be 
underestimated, must be separated from the impact of falling world prices to accurately 
assess the stagnation of the oil sands industry in the 1980s. 
By 1982 the multibillion-dollar Alsands project was on the rocks. Modelled 
similarly to Syncrude, Alsands was a consortium-funded project to strip-mine a bitumen 
deposit on the east side of the Athabasca River across from Fort McKay. By 1982, five 
companies representing a 50% interest in the Alsands consortium withdrew from the 
increasingly risky project. 107 Peter Foster reported in Canadian Business magazine in 
April 1982 that "as a direct result of the OPEC glut, a number of oil companies have been 
hoisted on their own free-enterprise petards ... The risks particular to energy projects are 
already apparent and they are proving daunting to many lenders." 108 As a last ditch effort, 
the government of Alberta and the federal government each took a 25% equity stake in 
the Alsands consortium, in an investment estimated to be worth $14 billion. 109 On 30 
April 1982, the Alsands partnership collapsed and the project was cancelled. 110 The 
co llapse of global oil prices and the failure of the Alsands project demonstrated the power 
of o il prices to influence human designs on the Athabasca bitumen deposits, and the 
inability of individual governments to skew the forces of international oil markets. 
107 
"Lalonde Clarifies Position of Alsands; Officials Meet In Edmonton," Daily Oil Bulletin, 26 February 
1982, in Alsands Press C lippings M-6328 Box. I, GA. 
108 Peter Foster, "Risks: unknown, This big question in energy financing isn' t who's got the money . It ' s 
who will assume the risks that seem to be getting steeper by the day," Canadian Business, April 1982, 
Alsands Press C lippings M-6328 Box. 3, GA. 
109 
"governments offer to take 25% each of Alsands," Daily Oil Bulletin, 30 April 1982, and David Hatter 
and Yvonne Zacharias, "$ 14-billion rescue bid: Alsands tossed a lifeline," Calgary Herald, 30 April 1982, 
in Alsands Press C lippings M-6328 Box. 3, GA . 
11 0 Peter Foster, The Sorcerer ·s Apprentices: Canada ·s Super-Bureaucrats and the Energy Mess (Canada: 
Harper Collins, 1982), 200-0 I. 
70 
Following the collapse of oil prices in 1982, the strip-mining of the Athabasca 
bitumen deposits stagnated with no new projects moving ahead until the late 1990s. The 
CanStar project was abandoned later in the decade as world oil prices dropped from 
$31.75 per barrel in November 1985 to $10 per barrel in early 1986. 111 In 1987, despite 
higher production, fewer technical problems and lower costs, Syncrude reported 
substantially lower revenue because of low prices. In 1984, amidst the political fallout 
from the NEP, Trudeau was defeated and Brian Mulroney's Conservative Party formed 
government. In Alberta, Peter Lougheed stepped down in 1985. On taking power, 
Mulroney worked quickly to reverse Trudeau's energy program. Canada ratified the 
Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement (CUFTA) in 1988, e liminating any future 
possibility of protectionist energy policies. T he signing of the CUFTA essentially 
achieved the exact opposite of the intent of the NEP. The NEP had sought to o rient the 
geography of the Canadian energy system a long an east-west axis to serve national 
markets, with more participation by Canadian companies and the building of the 
Montreal Pipeline. With CUFTA, and the greater intimacy of the o il and gas industry 
with the Alberta government following reaction to the NEP, the removal of trade barriers 
guaranteed that Alberta synthetic oi l would primarily flow over the U.S. border. 11 2 
Conclusion 
During the first development phase of the o il sands industry between 1967 and 
1982, the Alberta synthetic o il industry came to prominence as a crisis fuel funded 
largely by investments from the United States o il industry. In the early 1970s, the newly 
111 Yergin, The Pri:e.· The Epic Quest f or Oil, Money. and Power, 749-50 
112 Chastko, Developing Alberta 's Oil Sands: From Karl Clark to Kyoto, 180. 
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elected Lougheed government pursued a policy of rational planning to ensure maximum 
accrual of socio-economic benefits to Albertans from oil sands development and 
minimize socia l and environmental impacts by regulating the investments of foreign 
companies. With the OPEC crisis, the stakes changed as domestic energy security 
emerged as the new governing factor in the planning of oil sands projects. In response, 
the Alberta government began to participate in the industry by investing to save the 
Syncrude project. In doing so, Alberta emerged as an investor in the o il sands industry, 
becoming an aggressive entrepreneurial actor that worked to profitably develop the 
Athabasca bitumen deposits. The commitment of the Alberta government to oi l 
production produced a degree of regulatory capture by the mid-1970s that marginalized 
effective regulation ofthe environmental impacts of the industry. Following even greater 
price increases by the late 1970s, the federal government intervened in the Alberta oi l 
industry to protect Canadian consumers and to balance the accrual of resource rents, 
while investing in the success of the oil sands industry to try to achieve energy 
independence. 113 The resulting National Energy Program enacted in 1980 was an 
unprecedented attempt to regulate a Canadian resource industry that increased the cost of 
explo ration and new o il developments. The oil price collapse in 1982 led to the fa ilure of 
the A I sands project, the defeat of the Trudeau government and the stagnation of the o il 
sands industry, though the Syncrude and Suncor plants continued to operate. 
113 Though with urani um and the CCF's approach to northern resource development significant levels of 
national control were also apparent. Q uiring, CCF Colonialism in Northern SaskatcheJVan: Battling Parish 
Priests. Bootleggers. and Fur Sharks, Peter C. VanWyck, The High1vay of the Atom (Montreal: MeG ill-
Queen's University Press, 20 I 0), Keeling, "'Born in an atomic test tube': landscapes of cyc lonic 
development at Uranium City, Saskatchewan," and Piper, The Industrial Transf ormation ofSubarctic 
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CHAPTER TWO 
Development, Regulation, and Environmental Change in the Athabasca Oil Sands 
Region 
The oil sands industry had significant and increasing adverse ecological impacts 
on the Athabasca oi l sands region from construction, mining, the rapid increase in 
population, and from air and water pollution. Between 1970 and 1971 the Social Credit 
government took steps to establish environmental policies and regulations in Alberta, 
such as becoming the first provincial government to establish a Department of 
Environment in 1971. The Lougheed Conservatives initially maintained this approach, 
following a strategy of cautious development, establishing environmental policies and 
regulations, and beginning environmental research on the region and the impacts of oi l 
sands projects to ensure that Alberta received maximum benefits and minimal negative 
impacts from the oil sands industry. As the OPEC crisis emerged and produced an oi l 
development imperative in Alberta and Canada, the Alberta government' s focus on 
environmental regulation was sidelined by the mid-1970s. Once the Alberta government 
took equity in Syncrude in 1975, and made major investments in industry infrastructure, 
it became saddled with conflicting mandates as both developer and regulator of the 
resource. The Syncrude equity put the government of Alberta in a potential conflict of 
interest position that may have negatively impacted regulation of the industry and 
government commitments to environmental research. The marginalization of 
environmental regulation socialized the environmental risks and impacts of the oil sands 
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industry and had drastic consequences for ecosystems and Indigenous communities in the 
oil sands region. 
Government correspondence dating to the late 1950s indicates federal and 
provincial scientific concern for the environmental impacts of the oil sands industry. On I 
April 1959 D. S. Montgomery, a senior scientist in the federal Department of Mines and 
Technical Surveys wrote to Dr. P. A. Koller in the economic division of the Department 
ofNorthern Affairs and National Resources expressing concern with technical problems 
but also with the lack of environmental planning in the GCOS proposal. He wrote that 
"very little has been said beyond merely mentioning the waste disposal systems to ensure 
the preservation of aquatic life in the Athabasca river, a factor of prime concern to the 
Department ofNorthern Affairs." 1 By early 1960, Dr. Koller was a lso aware of the intent 
of GCOS to produce 25 ,000 pounds per hour of sulphur dioxide, and that these emissions 
would have "a devastating effect on the vegetation in the whole area," and that the 
" resulting sand dunes would present a considerable danger to surrounding areas in that 
region." Dr. Ko ller w rote that while GCOS had said that they had an agreement with 
Alberta health authorities, "an Inquiry by the Conservation Board, however, indicated 
that these health authorities have not heard anything from the Great Canadian Oil Sands 
Limited."2 The primary concern was with the dubious logistics of the GCOS project, and 
with the potential environmental impacts on the region. It is unclear from this file what 
broader interest Northern Affairs and National Resources had in the potential 
env ironmental impacts of the o il sands industry. 
1 D. S. Montgomery, Department of Mines and Technical Surveys to Dr. P. A. Kol ler, Department of 
Northern Affairs and National Resources, I April 1959, in RG22 vol. 1334 file 40-3-36 vol. I, LAC. 
2 Dr. P. A. Koller to Dr. Jennes, Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources, 23 June 1960, in 
RG22 val. 1334 file 40-3-36 val. I , LAC. 
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Prior to the environmental movements of the 1970s and the creation of 
environmental agencies at federal and provincial levels, environmental protection 
concerns pertaining to oil sands development were mainly couched in terms of protecting 
waterfowl under the 1916 Migratory Birds Convention Act as well as concern for 
National Parks, and game regulations at the federal level.3 At the provincial level, 
environmental monitoring and regulation was conducted by the Department of Health. A 
letter from Deputy Minister of Northern Affairs and National Resources E. A. Cote to 
GCOS President W. H. Rea regarding water safety in synthetic oil production cited the 
potential impacts on birds. Referring to the 1916 Migratory Birds Convention Act with 
the United States, Cote wrote, "The many species of migratory birds are of interest and 
use to farmers, naturalists, hunters and, indeed increasing numbers of Canadians of all 
populations." The letter emphasized that "tens of thousands of ducks and geese and 
thousands of whistling swans" use the water areas of the Peace-Athabasca at the west end 
of Lake Athabasca as a regular stopping point on spring and fall migrations. He 
recommended that water be treated as much as possible before being released into the 
watershed, and that the Canadian government "will be most appreciative of any spec ial 
precautions you may be able to arrange that would minimize the chances of release of 
oil. ''4 Rea responded to Cote with a guarantee, "you can be sure that our Company will 
co-operate in every way with you to avoid injury to the Wildlife of our country."5 Early 
3 Conservation sensibilities have been traced back to the Thirteen Colon ies. Richard William Judd, The 
Untilled Garden: Natural History and the Spirit of Conservation in America (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009), Richard William Judd, Common Lands, Common People: The Origins of 
Conservation in Northern NeJV England (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1997), and 
Tina Loo, Stales ofNature: Conserving Canada's Wildlife in the TIVenlieth Centu1y (Vancouver: UBC 
Press, 2006). 
4 E. A. Cote, Deputy Minister of Northern Affairs and National Resources toW. J . Rea, President, GCOS, 
12 November 1965, in RG22 vol. 1334 file 40-3-36 vol. I , LAC. 
5 W.J. Rea to E. A. Cote, 22 Novem ber 1965 , in RG22 vol. 1334 file 40-3-36 vo l. I, LAC. 
75 
the next year GCOS again wrote Cote to assure that "we have incorporated extensive 
facilities in our plant fo r containment of waste components, both of a routine and an 
accidental nature, to avoid any adverse effects on migratory wildlife."6 The Department 
ofNorthern Affairs and National Resources were fulfilling due diligence under the 
MBCA, but their efforts did not mention the people who lived, and continue to live, on or 
near the Athabasca bitumen deposits, and historically relied on the air, water, birds, fish, 
animals, vegetation and general environmental well being of the reg ion for survival. 
In early 1968 reports of an oil spill prompted inquiry from Northern Affairs to 
GCOS. Arthur Laing, Minister of Indian Affairs and N orthern Deve lopment, wrote to 
Rea, citing the 1965 letter from Cote and the 1966 guarantee from T hayer, expressing 
concern about reports of extensive seepage of o il into the Athabasca River from the 
RCM P and Dr. J. D. Ross, Alberta Minister of Health. He wrote that the government was 
aware that "o il , phenols and arsenic are escaping from the "scavenger cells" (secondary 
retaining ponds designed as backup), from a retaining pond with a broken earthen dyke, 
and from a seventy-acre dry wash that has been flooded with heavy crude o il." 7 With 
slight mention of "other renewable natura l resources," Laing cited the importance of the 
Migratory Birds Convention Act in emphasizing cleanup and the prevention of future 
incidents. K.F. Heddon from GCOS wrote to Jean Chretien, Minister of Indian Affairs 
and Northern Development, on 23 September 1968 describing the o il spill , 
During the night ofNovember 30, 1967, with temperatures of -20°F, we 
experienced a complete failure of our steam and power plant with no 
advance warning of any type. A ll e lectric lights, power, steam, etc., fai led 
at our refinery processing units. Plant personne l were working in the dark 
endeavouring to avert process and equipment failures and, obviously, w ith 
6 C. Thayer, President, GCOS to E. A. Cote, 20 January 1966, in RG22 vol. 1334 fil e 40-3-36 vol. I, LAC. 
7 Arthur Liang toW. J. Rea, 13 May 1968, in RG22 vol. 1334 file 40-3-36 vol. I, LAC. 
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an emergency of this magnitude, were unable to cover simultaneously all 
the problems that arose under this type of circumstance.8 
Heddon continued, explaining the magnitude of the failure and the unstoppable power of 
the discharge: 
Under these conditions major quantities of gas and petroleum liqu ids may 
be released to the emergency blow-drum and flare system. The gas 
streams are burned off safely and the liquids are collected in the knock-out 
drum and are recovered via the plant sewer and oil recovery fac ilities. 
However, in this instance, the drainage facilities from the knock-out drum 
were inadequate to handle the quantities of water and oil that were 
discharged. The excess oil and water flooded a low-lying area adjacent to 
the plant, overflowed across a plant road, and escaped under the snow 
blanket into an adj o ining forest and muskeg area. Due to the contour of 
the land and heavy snow covering, it was not apparent that oil extended in 
significant amounts into this area. 9 
As the spill was essentially hidden, Heddon claimed it was unseen by plant operators and 
Alberta officials and thus not detected until spring runoff when it started flowing into the 
Athabasca river. GCOS built a dyke to prevent flow into the river, but admitted that it 
leaked considerably. Heddon wrote that the spill was eventually contained and the 
contaminated area dug out and backfi lled with clean earth and sand to the satisfaction of 
Alberta officials. 
Heddon a lso discussed the use of a "Vetrocoke Process" for the removal of carbon 
dioxide in the hydrogen plant, which used potass ium carbonate in a water solution with 
arsenic trioxide, which was discontinued after the Alberta Department of Health found 
arsenic concentrations exceeding 0.7 parts per million in effluent water flowing into the 
Athabasca river from w hat was intended to be a c losed system. Heddon admitted that up 
to 40 pounds per day of phenolic compounds were present in effluent flows to the 
8 K.F. Heddon, GCOS, to Jean Chretien, Mi nister oflndian Affairs and Northern Development, 23 
September 1968, in RG22 vol. 1334 file 40-3-36 vol. I, LAC. 
9 Ibid . 
77 
Athabasca River, citing an explosion and fire, which crippled the sour water stripping 
facilities used to process streams containing phenols. The letter concluded expressing 
concern that the incidents had occurred and an assurance to prevent the GOCS plant 
being a hazard to " river use and security of wild life in the river and beyond." 10 Though 
these reports discuss direct pollution of the Athabasca River, it is unclear how much the 
river was contaminated by these pollutants. 
Cautious Development: 1967-1973 
In the late 1960s and early 1970s environmental impacts such as the GCOS oil spill 
prompted backlash from the opposition against the Social Credit government for poor 
environmental regulation. Opposition MLA and future Environment Minister William 
Yurko told the press in 1971 that "the industry needs a whole new approach to pollution 
control." He asserted that classified details of the GCOS oil spill should be public 
knowledge: " the government has an excellent idea of what is contained in the effluent of 
most industries in Alberta. The general public should know what individual industries are 
doing to streams or to the air." 11 Such attacks from the opposition and increasing public 
awareness of environmental impacts put pressure on the faltering Social Credit 
government to adopt more serious environmental policy. 
In 1970 the Strom government passed the Environment Conservation Act 1970 
creating the Environment Conservation Authority, a public ombudsman on env ironmental 
1° K.F. Heddon, GCOS, to Jean Chretien, Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, 23 
September 1968, in RG22 vol. 1334 file 40-3-36 vol. I , LAC. 
11 
" Re forms Urged for Industries' Pollution policy," Unlabelled Newspaper Article, 4 July 1971, in 72.59 
file . 187, PAA. 
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issues. 12 The ECA was set up to review government policies and programs, inquire into 
matters of environment conservation, and report findings to the Lieutenant Governor in 
Council. The ECA had the power to access any information it felt necessary to carry out 
its duties, hold public hearings, hold meetings with public advisory committees, and 
engage experts. The ECA was an autonomous and significantly empowered authority for 
its time. Also in 1970, Strom established the Department of Environmental Improvement 
to manage conservation. In 1971 , the same year that the Trudeau government created the 
federal Department of Environment, Alberta passed Bill 32 the Department of 
Environment Act, creating the Alberta Department of Environment. The Alberta 
Department of Environment was created for " preventing, controlling and stopping the 
loss, damage or pollution of air, water and land and plant and animal life, and for co-
ordinating government action in matters affecting the environment." 13 The Department of 
Environment was granted significant powers in managing environmental issues, 
including Article 16, which empowered the Minister of Environment to administer 'Stop 
Orders ' to deal with contraventions of the law, or to shut down plants or operations " in 
cases of actual or threatened pollution of the environment or destruction of or damage to 
natural resources." In the same year, Alberta passed Bill 40, the Clean Water Act, and 
Bill 41 the Clean Air Act. The Clean Water Act granted the Environment Minister 
important powers to impose water pollution regulations on industry. Article 3 a llowed the 
minister to prescribe the " maximum permissible concentration in water of any water 
contaminant," that could be less, but not greater, than that prescribed by the provincial 
12 
"The Environment Conservation Act," Legislative Assembly of Alberta, 1970, in M4755 file.709, GA. 
13 Lawrence Henderson, " Bill 32, The Department of Environment Act," Leg islative Assembly of Alberta, 
19 71 , in 78.77 box. I , PAA. 
79 
Board of Health and Article 7 granted the minister the power to issue stop orders. 14 The 
Clean Air Act was similar in scope to the Clean Water Act, though pertaining to air 
pollution. By 1971 Alberta was intent on meeting the rapid industrialization of the 
province with strict environmental regulation. 
Alberta' s environmental policy in the early 1970s seems to have been influenced in 
part by biblical notions of stewardship, a belief that humans were entrusted with control 
of the non-human natural world. Announcing the creation of the Department of 
Environmental Improvement on 24 October 1970, Harry Strom asserted that his 
government would use the new department to " maximize the benefits of resource 
utilization while at the same time preserving our rich natural environment." 15 During the 
planning of the Department of Environmental Improvement, A.R. Patrick made a 
statement to cabinet on the importance of conservation: 
There is no better way of giving our lives the dimension of depth than by 
identifying ourselves as important factors in the balance of nature and 
putting our weight on the side of conserving what is good, correcting what 
is wrong and progressing to something higher in the scale. We were put on 
this earth, according to the book of Genesis, ' to dress it and to keep it. ' 16 
It is unclear to what extent religious influences prevailed, but they did factor in the logic 
that informed the structuring of certain early environmental programs. 
Alberta' s early environmental policy was also influenced strong ly by the emphasis 
on utilitarianism that defined mid-century conservation. In 1971 , H. W. Thiessen, 
Chairman of the Conservation and Utilization Committee, Department of Environment, 
drafted a "Natural Resources Policy Statement," that outlined the views of government 
14 
" Bill 40, T he Clean Water Act," Legis lative Assembly o f Alberta, 197 1, in 78.77 box. I, PAA. 
15 Premier Harry Strom, Press Re lease, 24 October 1970, in 78 .77 box.! , PAA. 
16 A. R. Patrick, Statement to Cabinet, " Department of Environmental Improvement," Aug ust 1970, in 
78.77 box. I, PAA. 
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on environmental protection. 17 Thiessen defined conservation as "a positive change in the 
rate of use in such proportion that the total product from the resource over time will be 
greater than if no change were made," and explained that the Alberta government's 
development strategy was, " in order to accentuate the cohesive aspects of man ' s 
relationship with his natural environment, and thereby strengthen the affinity within 
society, it must expand its role in the conservation of natural resources within the full and 
dynamic framework of the term." Though some of Thiessen's policies were 
questionable, he recognized at this early juncture that the " market system does not 
adequately provide the environmental maintenance mechanism," and that the government 
would need to draft carefully considered environmental regulations to achieve its goals. 18 
Though lacking important research, Alberta in the early 1970s was intent on responsibly 
moving forward to an industrial future. 
After coming to power, Peter Lougheed's Conservative government was advised 
in August 1972 by the Conservation and Utilization Committee to address the 
government' s approach to environmental regulation in the oil sands region which it 
described in its "Tar Sands Development Strategy" as " poorly defi ned, inconsistent and 
totally lacking in cohesiveness." 19 The Committee stated that the development of the tar 
sands "should result in a net long term benefit and improvement to Alberta ' s phys ical and 
ecological env ironment." This logic was incorporated in the economic arguments of the 
importance of Canadian content and considered as important to sustainably developing 
the o il sands industry. The Committee wrote that the objective regarding the natura l 
17 H. W. Thiessen, Chairman, Conservation and Utilization Committee, Department of Environment, 
"Natural Resources Policy Statement," 197 1, in 78.77 box. l , PAA. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Conservation and Utilization Committee, "Fort McM urray Athabasca Tar Sands Development Strategy," 
Policy Paper prepared for the Executive Council , government of Alberta, Edmonton, August 1972, 2, in 
RG 19 vol. 5238 file 9628- 15- 1 pt.l , LAC. 
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environment should be to "enhance and improve it for subsequent land use after the 
extraction has been completed." The philosophies of reclamation in the early years of the 
oi l sands industry were founded on the ideas of the Department of Environmental 
Improvement, that Alberta could mine the bitumen depos its and convert the former mine 
sites into arable farmland "a subsequent land use more beneficial to society than at 
present." The Committee advocated that serious water effluent and atmospheric emission 
controls be imposed " to the limits of technology in order that environmental degradation 
would be prevented."20 The application of the best available, versus what industry termed 
the best practicable (most affordable), pollution control technology became a significant 
debate between government and industry, specifically concerning sulphur dioxide 
emissions. The o il sands industry often stated that it was too expensive to employ the best 
ava ilable sulphur dioxide capture technology, and thus the best practicable technology 
should be used instead, although less effective. Debates about environmental impact 
mitigation technology were s ignificant throughout the evolution of the oil sands industry, 
and in other aspects of the oi I and gas industry, especial ly in the extraction of sour gas.2 1 
The Committee called for the Alberta Research Council to undertake research into 
bitumen extraction and processing, ta ilings disposal, reclamation and revegetation 
techniques, and suggested the industry be charged a research tax at I 0¢ per acre. It noted 
the major problems with water management and tailings disposal , stating the need to 
restrict the area of impact, a lthough it "anticipated that future mining applications will be 
restricted to the west side of the Athabasca River until tailings disposal and reclamation 
2
° Conservation and Utilization Committee, "Fort McMurray Athabasca Tar Sands Development Strategy," 
Policy Paper prepared for the Executive Council, government of Alberta, Edmonton, A ugust 1972, 2, in 
RG 19 vol. 5238 file 9628- 15-1 pt. I , LAC. 
21 Keeling, "The Rancher and the Regulator: Public Challenges to Sour-Gas Industry Regulation in Alberta 
1970- 1994." 
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technology has advanced beyond the present state."22 The Committee reinforced the 
importance of close management of the environmental dimensions of the o il sands 
industry noting that "since the environmental costs of these developments are extremely 
high and s ince the current technology and economies of extraction are still in their 
operational infancy, the tendency will be for the corporate structures to externalize these 
costs for society to absorb."23 The Committee advocated the idea espoused at the time by 
Lougheed that development be slowed to achieve the balanced growth and environmental 
protection the government sought. 
Perhaps the most important and historica lly significant environmental 
recommendation from the Conservation and Utilization Committee was for the "zoning 
and prohibition of mining and tailings sands disposals along the Athabasca River and 
other designated water courses required to be mainta ined to ensure the integrity of the 
watershed."24 The Committee emphasized that there had not yet been any research into 
tailings disposal, reclamation or revegetation and that the apparent emphas is on " winning 
the resource" indicated "the heavy influence of the conventional crude o il industry." The 
Committee outlined major environmental problems associated with the hot water 
separation process and its massive generation oftailings. The Committee predicted, 
The downstream environmental effects on the Athabasca and Mackenzie 
River systems of the accidenta l release of enormous volumes of these 
wastes can only be considered with a larm ... Continuation of this practice 
may not appear to have been a responsible method to succeeding 
generations of Albertans. In summary, it can be said that the hot water 
22 Conservation and Utilization Committee, " Fort McM urray Athabasca Tar Sands Development Strategy," 
Policy Paper prepared for the Executive Council , government of Alberta, Edmonton, A ugust 1972, 2, in 
RG 19 vol. 5238 file 9628-15-1 pt. I, LAC. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid. 
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process with its concomitant tailings ponds will have a very adverse affect 
on the environment.25 
The government did not at this point express awareness of the specific sorts of pollutants 
contained in oil sands effluent water, as environmental research was yet to be undertaken 
on a s ignificant level, but basic concern with the assumed toxic qualities of effluent water 
was apparent. It concluded by emphasizing that the rapid development of alternative 
process methods should become a major priority of government. The time during which 
these recommendations were be ing seriously considered by the Cabinet coincided with 
the OPEC price increases that created o il supply shortages the Lougheed government 
could not afford to ignore. Moreover, this report was received shortly after the Syncrude 
Consortium had tabled its report on the economic and technological difficulties they were 
having planning the construction and operation of a second oil sands plant. 
In its first years, the Lougheed government sought to carefully regulate a ll aspects 
of the o il industry and s low the process of development to minimize negative impacts. In 
1972, the Alberta government also amended the Alberta Environmental Research Trust 
Act to orient environmental research towards minimiz ing the impacts of mining and o il 
sands operations, focusing research priorities on the disposal of mine waste and land 
rec lamation? 6 An October 1972 Globe and Mail article reported that " the Alberta 
government wi ll not permit large scale development of the Athabasca oil sands until the 
completion of a policy rev iew on environmenta l guide lines next year. . . Lougheed 
25 Conservation and Utilization Committee, "Fort McMurray Athabasca Tar Sands Development Strategy," 
Policy Paper prepared for the Executive Council , government of Alberta, Edmonton, August 1972, 2, in 
RG 19 vo l. 5238 file 9628- 15- 1 pt.l , LAC. 
26 
" Alberta Environmenta l Research Trust Amendment Act," Alberta Hansard, vol. 33, p.40, 24 April 
1970, PAA . 
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prepared to slow development to ensure it goes ahead with best possible adherence to 
. l . ,27 
env1ronmenta protection. 
In I 973 environmental research began to be more seriously pursued at both the 
federal and provincial levels. In November of I 973 the Alberta Cabinet produced a memo 
titled "Alberta Oil Sands Management and Development- Research Phase," which 
sought federal involvement in environmental research. In December 1973 finance policy 
advisor S.S. Reisman wrote to the federal Minister of Finance calling for a $40 million 
investment in oil sands technology and promoted the creation of a research program to 
conduct photomapping, sedimento logy, mandatory environmental eng ineering and 
geological studies by oil sands companies to minimize environmental impact, research to 
improve extraction processes, minimize effluents, and reduce sulphur dioxide 
emissions? 8 Later that year, the Alberta Research Secretariat was created as a Division of 
the A lberta Department of Environment to assume responsibility fo r research activ ities of 
the department. The div ision was provided with managers and staff to work w ith various 
other government agencies and scientific services in the department.29 A lthough the 
development of the o il sands industry was prioritized, the Lougheed government took 
majo r steps in 1973 to build an environmental regime to regulate the industry. 
However, Lougheed a lso introduced flexibility into his policies by not committing 
to a particular framework. He told The Calgary Herald that his government was ' 'not 
go ing to come forward with any long term plan that commits our government to any 
particular royalty, public participation or other terms of reference that wou ld tie our 
c.
7 
" Big oi l sands projects await guide line review," The Globe and Mail. 27 October 1972, in RG 19 vol. 
5238 file 9628- 15- 1 pt.l , LAC. 
28 S.S. Reisman to Minister of Finance, 3 December 1973, RG 19 vol. 5238 fi le 9628- 15- 1 pt. I, LAC. 
29 Dr. A . Macpherson, Regiona l Director General, to J . B. Seaborn, Deputy Minister of Environment, 16 
May 1980, RG39 box 76 file 6638-2- 1-2-2 pt. I , LAC. 
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hands over the long term in the tar sands."30 Lougheed had established that his 
government would evaluate each synthetic oi l project on a case-by-case basis and would 
not agree to any pre-established terms. Environment Minister William Yurko introduced 
a "one-window concept" whereby all project assessments and approvals would be 
conducted through the ERCB, via individual government departments, such as the 
Department of Environment or Energy, Mines and Natural Resources.31 By introducing 
the "one-window concept" Yurko improved the efficiency of project approvals but also 
centralized energy project decis ion-making in the ERCB, an arrangement that may have 
contributed to the marginalization of environmental concerns later in the decade. 
Environmental regulation and the development imperative, 1974-79 
With the major price increases and the development imperative produced by the 
OPEC crisis, the Alberta government's emphasis on slow development and careful 
environmenta l regulation was minimalized by the pressing need to produce oil. In the 
early 1970s, though GCOS had been operating since 1967 and other projects dated back 
much earlier, base line ecological knowledge of the oi l sands region was more or less non-
existent. Larry Pratt c ited an unnamed industry ecologist who to ld him " the government 
should have initiated ecological studies back about 1948 to monitor water flows, c limate 
changes, soil conditions, temperature inversions, etc., on a long-term bas is."32 The only 
major survey of the environmenta l impacts was the 1973 " INTEG" report of 
Intercontinenta l Engineering of Alberta. The report stated that without the invention and 
3
° Kevin Peterson, "Prompted by energy crisis, Lougheed abandons long range tar sand policy," The 
Calgary Herald. 17 May 1973 , in RG 19 vol. 5238 file 9628- 15- 1 pt.l, LAC. 
31 Wi lliam Yurko, Alberta Hansard. vol.40 p.20 14, 10 April , 1973, PAA. 
32 Industry ecologist c ited in Larry Pratt, The Tar Sands: Syncrude and the Politics of Oil (Edmonton: 
Hurtig Publi shers, 1976) . I 04. 
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adoption of preventative measures, the environmental effects of multiple oil sands 
operations throughout the Athabasca oil sands region would be enormous.33 Pratt c ited 
senior Alberta government officials, who to ld him that development may well " turn the 
Fort McMurray area of north-eastern Alberta into a disaster region resembling a lunar 
landscape," and that strip-mining would turn the Athabasca region into a " bio logica lly 
barren wasteland." 34 A 1975 report by the Science Council of Canada stated that 
knowledge and research of frag ile northern ecosystems was incomplete, and that hasty 
collection of research after o il sands deve lopment decisions had been approved would not 
adequately fill knowledge gaps or build strong policy foundations. The report prescribed 
that development projects should always be preceded by significant environmental 
research.35 
The environmental regulation of the oil sands industry was principally under 
Alberta jurisdiction, but the federal Department of Environment increasingly advocated 
for environmental regulation and restraint. On 16 January 1974, Jean Chretien, Minister 
of Indian and Northern Affai rs, wrote to Jack Davis, federal Minister of the Environment, 
to express concern about the expansion of the o il sands industry, 
With the commercial exploitation of the Athabaska [sic] tar sands an 
increasing possibility, I would like to record my concern about potential 
detrimental downstream effects of any major developments. Wood 
Buffalo National Park and other areas of the Northwest Terri tories would 
suffer from any serious pollution of the Athabaska River. In an analogous 
situation, we found ourselves acting too late in the Bennett Dam problem 
and we are still try ing to ameliorate the downstream damages. If there is 
any action we can take to assist your people, or any joint actions we ought 
33 Intercontinental Engineering of Alberta Ltd., An Environmental Study of the Athabasca Tar Sands 
(Edmonton : Alberta Environment, March 1973), in ibid., I 02. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Science Council of Canada, Canada' s Energy Opportunities, Report No. 23 (Ottawa: Information 
Canada, 1975), in ibid., I 03. 
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to be considering, to protect our interests in federal lands, I would be 
anxious to get underway as soon as possible.36 
In a March I 974 letter to Jean Pierre Goyer, Minister of Supply and Services, Davis 
expressed his own concern, one of the first acknowledgements of the impact of the oil 
sands industry on communities in the region, 
Even if rapid deve lopment were financially and technologically feasible I 
am convinced that it could be environmentally disastrous. From overview 
studies carried out by my officers, it is clear that the area is inversion 
prone; under these circumstances, unless the sulphur discharges are rigidly 
controlled and monitored, the impact on the vegetation, water and even on 
the resident population could cause real problems.37 
Davis wrote " present standards for minimum sulphur discharge may well be inadequate 
for the Tar Sands area," and that " that toxic materials, in particular sodium hydroxide 
which is added to disperse clay particles, will be discharged into tailings ponds, and 
through the ground water to the Athabasca and downstream to the Delta and the 
Mackenzie." He asserted that major development should not happen before the 
environmental effects were identified and existing techno logy improved.38 
OPEC o il price increases and the supply securi ty threats that emerged in 1973 and 
escalated into the early 1980s, dominated the decision making process that surrounded 
the development of the oi I sands industry. Changes in Alberta government rhetoric 
through 1974 reflect the impact of increasing political and economic pressures to produce 
oil on environmenta l regulation. In an address to the Engineering Institute of Canada 
Conference on 17 April 1974 in Edmonton, Yurko publicly expressed concern about the 
risks of a poorly regulated o il sands industry . He called for government to co llect data on 
36 Jean Chretien to Jack Davis, 16 January 1974, in RG I 08 vol. 284 fi le 4833-3 Water Pollution -
Activities - Tar Sands, LAC . 
37 A temperature inversion is reversal of the normal decrease in temperature with a ltitude. Jack Davis to 
Jean Pierre Goyer, 24 March 1974, in RG I 08 vol. 284 file 4833-3 Water Pollution - Activities - Tar Sands, 
LAC. 
38 Ibid . 
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the region before it was further impacted by development. Yurko was sceptical that it 
would be politically feasible for any government to overcome economic dependence on 
o il production and stop oil sands development once skilled labour was trained, 
infrastructure built and construction began: "once the momentum of building oil sands 
plants is established, it will be sustained," he said.39 In the legislative assembly, Yurko 
stated that in terms of environmental impacts, " I do say again, Mr. Speaker, at this time 
all we do know is there may be a problem in the future. We will be studying it with 
considerable intensity."40 However Lougheed said the same day that the "general 
assessment we have at the moment is that in terms of development it's quite clear that the 
environmental situation can be adequately handled." Based on the assumption that his 
government had taken steps to protect the environment, "we would hope that. .. hon. 
members on both sides of the House would encourage the creation of new and 
mean ingful jobs in this province." 4 1 Lougheed's rhetoric contributed to creating a false 
dichotomy between environmental protection and employment. 
In 1974 Jack Davis was succeeded by Jeanne Sauve as federal Env ironment 
Minister. Sauve continued to hold that the environmental impacts of the oil sands 
industry were unacceptable, and advocated for rigorous environmental impact 
assessments of all oil sands projects. Writing to Yurko in December 1974 regarding the 
environmenta l dimensions of the Syncrude project, she affirmed that " if approval-in-
principle is granted to the development proposal, the proponent should demonstrate 
through design measures that protection of the env ironment will be assured prior to a 
39 William Yurko, "Address to the Engineering Institute of Canada Conference," (Edmonton, Alberta, Apri l 
17, 1974 ), in C hastko, Developing Alberta 's Oil Sands: From Karl Clark to Kyoto: 163 . 
40 W. J. Yurko, Alberta Hansard, p. 1442, 26 April 1974, PAA . 
41 Peter Lougheed, Alberta Hansard, p. 1443, 26 Apri l 1974, PAA. 
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permit being issued for construction and operation." She asserted that she was not 
satisfied that Syncrude had " presented adequate quantification to reasonably permit a 
prediction of the environmental consequences of this development." She also advocated 
federal-provincial participation in a research program to correct existing information 
deficiencies to improve the predictive capability of government regulators to assess the 
cumulative effects of multiple plant operations on the environment.42 
An exchange between Yurko and Sauve regarding Environment Canada' s critique 
of Syncrude' s 1973 " Environmental Impact Assessment" report explicitly illustrates the 
development imperative produced by the OPEC crisis.43 Sauve wrote in a 1974 report 
that Syncrude had " failed to appreciate the real scope of environmental concerns and has 
also failed to address the question of environmental protection in either a realistic or 
adequate manner."44 She stated that Syncrude' s documentation " is deficient in detailed 
information in many areas of environmental concern and we believe that there is a 
likelihood for major environmental damage." Sauve found the Syncrude Environmental 
Impact Assessment was 
... wanting in quantitative data relevant to the existing ecosystem 
components (biological and physical) on Lease 17 and the Athabasca tar 
sands in general. The functional relationships of ecosystem components 
lacked quantification and specific aspects of the Sync rude development 
proposal lacked adequate clarification to effectively predict the ecological 
consequences of the project. In view of these voids in information, 
statements presented by the proponent relating to the environmental 
effects forecast from the development must be considered as conjectural. . . 
42 Jeanne Sauve to W. J . Yurko, 18 December 1974, in RG I 08 vo l. 284 fil e 4833-3 Water Po llution -
Activ ities - Tar Sands, LAC. 
43 Syncrude Canada Ltd., Environmental Impact Assessment (Syncrude: Edmonton, 1973) 
44 Environment Canada, "Memorandum and Correspondence Re lating to the Syncrude Environmental 
Impact Assessment" (September, 1974 ), in Pratt, The Tar Sands: Syncrude and the Politics of Oil, I 07. 
90 
Yurko, who had so forcefully advocated environmental protection in the early 1970s, 
responded to Sauve stating that oil supply priorities outweighed environmental risks: 
Most of the deficiencies identified by your regional task force have also 
been identified by my staff. We know that major information gaps exist in 
respect to the baseline environmental data in the entire area. Nevertheless, 
in the light of Canada's critical energy balance, it did not and does not 
appear prudent to delay oil sands development until all needed 
information is available. We need to proceed and at the same time gather 
information with the premise that environmental restrictions may increase 
with each successive plant.45 
The contrast to his earlier words in the decade, and at other junctures suggests the 
significant power of po litical and economic forces to shape government policies. By the 
end of 1974 environmental policy rheto ric from the Lougheed government had changed 
from the reserved tone of caution that characterised 1971 and 1972, to statements that 
expressed the risks of development but also the absolute necessity of mobilizing the 
industry. 
Opposition MLAs argued that the Lougheed government' s investment in Syncrude 
put it in a conflict of interest position that could corrupt its regulation of the 
environmental dimensions of the oil sands industry. As NDP MLA Grant Notley said in 
legis lature in 1976, 
The Syncrude arrangement itse lf, in many respects, places the government 
of Alberta in virtually a conflict of interest position because we are now a 
major part of that project. The more stringent the environmental standards 
are, a portion of that cost will have to be met by the taxpayers of Alberta.46 
Notley sought to pass a motion in the Legislative Assembly that would reduce a llowed 
Syncrude sulphur dioxide emissions by amend ing permit number 73-AP-054 under the 
Clean Air Act from 287 long tons per stream day to 60, as technology existed to limit 
45 W. J. Yurko to Jeanne Sauve, 15 October 1974, in RG I 08 vol. 284 file 4833-3, LAC. 
46 Grant Notley, Alberta Hansard. 16 March 1976, p. l96. 
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emissions to this level. He argued that permitted emissions were arbitrary and could not 
realistically prevent the environmental impacts of sulphur dioxide deposition. 
Conservative MLA Tom Chambers, challenged Notley ' s motion arguing that to change 
the technology criteria for the Syncrude plant wou ld "be the height of irresponsibility." 
Chambers emphasized the reliance of many Albertans on the oil sands industry for 
employment, and the importance of the project to Canada. To attack Notley, Chambers 
exploited the false dichotomy that environmental protection initiatives inherently 
undermine employment opportunities: " In my view, those who would destroy the 
viability of the project by attempting to force needless and unduly harsh environmental 
standards are doing an immense disservice, not on ly to Syncrude, but to Alberta and to 
the Canadian nation as a whole."47 In response to Chambers's attack, Social Credit 
Opposition Leader Bob Clark stepped in to support Notley with an extensive statement: 
One has to remember, when we look at the Syncrude plant in Alberta 
today, because of the corporate make-up of Syncrude now, that we find 
ourselves in a situation of having at least the potential for a public conflict 
of interest. I say that frankly, because the government, the people of 
Alberta, the Legislature have or wi ll have over a billion dollars tied up in 
Syncrude. Look at the equity participation by the province. Look at the 
infrastructure in Fort McMurray, the road up to Fort McMurray, the 
contribution by the Alberta Housing Corporation, the power plant, and the 
pipeline. Let's face squarely what we're looking at here. We're looking at a 
project which I think the vast majority of Albertans want to see go ahead. 
But we're looking at a project which the government of the day, regardless 
of who the government is, now has got at least a billion dollars- likely 
closer to $1.2 billion - committed to this project. Very frank ly, if the 
project has problems down the road, this government today has its 
political neck out some distance. If there isn't a good rate of return, if the 
project doesn 't work wel l, let's face it, there's going to be tremendous 
pressure on the government of the day to make some adjustments. I think 
the first thing members on both sides of the House have to appreciate is 
this potentia l conflict of interest situation. There's no way we can simply 
say it isn't here. It is. The member who sits on the board of Syncrude made 
the point that the permit wi ll be reviewed in, l be lieve, 1983. That is true. 
47 Tom Chambers, Alberta Hansard, 16 March 1976, p.20 I. 
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But members of the Assembly, let's remember that in 1983, the 
Department of the Environment will be making recommendations as to 
what should happen to the permit. If Syncrude is having very serious 
problems at that time, let's not be so naive as to say there is not going to be 
pressure to make changes in the standards. If we recognize that, at least 
we're at first base. But it seems so many people in this province tend to 
gloss over that. I think that's why there are certainly some legitimate 
concerns by people when they look at this potential conflict of interest. 
Frankly it's o ne of the reasons I personally don't think we should be 
getting involved in more of these government/business partnerships .. . I 
th ink it is important that we recognize the conflict of interest s ituation is 
here, regardless of where we sit in the House. T hat's with us.48 
Notley's motion was defeated by the majority Conservative government. But by 
criticizing the state/capital partnership that funded the Syncrude project, the opposition 
challenged Lougheed 's strategy of industry control through participation. 
The influence of the development imperative was apparent in the A lberta 
government' s environmental regulation of the GCOS project. By 1975 GCOS was in dire 
straits. GCOS stated in a report to the Alberta government on 29 March 1976 that Sun Oil 
had injected a total of $332 million in additional funds and concluded that because of 
cons istent losses and no return on past investments, Sun was not going to commit any 
further financing to the project.49 GCOS cited severa l specific factors that were 
increasing costs that inc luded: the poor re liability of the sulphur recovery plant, the costs 
of reducing particulate and sulphur dioxide emissions from the powerhouse, e lectrica l 
requirements, s ludge disposal and tailings settling, problems with land surface 
conservation and reclamation regulations, and the pressures of increasing environmental 
regulation. 5° The report provides a window to the technical cha llenges that the oil sands 
~8 Bob Clark, Alberta Hansard, 16 March 1976, p. 202-203. 
49 Great Canadian Oil Sands Lim ited, "Submission to the Honourable Don Getty, Minister of Energy and 
Natural Resources, Province of Alberta," 29 March 1976, in 82.165 fi le 466, PAA. 
50 Department of Energy and Natural Resources, government of Alberta, Notes Re. Great Canadian Oil 
Sands Submission of March 29, 1976 to the Alberta government," 2 1 October 1976, in 82. 165 fi le. 466, 
PAA. 
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industry struggled with to produce oil from the Athabasca bitumen deposits, and also the 
inability of the Alberta government to impose strict environmental regulation on the 
financially precarious industry. 
As early as 1968, the first year of operation, the report stated the GCOS plant 
suffered huge setbacks from boiler breakdowns and equipment failures that limited the 
availability of adequate levels of heat and power. GCOS was especially hampered by the 
challenge of stripping trees, muskeg, and soil from above the bitumen deposits, and 
extraction of the deposits under widely varying weather conditions, especially winter 
temperatures regularly dropping to -40° Celsius. Under such extreme cold temperatures, 
muskeg froze, and exposed bitumen deposits became rock hard. Such temperatures make 
steel brittle and greatly reduce its strength. Frigid temperatures rapidly destroyed 
extraction equipment and presented one of the most challenging production problems. 
The cold temperatures caused regular failures of steam and power plants, which resulted 
in regular unplanned shutdowns of refining units that caused significant damage to 
• 51 
equipment. 
In 1972 and 1973 improved equipment performance and fewer shutdowns increased 
production. The plant produced between 786,000 and 1.8 million barrels per month, 
averaging near the designed approximate production capacity of 45 ,000 bbl./d. 52 In 1974 
however, a turbo-generator failure caused a process unit to spew a solution of potassium 
carbonate into the air which settled on nearby power lines, causing a ground fault and 
shutting down the entire plant. The system failed several times before properly starting up 
51 Department of Energy and Natural Resources, government of Alberta, Notes Re. Great Canadian Oil 
Sands Submission of March 29, 1976 to the Alberta government," 2 1 October 1976, in 82 .1 65 fil e. 466, 
PAA 
52 Great Canadian Oil Sands Limited, "Submission to the Honourable Don Getty, Minister of Energy and 
Natural Resources, Province of Alberta," 29 March 1976, in 82. 165 file 466, PAA. 
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again . The stops and starts caused significant damage to the processing system, which 
caused equipment failures and further shut downs later in the year. Cold weather 
problems also caused the structural failure of the small bucketwheel extractor, and frozen 
lumps of bitumen damaged conveyor belts. 1975 was an extremely cold winter, with 
temperatures dropping to -56° Celsi us. Extraction equipment regularly broke and froze on 
the solid overburden and frozen mine face, processing equipment failed regularly as 
instruments froze. The damage required a maintenance shutdown in April and May that 
was difficult to recover from. During the spring of that year massive rainfall flooded the 
mine site, turning it into a swamp that swallowed overburden stripping equ ipment and 
halted operations. The processing facilities experienced major problems including fires, 
corrosion, shutdowns, failures, and multiple electrical problems. GCOS described the 
plant as a "domino structure," a highly complex facility composed of "a chain of units 
that cannot be effectively uncoupled."53 Failure in one area compromised all other 
aspects of the operation. Engineers had built storage capacity for diluted bitumen 
between the extraction plant and the process area to try to alleviate the processing 
consistency problems. However, they felt that the only way to properly fix the problem 
would be to duplicate each aspect of the facility, but that this would be unrealistically 
GCOS wrote that huge workforce turnovers compounded the problem. The 
isolation of the plant and extreme working conditions made it difficu lt fo r the operation 
to retain the highly skilled and trained personnel it required to operate and maintain the 
plant. GCOS also wrote that in 1963 when the decision was made to build the plant, the 
53 Great Canadian Oil Sands Limited, "Submission to the Honourable Don Getty, Minister o f Energy and 
Natura l Resources, Province of Alberta," 29 March 1976, in 82.165 fi le 466, PAA. 
54 Ibid. 
95 
synthetic oil industry looked promising. Through the late 1960s and early 1970s inflation 
had greatly increased costs despite rising oil prices. Meanwhile the federal government' s 
price freezes and export taxes had created a condition where prices were controlled but 
costs were not, compromising the industry's ability to generate funds. The combination 
of such massive technical problems and a worsening economic environment was kil ling 
the project. 
It also pressured the Alberta government to reconsider the increasingly stringent 
environmental regulations. The report stated that "when GCOS first commenced 
production in the late 1960s it met all the environmental requirements in the permit it 
received from the Alberta government. Since then the Environmental Standards, 
particularly those concerned with air emissions have become more stringent." 55 It wrote 
that their 1973 Clean Air Act Licence called for a major reduction in the emission of 
particulates from the GCOS powerhouse by 31 July 1979, and that it also required GCOS 
to submit to the Department of the Environment a proposal detailing the steps which the 
company planned "to implement to comply with a maximum calculated ground level 
sulphur diox ide concentration of 0.06 ppm with respect to emissions from the plant under 
a ll operating conditions." It c laimed that they were having huge problems maintaining the 
re liability of their sulphur recovery unit, which had most recently cost them $600,000 in 
upgrades and repairs following failure in 1975. They c laimed that it would cost them $ 13 
million to build the best backup and enhancement units. They went on to claim that 
improved solut ions to s ludge disposal and tailings treatment would be even more 
expens ive . GCOS also lamented the increasing costs of land surface conservation and 
55 Department of Energy and Natural Resources, government of Alberta, Notes Re. Great Canadian O il 
Sands Submission of March 29, 1976 to the Alberta government," 2 1 October 1976, in 82. 165 file. 466, 
PAA . 
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requirements for reclamation deposits. They pleaded the case that the costs and 
requirements were too much for a pioneer o il sands plant taking huge financial losses. 
GCOS advocated expanding the plant from 45 ,000 to 65 ,000 bbl ./d to make the 
plant more profitable by operating on a larger scale. GCOS sought more funding from 
Sun Oil or a bailout from the Alberta government, as well as reduced royalty rates, more 
relaxed environmental regulations, and lowered debt burdens. The report specifically 
highlighted the socio-economic consequences for Fort McMurray and the Alberta 
synthetic o il industry if the plant were to be shut down.56 As GCOS moved through the 
application process, the Iranian Revolution caused a further price increase that greatly 
improved the economics of the oil sands industry. In response, Sun Oil took steps to 
merge with GCOS into what would become Suncor to take advantage of the opportunity 
to pay a sub-market value price for privately held GCOS shares by merging the company 
prior to the inevitable increase in share prices that would follow the appraisal of the 
imminent expansion. Sun announced the merger On 6 September 1978, in spite of the 
acrimony of small shareholders. 57 Alberta Environment officials maintained that the plant 
would be classified as a new plant and therefore subject to new environmental impact 
assessments and regulations. G.B. Mellon, Alberta Minister of Energy, Mines, and 
Resources wrote to Energy Minister Don Getty, stating that " it is rather late in the 
planning process for Environment to change its views on the requ irements for sulphur 
emission contro ls."58 In spite of a negative intervention from the Fort McKay First Nation 
at the ERCB hearing, expressing the environ mental consequences of the first decade of 
56 Department of Energy and Natural Resources, government of Alberta, Notes Re. Great Canadian O il 
Sands Submission of March 29, 1976 to the Alberta government," 2 1 October 1976, in 82.1 65 file . 466, 
PAA. 
57 Ron Nowell , "Shareho lder tries to block merger," Calgary Herald, 20 December 1978, 82. 165 fi le . 683, 
PAA. 
58 G.B. Mellon to Don Getty, 3 May 1978, in 82.165 fi le . 466, PAA. 
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the GCOS plant' s existence, GCOS was granted Ministerial Approval to expand by 
Minister of Renewable Resources F. W. MacDougall on 8 March 1979.59 
Environmental Research 
The federal government and the government of Alberta created the Alberta Oil 
Sands Environmental Research Program (AOSERP) in early 1975. AOSERP was the first 
major research program designed to analyse the environmental impacts of the 
development of the oil sands industry. It was under joint control of Environment Canada 
and the Alberta Department of Environment and intended to run for ten years on a $40 
million budget, formed by an agreement signed on 26 February 1975. AOS ERP' s 
mandate was to undertake environmental research relative to renewable resources in the 
Athabasca oil sands region and make information available to the two governments to 
minimize negative environmental impacts from oil sands development.60 Though the 
purpose of AOSERP was to produce information to aid the establishment of 
environmental regulations for acceptable limits of damage, the program was confined to 
research only and did not " involve the management of renewable resources."6 1 
AOS ERP was a comprehensive program that in its fi ve-year life span was funded 
with over $17 million by the federal and provincial governments.62 The project produced 
59 G.B. Mellon to Don Getty, 3 May 1978, in 82. 165 file. 466, PAA. 
60 Government of Alberta, "Canada- Alberta Agreement for the Alberta Oil Sands Environmental Research 
Program 1975, 1977," 5, from Oil Sands Research and Information Network, "Alberta O il Sands 
Environmental Research Program (AOSERP) Report Collection" (Edmonton: University of Alberta 
Libraries Education and Research Archive, 20 I 0) 
https:/ /era. I ibrary . ual berta.ca/pub lic/view/collection/u uid :0 I 05 d798-7 e23 -4232-8920-4 f849fca3 8b 7 
(Accessed 5 October 20 II ). 
61 Government of Alberta, "Canada- Alberta Agreement for the Alberta Oil Sands Environmental Research 
Program 1975, 1977,"3 
62 Stuart B. Smith ed., "Alberta Oil Sands Environmental Research Program interim report covering the 
period April 1975 to November 1978," ( 1979), 101. from Oil Sands Research and Information Network, 
"A lberta Oil Sands Environmental Research Program (AOSERP) Report Collection" (Edmonton: 
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over 200 reports on air systems, land systems, water systems and human systems. Dr Ron 
Wallace, the former director the AOSERP aquatic fauna research group wrote that 
considering the agreement was "s igned during a period of heightened jurisdictional 
tensions between Alberta and Canada, the 1975 AOSERP program was unique in scope 
and degree."63 The program received financial support and personnel from the federa l 
and provincial government, from Fisheries and Oceans Canada, Environment Canada, 
representatives from Alberta agencies and university researchers.64 AOSERP was 
managed by a series of committees chaired by two federal and six Alberta 
representatives, reported through an Alberta Program Manager and j ointly to the 
Ministers of Alberta Environment and Env ironment Canada. Wallace writes that the 
program " received international attention for its unique, co-operative and integrated 
approach to regional baseline monitoring and environmental research."65 
Before the agreement was signed, correspondence from within Environment 
Canada indicated concern that research priorities could be compromised by federal 
investments in the Syncrude project. A. S. Rosemarin from the Fisheries and Marine 
Service wrote to Dr. R. H. Bailey at the Lands Directorate in January expressing that the 
University of A lberta Libraries Education and Research Archive, 2010) 
https://era. library .ualberta.ca/publ ic/view/collection/ uu id:O I 05d798-7e23-4232-8920-4f849fca38b7 
(Accessed 5 October 20 II ). 
63 Ron Wallace, " History and Governance As A Blueprint For Future federal-provincial Co-operation on 
Environmental Mon itoring in the Alberta O il Sands Region" (A lberta Water Portal, November, 20 11 ) 
http:/ /alberta water .com/ index .ph p?option=com _content& v iew=artic le&id= 80 I %3 A guest -co I urn n ist -ron-
wallace&catid=45&ltemid=7 1 (accessed 14 November 20 I I, 8. 
64 Stuart B. Smith, "A lberta Oil Sands Environmenta l Research Program 1975- 1980: Summary Report" 
(government of Alberta, November 198 1 ), 8, from Oi l Sands Research and Information Network, " Alberta 
Oil Sands Environmental Research Program (AOSERP) Report Collection" (Edmonton : University of 
Alberta Libraries Education and Research Archive, 20 I 0) 
https://era. l ibrary. ualberta.ca/publ ic/view/collection/uu id:O I 05d798-7 e23-423 2-8920-4 f849fca3 8 b 7 
Accessed 5 October 20 II . 
65 Wallace, " History and Governance As A Blueprint For Future federa l-provinc ial Co-operation on 
Environmental Monitoring in the Alberta O il Sands Region," 8. 
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research priorities had not been clarified, and that perceived inadequacies in the 
agreement "will loom even greater if federal funds become tied up in the tar sands 
development as may be the case in light of the present state of affairs with Syncrude. 
Such federal influence could certainly alter details in the agreement. . . "66 Within 
Environment Canada, and more generally at the national level, involvement of the federal 
government in environmental research and regulation in Alberta was seen as a duty to 
Alberta during the 1970s. It was felt by the federal government that as Alberta' s 
resources were being developed for the national need it was the responsibility of the 
federal government to invest in environmental protection so as to ensure that excess 
negative impacts did not accrue to the province.67 
As AOSERP evolved, there were internal and external debates and power 
struggles centred on disagreements about the program ' s research priorities and general 
purpose. Industry and government largely saw development as inevitable, and sought 
research that would identify which impacts were acceptable and how mitigation measures 
could be taken, while researchers were more concerned with establishing baseline data 
and identifying major environmental impacts. The Alberta Environment Research 
Secretariat (AERS) saw the environment as one of four considerations in oil sands 
development political decision-making, the other three being technological , social and 
economic factors. The AERS felt that " from the hierarchical arrangement it can be seen 
that AOSERP should function in a manner consistent with the needs of management 
agencies, which in turn are responsible to government." They maintained that AOSERP 
66 A. S. Rosemarin, Fisheries and Marine Service to Dr. R. W. Bailey, Lands Directorate, 20 January 1975, 
67 E.F. Roots, Science Adivsor to J. B. Seaborn 25 July 1979 and J.B. Seaborn to John Fraser. 19 July 1979, 
in RG I 08 vol. 11 2 file 1165-36/H5 pt. I Committees, Boards, Councils, Commissions. Human 
Environment, LAC 
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research should be directed towards the "solution of practical social and technical 
environmental problems resulting from oil sands development and to provide scientific 
data for the use of government and industry so a better job can be done of protecting man, 
animals and plants and to aid in restoring the area to a biological productivity as good as 
or better than before mining commenced."68 The Oil Sands Environmental Study Group 
sought to champion the position of industry in all aspects of research planning. The 
OSESG sought for AOSERP to be focused on consolidating environmental information, 
creating environmental inventories of the region, and identifying the absorptive capacity 
of the ecosystem of toxins, prior to maj or deve lopment. Bill Cary, cha irman of the 
OSESG at the second AOSERP planning workshop stated that "there will be 
development; it will have an impact, we cannot say it won' t. Therefore we have to 
measure somehow how much impact, or how much absorptive capacity the ecosystem 
has." He expressed dismay at the use of AOSERP money in funding projects that 
industry deemed not contributing to the solution of practical problems faced by industry : 
we are content with the re-orientation toward the solution of practical 
environmental problems which have occurred over the last year, but much 
progress remains to be done to answer the high expectations of AOSERP 
held by both the government and industry, who in the long final ana lys is 
will be the users of this work.69 
Conflicts created tensions between AOS ERP, industry and the Alberta and federal 
governments and caused significant problems with operation of the program. 
Disagreements about the purpose of AOSERP, combined with Alberta 
government replacements of some research managers prompted a significant 
68 Alberta Environment Research Secretariat, "A lberta Oi l Sands Environmental Research Program : 
Proposed Purpose and Objectives," December 1975, in G RI 981.203/4 box. I AOSERP, PAA. 
69 Bi ll Cary, OSESG chairman, 
AOSERP Second Planning Workshop, 30 September 1976, in GR I98 1.203/4 box . I AOSERP, PAA. 
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restructuring of the program through 1976 and 1977. On a basic level , there were broad 
based disagreements between the po liticians and bureaucrats who funded and controlled 
the program, and the scientists actually do ing the research. At the 28 July 1976 Steering 
committee meeting W. Solodzuk stated that, 
Much of the problem lies within the organizational structure. The present 
structure does not clearly delineate lines of responsibility and 
accountability and many people, particularly project leaders, are finding 
they have two masters, one the Technical Research Committee, who 
designs the research and the other, Program Management, who is 
responsible for the activities. Without line accountability Technical 
Research Committee' s plans do not a lways reflect the needs and 
responsibilities incumbent in the Alberta-Canada Agreement.70 
Meanwhile, Dr Ron Wallace, director of the Aquatic Fauna Technical Research Group, 
who went on to form Dominion Ecological Consultants and a long career as a federal 
environmental scientist with the Environmental Protection Service, argued that there 
should be a separation from program management to preserve the autonomy of research, 
that program management should act more as a facilitator, and the Technica l Research 
Committees (TRCs) "should have greater responsibility to encourage research rather than 
emphas ize control of research."71 At the third Program Operations Group Meeting, a 
note-taker recorded that Dr Wallace 
voiced displeasure with the notes. He said the notes gave him the 
impression that Air Quality and Aquatic Fauna were not cooperating. He 
felt the spirit of the meeting was missed. He also questioned the need for 
notes as he felt that they were there to talk science and not become 
bureaucrats. 72 
70 W. Solodzuk, AOSERP Joint Steering Committee Meeting, 28 July 1976, in RG39 box 76 file 6638-2- 1-
2-2 pt. I AOSERP, LAC. 
71 Dr. Ron Wallace, AOSERP Joint Steering Committee Meeting, 17 August 1976, in RG39 box 76 fi le 
6638-2- 1-2-2 pt. I AOSERP, LAC. 
72 Program Operations G roup Meeting #2, November 1976, in 8 1.203 box . I fi le.6, PAA . 
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The planning committee found it highly problematic that there were no broad based 
reports that could be used by industry and government in policy and technology planning. 
It stated that " the narrow, discipline-specific projects that characterize the present 
Program will not provide the answers to questions on broad environmental problems," 
and that a systems based approach to environmental research would be more useful.73 
The planning committee felt also that it was problematic that AOSERP did not consider 
any proposed oil sands industry development or reclamation scenarios environmentally 
sound or acceptable. 
The result of these meetings was a major reorganization of AOSERP to a systems 
based approach to environmental research that necessitated the negotiation and signing of 
a new agreement in 1977.74 The senior advisory and liaison committee was eliminated 
and replaced with a senior advisory board appointed by the Alberta minister and deputy 
minister of environment to provide " policy level advice to the Steering Committee," a 
program director responsible to the steering committee, a new accountability of the TRCs 
to the program director, and a changed financial agreement whereby the program would 
be funded fully by Alberta, and reimbursed by the federal government.75 These changes 
drastically reduced the independence and autonomy of AOSERP as the new structure 
allowed for s ignificant interference from research managers. R. P. Angle, a meteorologist 
with the Air Quality Control Branch wrote to J. C . Jack, head o f the A ir Quality Control 
Branch, expressing concern about the ro le of the research manager following the 
AOSERP reorganization, 
73 Program Operations Group Meeting #2, November 1976, in 81 .203 box . ! file .6, PAA . 
74 Smith, "A lberta Oil Sands Environmental Research Program 1975- 1980: Summary Report." 
75 AOSERP Steering Committee to A ll AOSERP Technical Research Committee Chairmen, 18 January 
1977, in GR I997.0370 AOSE RP I 2005- l -2-55R, LAC. 
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To a large extent I believe the members all felt intimidated by the 
Research Manager, in whom all power was vested. Proposals were no 
longer suggested, referred to subcommittee and then acted upon. Instead, 
committee members were asked only to criticize already written terms of 
reference. 
Angle continued that coupled with the new AOSERP Operational Po licy and Research 
Goals, the new structure was a "major shift towards meeting objectives set by Alberta 
rather than those set by the federal government."76 He wrote that his new Research 
Manager was not actually a scientist, and lacked the scientific literacy to make sound 
scientific judgments and manage research projects. Research was reined in following the 
re-organization to meet more closely the des ires of the Alberta government and the oil 
sands industry. The financial involvement of the Alberta government in the oil sands 
industry correlated with the Alberta government taking control of and repurposing of the 
originally independent AOSERP program to orient research towards provincial and 
industry dictated objectives. 
On 13 September 1978, Len Marchand, federal Minister of Environment, wrote to 
D. J. Russell , A lberta Minister of Environment, announcing the w ithdrawal of federa l 
funding from AOSERP, effective I April 1979.77 Marchand primarily cited mass ive 
budget cuts as the main reason for the withdrawal , but a lso noted the A lberta dominance 
of the program that "the future work under the Program would have sh ifted gradua lly 
towards studies of provincial inte rest w ith somewhat less emphas is on matters of fede ral 
interest." Attached to Russell 's letter were comments from R.G . Skinner who indicated 
that the federal government was somewhat fed up w ith the A lberta government's 
handling of the program: 
76 R.P. Angle, Meteorologist, A ir Quali ty Control Branch, to J.C. Jack, Head Ai r Quality Contro l Branch, 
22 September 1977, in GR 1997.0370 AOSERP I 2005- I-2-55R, LAC. 
77 Len Marchand to D. J . Russell, 13 September 1978, in R 1526 vol. 267 file no.5 fi le.243-14, LAC. 
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AOSERP has been plagued with difficulties from its inception. Beset with 
federal-provincial wrangling over who would study what, the tendency to 
appoint heads of projects based on government affiliation rather than 
expertise, low morale, high staff turnover and general misdirection would 
have or should have raised serious doubts sooner or later as to AOSERP's 
usefulness. 78 
He also pointed out that notwithstanding the collapse of AOSERP, "the prospect of 
continued and expanded development ofthe tar sands will continue to raise concerns 
about water supply and quality, air emissions and land reclamation." Russe ll 's response 
to the AOSERP withdrawal indicates that the Alberta government saw the action as 
another in a long chain of federal disservices to Alberta. He wrote back to Marchand on 3 
October, 
I must state that our reaction to this yet another unilateral federal 
' decision ' is one of extreme displeasure. It seems to be the current style of 
the federal government and, insofar as Alberta is concerned, it is not 
conducive to harmonious federal-provincial relations. Your initiative is an 
absolute contradiction of the spirit of the Prime Minister's August 18th 
telex to Premier Lougheed wherein it was stated ' ... we will undertake to 
fully discuss with you before deciding to make changes to federal-
provincial contractual or legislative arrangements presently in effect. The 
federal government is most anxious not to amend unilaterally existing 
contractual or legal commitments.' 79 
Russell emphasized that the oil sands industry was a joint project between the federal and 
provincial governments to bo lster national energy security, and that regardless of 
jurisdiction the unknown environmental impacts of oil sands mines on Alberta should be 
matters of national importance. The provincial government funded AOSERP until the end 
of 1980, when it was formally shut down. 
Correspondence from within Environment Canada following the withdrawal from 
AOSERP gives insight into the perspectives and concerns of the federal government on 
78 R. G. Skinner, "Comments on termination of AOSERP" attached to Len Marchand to D. J. Russell, 13 
September 1978, in R I 526 vol. 267 file no.5 file.243- 14, LAC. 
79 D. J. Russell to Len Marchand, 3 October 1978, in Rl526 vol. 267 file no.5 file.243-14, LAC. 
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oil sands industry development and environmental management. E. F. Roots, an 
Environment Canada Science advisor wrote to Deputy Minister J. B. Seaborn in July 
1979, 
Programs like AOSERP and its provincial progeny are defining the 
problems, and serve to indicate some constraints and point to some areas 
of solution, but also serve to indicate how little real attention is being 
g iven to environmental matters in the energy policy and economic 
considerations of tar sands development ... Both provincial and federal 
environmental programs appear to be in danger of being left behind in tar 
sands decisions. The decisions are almost exclusively weighed in the areas 
of conventional economics and federal/provincial influence.80 
This memo pinpoints the dominance of economic perspectives of government 
assessments of resource extraction and environmental protection. In oil sands projects, 
the value of environmental protection was considered external to traditional cost-benefit 
analysis. In 1979, R. W. Drurie, a senior policy adv isor in the federal Department of 
Energy, Mines and Resources, wrote a memo to file following a meeting with 
environmenta l coordinator Bob Skinner, petroleum resources advisor James Hea and 
University of Alberta chemistry professor Doug Montgomery: 
The environmental implications of an accelerated and enlarged tar sands 
program are clearly immense if that development is to be pushed forward 
on a scale commensurate with a policy to achieve petroleum self-
suffic iency for Canada by 1990 ... In the first tar sand projects, 
environmenta l standards were set with the assumption that development 
experience would lead to improved technology for control of emissions 
such as sulphur dioxide and fines in wastewater. However, the current 
thrust to development is bas ically a conservative one in w hich only proven 
and applied technology is used for tar extraction and for pollution control. 
The anticipated advances have not been achieved .... The expenditures 
contemplated fo r tar sands deve lopment are measured in tens of billions of 
dollars. The development research program is some $ 100 million. Yet 
80 E.F. Roots, to J . B. Seaborn 25 July 1979, in RG I 08 vol. 11 2 fi le 11 65-36/ H5 pt. I Committees, Boards, 
Councils, Commissions. Human Environment - Athabaska Tar Sands - Syncrude AOSERP, LAC. 
107 
environmental research projects requiring some few thousands dollars can 
not get funded . .. 81 
The co llapse of AOSERP reduced the production of environmental knowledge that could 
have been applied to the structuring of environmental regulation and the enforcement of 
the Clean Air and Clean Water Acts. Government-organized environmental research was 
limited while development priorities increased and federal-provincial tensions grew with 
increasing hostility. Following the collapse of the AOSERP agreement, the program did 
not fully disappear, but was amalgamated with the Research Secretariat to form the 
Alberta Environment Research Management Division.82 The Research Management 
Divis ion was better than nothing, but environmental research on the oil sands industry 
generally languished after AOSERP. 
The fina l 1981 report, authored by Stuart Sm ith, was only submitted to Alberta 
Environment. Smith ' s report reveals significant anger at the program ' s death and looks 
towards a dark future for the environmental monitoring of the o il sands industry. The 
report held that the efforts of AOSERP were "only the first step toward any in-depth 
assessment of ecosystems and socia l impacts ... " and that in order " to assess with any 
degree of exactitude what long-term impacts of o il sands development might be, 
extensive research will be required to develop a predictive capability which does not now 
exist."83 T he program was understood to have achieved the important goal of establishing 
the solid baseline data that was so desperate ly needed. Smith wrote that 
Most of the baseline research described in the AOSERP Interim Report 
has been carried out in a natura l environment that appears so far not to 
81 Memo to fi le, R. W. Drurie, Bob Skinner, James Hea, Doug Montgomery, in RG 108 vol. 11 2 file 1165-
36/H5 pt. I Comm ittees, Boards, Counc ils, Commissions. Human Environment - Athabaska Tar Sands-
Sy ncrude AOSERP, LAC. 
82 
" Notice of Amalgamation," Research Management Divis ion, Alberta Environment, 14 May 1980, in 
RG39 box 76 fi le 6638-2- 1-2-2 pt. I AOSERP, LAC. 
83 Smith, "A lberta Oi l Sands Environmental Research Program 1975- 1980: Summary Report," 120. 
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have suffered any general debilitation from oil sand activities. Data 
gathered from such an environment are therefore extremely valuable as 
benchmark information against which future developmental impacts can 
be measured. 84 
He maintained that " research concerning impacts of air pollution on soils and vegetation 
has not yet demonstrated that damage has occurred from atmospheric pollutants," and 
that "studies of water chemistry and aquatic biota in the Athabasca River fai l to revea l 
significant impacts downstream of Fort McMurray and the two presently operating o il 
sands plants, e ither from materials emanating from the industrial operations or from 
domestic sewage and municipal drainage from Fort McMurray." 85 The conclusions of 
AOSERP, the Alberta Oil Sands Industry Environmental Association (AOS IEA), and 
from Syncrude, Suncor, Alsands and other corporate interests, stated that the o il sands 
industry was causing negligi ble environmental damage in the reg ion.86 However, Smith 
wrote that there had been "a start I ing transformation of the region during the period from 
1960 to 1980, with Fort McMurray increasing its population by about I 0 times," and that 
the results of AOSERP were not reliable: 
the deficiencies invo lved with lack of interdisciplinary connections and 
lack of clear research direction for AOSERP may have prejudiced the 
capacity for the program to detect effects of emissions and effluents on 
terrestria l and aquatic ecosystems, respectively .. . Neither impacts nor 
predictions for the future are possible from the results of AOSERP 
investigations. 87 
Many studies were incomplete, and did not cover a wide enough area or period of time 
and therefore could not be looked to for an accurate picture of environmental conditions 
84 Smith, "A lberta O il Sands Env ironmental Research Program 1975-1 980: Summary Report," 26. 
85 Ibid., 27. 
86 T he Fort McKay Biophysical Impact Assessment was commissioned by the ERCB, and prepared for the 
community under the direction of Dr. Ron Wallace from Dominion Environmental Consultants Ltd. 
McKay Community Fort, "A Review of the Biophys ical Impact Assessment and Reclamation Plan For 
New Mining Areas In Support of Approved New Facilit ies at the Syncrude Canada Ltd. Mildred Lake 
Plant," (Ft. McKay, A lberta 1986), 7. 
87 Smith, "Alberta Oil Sands Environmental Research Program 1975-1980: Summary Report," 120. 
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in the Athabasca oil sands region. Although environmental research continued under the 
Alberta Environment Research Secretariat, the collapse of AOSERP marked the end of 
collaborative, interjurisdictional environmental research in the oil sands region. 
Other environmental and social scientific research done by Alberta Environment, 
independent researchers, and environmental consulting companies between the mid-
1970s and mid-1980s asserted that major environmental degradation was taking place.88 
The development of the oil sands industry had direct adverse impacts on proximate 
ecosystems, caused by the physical construction and operation of oil sands plants and 
associated infrastructure, the expansion of the town of Fort McMurray, water pollution 
associated with ta ilings ponds, effluent seepage and oil spills, and atmospheric emissions, 
most prominently sulphur dioxide emissions from the upgrading process. The Athabasca 
River valley was a rich ecosystem that sustained large populations of moose, caribou, 
birds and fur bearing mammals. By strip-mining thousands of acres of forests and 
creating huge tailings ponds, the direct impact of the o il sands plants destroyed vast areas 
of wildlife habitat. By the 1980s, the Fort McKay community reported that they were 
seeing far fewer birds, squirrels, muskrats and moose.89 The community also reported 
that the influx of people to the reg ion was compounding pressures on wildlife . They 
noted a huge increase in waste dumping and garbage by newcomers who also brought an 
increase in recreational hunting, which compounded pressures on moose populations.90 
88 Graeme Bethell , "Preliminary Inventory of the Envrionmentall ssues and Concerns Affecting the People 
of Fort MacKay A lberta," (Brentwood Bay, B.C.: Bethell Management Ltd., May 1985). Roger Justus and 
Joanne Simonetta, "Major Resource Impact Evaluation, Prepared for the Cold Lake Band and The Indian 
and Inuit Affairs Program," (Vancouver: Justus-S imonetta Development Consultants Limited, December 
1979). and, Fort McKay Indian Band, "From Where We Stand," (Fort McMurray, Alberta: Fort McKay 
Indian Band, 1983). 
89 Bethell , "Preliminary Inventory of the Envrionmental Issues and Concerns Affecting the People of Fort 
MacKay Alberta," 23. 
90 Ibid ., 24. 
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The deve lopment of the o il sands industry had widespread negative impacts on 
water that correlate between scientific research and community observations. By 1977 
two major studies had assessed the GCOS tailings pond. Designed in 1964 to be 
temporary storage on Tar Island pending the availability of an inland mined out area for a 
permanent site, the GCOS tailings dyke was initially twelve metres tall , constructed of 
compacted earth fill.91 Because of unanticipated processing difficulties, more tailings 
storage was required than initia lly anticipated, and by 1974 the dyke was over sixty-seven 
metres tall and more than three and a half kilometres long. By 1976 effl uent seepage from 
the tailings dyke was between 1.5 and 1.6 million litres per day.92 However, this seepage 
was thought to account for only 55-70% of total seepage because of unknown quantities 
f d 0 0 93 o groun water contammat1on. 
One of the most e rroneous yet widely believed arguments made by those who deny 
the envi ronmenta l impacts of the oil sands industry is that the industry cannot be blamed 
for water pollution because bitumen naturally leaches into the Athabasca River on hot 
days.94 However, recent research by Kurek et al. , has demonstrated that o il sands 
activities have resulted in increased levels of PAHs in surrounding lakes from 
atmospheric deposition, not from naturally leached bitumen.95 Furthermore, Alberta 
Department of the Envi ronment scientist W. C. MacKay conducted research in the mid-
1970s which revealed that the organic carbon fraction of dyke drainage water was more 
9 1 W. Solodzuk et al. , "Report on Great Canadian Oil Sands Tar Island Tailings Dyke," (Design Review 
Panel, Alberta Environment, February 1977), I. 
92 P. H. Bouthillier, "A Review of the GCOS Dyke Discharge Water," in Great Canadian Oil Sands Dyke 
Discharge Water (Edmonton, Alberta: Alberta Department ofthe Environment, August 1977), I. 
93 D. N. Gallup, "I mpact Assessment of Discharge," in Great Canadian Oil Sands Dyke Discharge Water 
(Edmonton, Alberta: Alberta Department of the Environment, August 1977). 
94 
"Alberta's Oi l Sands: Opportunity. Balance." Government of Alberta, 2008. 
95 Kurek et al. , "Legacy of a Half Century of Athabasca Oi l Sands Development Recorded by Lake 
Ecosystems." 
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toxic in composition than the carbon compounds which naturally leached from exposed 
bitumen deposits.96 Samples of tailings pond water in 1976 revealed significant 
concentrations of ammonia and heavy metals including, copper, nickel , chromium and 
zinc.97 Bioassay testing of the toxicity oftailings pond water conducted in 1974 found the 
heavy metal content to be lethal to rainbow trout.98 Dilution of effluent flows one mile 
downstream of the dyke were 400 times in winter and 1200 times in summer.99 
Figure 10: Unknown Photographer, "Aerial View of Great Canadian Oil Sands Ltd. Tar Is land Tailings 
Dy ke," (July 1975), in W. Solodzuk, N. R. Morgenstern, N . L. Iverson, E. J. Klohn, M.A. J. Matich, B . D. 
Prasad, I. H. Anderson "Report on Great Canadian Oil Sands Tar Is land T ailings Dyke," Design Review 
Pane l, Alberta Environment, February 1977. Used with permission. 
While such dilution reduced the toxicity of contaminants to a non-lethal level , Mackay 
mainta ined that sub-lethal concentrations of ta ilings water toxicants would impair various 
96 W. C. Mackay, "Toxic ity of GCOS Tailings Pond Dyke Discharge," in Great Canadian Oil Sands Dyke 
Discharge Water (Edmonton, Alberta: A lberta Department of the Environment, August 1977). 
97 Ibid . 
98 S . E. Hrudey, "Characterization of wastewaters from the Great Canadian O il Sands bitumen extractio n 
and upgrading plant," (Ottawa, Canada: Water Pollution Control Section, Envrionmenta l Protection 
Service, Northwest Region, Environment Canada, 1975). 
99 Gallup, "Impact Assessment of Discharge." 
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body functions and cause significant health problems in fi sh. 100 D. N . Gallup asserted that 
the river diluted effluents to a non-letha l level, but research did not exist that could 
accurate ly assess the long term health implications of the chemical and organic 
contaminants in the Athabasca River for fish and humans. 101 Effluent seepage from the 
GCOS tailings dyke was not regulated by the Alberta government. T he company's 1973 
Clean Water Act licence regulated the requirements fo r effluents entering the tailings 
ponds but did not cover seepage rates or qua lity. 102 However, it is not clear the extent to 
which improvements ta ilings treatment and containment has ameliorated the issue of 
watershed pollution from groundwater contamination and dyke seepage. 
The Athabasca River was also contaminated by bio logical pathogens from sewage 
that was dumped into the Athabasca River by the rapidly expanding town of Fort 
McMurray. By the early 1970s Fort McKay reported that drinking water from the 
Athabasca River induced nausea and vomiting and illnesses.103 Between 1967 and 1975 
the A lberta department of hea lth warned the people of Fort McKay to stop drinking water 
from the river. 104 Two water storage tanks were installed at e ither end of the town. 
During the w inter, the tanks had to be constantly heated by propane burners to prevent 
them from freez ing. 105 By 1980, residents of Fort McKay reported that they could no 
longer even wash clothes with river water because it would cause them to stink and 
induce skin irritation and rashes. The community reported that pike and pickerel caught 
from the Athabasca River tasted bad and induced vomiting. By the early 1980s dead fish 
100 Mackay, "Toxicity of GCOS Tailings Pond Dyke Discharge." 
10 1 Gallup, "Impact Assessment of Discharge." 
102 GCOS C WA Licence No. 73-WL-041 ( 1973) in Bouthill ier, "A Review of the GCOS Dyke Discharge 
Water." 
103 Bethell , "Pre liminary Inventory of the Envrionmental Issues and Concerns Affecting the People of Fort 
MacKay Alberta," 16. 
104 Ibid., 38. 
105 Ibid ., 39. 
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were regularly seen floating in the Athabasca River and fi sh from the Muskeg River 
began to taste like oil and were subsequently abandoned as a food source by the 
community. 106 By 1985 an environmental impact assessment study of Fort McKay 
commissioned by the ERCB asserted that everyone in the community relied on the river, 
ice, snow and rain for water, but that all of these sources were contaminated. The 
community reported that rainwater had developed a "yellow scum" when collected and 
allowed to settle. 107 
Oil sands activities produced atmospheric emissions that bore de leterious 
consequences for surrounding ecosystems. A 1986 environmental impact assessment 
commissioned by the Fort McKay community stated, "there has been a definite and 
statistically s ignificant deterioration in the long-term air qua lity of the region." 108 The 
report argued that the atmospheric concentration of sulphur dioxide, nitrogen dioxide and 
hydrogen sulphide permitted by the Alberta Air Quality Objectives (AQOs) under the 
Clean Air Act was significantly greater than the g lobal atmospheric background 
concentration of those compounds. The report argued that government emphasis on 
compliance with the AQOs of the period had no ecological relevance, as meeting 
negotiable AQOs wrongly implied that environmental quality wou ld be maintained in the 
long term, despite that no research data existed to support such a resu lt. 109 The particulate 
emissions of fly ash (small dark flecks of ash produced from the burning of coke) from 
the Syncrude and Suncor plants increased the a lkalinity and trace e lement and metal 
106 Bethell, "Preliminary Inventory of the Envrionmental Issues and Concerns Affecting the People of Fort 
MacKay Alberta," 16. 
107 1bid., l 7. 
108 Fort McKay Community, "An Issues Assessment for Concerns Regarding Ongoing Oi l Sands 
Developments and the Community of Fort McKay," (Fort McKay, Alberta : Fort McKay Indian Band, 
1986), 16 . 
109 1bid., 13 . 
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content of the snowpack in the oil sands region, and can be correlated with the snowpack 
observations of the Fort McKay community. 110 
An environmental impact assessment report commissioned by Fort McKay cites 
research which indicates that the alkalinity in snow resulted from calcium and 
magnesium oxides. 111 Particulate emissions from the Syncrude stack were 3060 
kilograms per day. Analysis of the particulate emissions revealed twenty-six trace 
elements and metals emitted at seventy kilograms per day. 112 Of the trace element 
emissions ninety-five per cent consisted of sodium, vanadium, magnesium, titanium, and 
manganese. Most toxic of these trace e lements was vanadium, a transition metal emitted 
at three kilograms per day. Vanadium inhalation has adverse effects on the human 
respiratory system and repeated exposure can cause permanent health problems and 
death . Oil sands operations also emitted significant amounts of hydrocarbon particulates 
that cou ld explain the presence of oily residue in water melted from snow in Fort McKay . 
The particulate emissions from the oi l sands operations had potential for significant 
alteration of the mineral nutrient cycle in the oil sands region, and negative long-term 
environmental impacts on terrestrial environments. 
Fort McKay residents associated atmospheric emissions from oil sands operations 
with a decline in the health of reg ional vegetation. 11 3 They reported that the tops of birch 
11° Fort McKay Community, "An Issues Assessment for Concerns Regarding Ongoing Oil Sands 
Developments and the Community of Fort McKay," (Fort McKay, A lberta : Fort McKay Indian Band, 
1986), 18. 
11 1 L. A. Barrie, "T he fate of particulate emissions from an isolated power plant in the Oi l Sands area of 
Western Canada," Annals ofthe NeJV York Academy of Sciences 338( 1980), in Fort McKay Community , 
"An Issues Assessment for Concerns Regarding Ongoing Oil Sands Developments and the Community of 
FortMcKay," 18. 
112 Syncrude, "Biophysical Impact Assessment for the New Facilities at the Syncrude Canada Ltd. Mi ldred 
Lake Plant," (Calgary : Syncrude Canada Ltd., 1984). in ibid. 
113 Bethell, "Pre! iminary Inventory of the Envrionmenta l Issues and Concerns Affecting the People of Fort 
MacKay Alberta." 
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trees were dy ing, and that those that were still a live had yellowing leaves and were not 
healthy. All trees had generally decl ined in health and produced less foliage. They noted 
that jack-pine needles were drying and falling off and that all coniferous trees were 
producing fewer cones and nuts. Soon after the GCOS plant began operations they 
observed that berries had decreased in abundance. 114 Although AOSERP, industry and 
others asserted that the establishment of oi l sands industry was not damaging to the 
environment of the broader region, significant research and community observation 
suggest that the industry caused extensive impacts that increased with the scale of 
production. 
Figure 7: Unknown Photographer, T he 600-foot Syncrude, A lberta (Winter 1976), Imperial Oi l Archives, 
IP 65, GA. Used with permission . 
114 Bethell, "Pre! iminary Inventory of the Envrionmenta l Issues and Concerns Affecting the Peop le ofF ort 
MacKay Alberta," 27. 
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Conclusion 
The 1970s were formative years for env ironmental policy and management at the 
federal and provincial levels. Provincial and federal government environmental concerns 
about the o il sands industry transformed from a focus on wild life conservation in the 
1950s and 60s, to the writing of laws oriented towards pollution prevention such as the 
Clean Air and Clean Water Acts, the formation of the ECA, and the creation of the 
Departments of Environment. Careful environmental management was a key priority of 
Lougheed's rational planning approach to the oi l sands industry in 1971 and 1972. The 
OPEC price increases and Alberta and Canada's investment in Syncrude created a 
development imperative that challenged Alberta's intention to closely control the growth 
of the industry, and produced a potential conflict of interest position that may have 
compromised effective regulation of the resource. Developed under such conditions, 
environmental regulators and researchers were never given the authority or autonomy to 
be effective. Though Alberta set precedent as the first Canadian province to develop 
serious environmental policy, further investment in and empowerment of environmental 
regulation trailed behind the rapid development of the oil sands industry. By the late 
1970s and early 1980s significant research demonstrated that environmental damage was 
taking place. With the ending of the AOSERP program and the fai lure of the Alsands 
project, the maintenance of government environmental research agendas dec lined 
significantly in the 1980s. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
Resource Colonialism and Indigenous Responses to Oil Sands Development 
The Athabasca oil sands region is home to five major First Nations and Metis 
communities, the First Nations of which form the Athabasca Tribal Council: Fort 
McMurray, Fort McKay, Fort Chipewyan, Janvier, and Cold Lake. Each of these 
communities is home to both Treaty and non-Treaty signatories and Metis. All First 
Nations governments in the region are signatories of Treaty 8.1 Traffic to the region grew 
with the establishment of Fort McMurray in 1870 and the introduction of steamboats to 
the Saskatchewan River in 1875.2 The completion of the CPR line to Calgary in 1883 
ended use of the Churchill-Clearwater River access route. When the HBC cut a road from 
Edmonton to Athabasca Landing and launched the S.S. Grahame at Fort Chipewyan, Fort 
McMurray became the southern terminus for northern transportation in the Mackenzie 
River Basin. The construction of this new transport network opened the reg ion to 
industrial development staged from Edmonton and Calgary. The completion of the 
Alberta and Great Waterways Railway to Waterways in 1925 boosted the relationship 
between southern Alberta and the oil sands hinterland. 3 For Aboriginal peoples, the influx 
of population and trade fo llowing the industrialization of transport with rai lroad and 
steamship imposed a regime of settlement and development on the fur trade society.4 
Between the 1890s and the 1950s Aboriginal populations were more widely spread, 
1 McCormack, Fort ChipeJVyan and the shaping ofCanadian histmy, 1788-1920s.· "We like to be free in 
this country", 20. 
2 J.M . Parker, " Athabasca O il Sands Historical Research Project," Alberta Oil Sands Environmental 
Research Program ( 1979), xiii. 
3 Ibid., xiv. 
4 Ibid. , xiv. 
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living as hunters and trappers, centred around trading posts. The influx of southern 
missionaries, trade, and institutions was accompanied by the establishment of residential 
schools, which became mandatory in the 1950s and 60s. The accessibility of residential 
schoo ls, family allowances, and other forms of social assistance led to a decl ine in bush 
camps by the 1960s. The most substantial permanent settlements became Janvier, Anzac, 
Fort McMurray, Fort McKay, and Fort Ch ipewyan. Though permanent communities 
became more populous, they remained dependent on hunting, gathering, trapping and 
fi shing for both income and subsistence.5 
The construction ofthe oil sands industry in the 1960s and 1970s was the physical 
manifestation of the reg ion ' s colonization by southern Canada that had begun with the 
industria lization of Fort McMurray in the 1930s and World War II , the construction of 
the Bennett Dam, the commencement of uranium mining at Uranium City, and the 
establishment of commercia l fi sheries on Lake Athabasca. The po licies that informed the 
first commercia l development phase of the o il sands industry only marginally addressed 
the existence of the First Nations and Metis communities who lived in the region. 
Industrial development imposed significant adverse environmental, social and economic 
impacts on proximate Indigenous communities. By the mid- late 1970s the impacts of the 
industry, compounded with other forces including declin ing fur prices, residential 
schooling, and an increased presence of government bureaucracy, undermined the 
contact-traditional economies of Indigenous communities and forced residents to seek 
employment in the industry from which they had largely been excluded. Indigenous 
5 McCormack, Fort Chipewyan and the shaping of Canadian histmy. 1788-1920s: "We like to befree in 
this countty": 20. 
119 
peoples in the o il sands region were unable to ha lt or mit igate envi ronmenta l destruction, 
and by the 1980s fought aggressive ly for environmental protection and employment. 
Resource degradation and exclusion 
The effect of envi ronmental impacts from o il sands activities on Ind igenous 
communities during thi s period is best accounted for by the Justus-Simonetta 
Deve lopment Consultants Ltd " Major Resource Impact Evaluation," which was prepared 
in 1979 for the Cold Lake Band and the Indian and Inuit Affa irs Program by Roger Justus 
and Joanne S imonetta. The stance of Esso and the ERCB on Cold Lake was based on the 
Board ' s public benefit menta lity, that regional and national needs and benefits of the 
industry outwe ighed any negative impacts w ithin the proj ect area. T he report was 
commissioned to investigate the impacts of the Athabasca o il sands industry and to draft 
a strategy fo r Cold Lake to deal w ith the pending Esso in-situ oil sands proj ect. T he study 
reflected perceptions of environmental and socia l change of a large number of Indigenous 
peoples in the o i I sands region who re lied on natura l resources for subsistence. Justus and 
Simo netta used a questionna ire and interview methodo logy to produce data, completing 
forty-six househo ld interv iews in Fort McKay, Fort McMurray and Fort Ch ipewyan, 
which refl ected the views of approximately 300 people. They interviewed thi rty-fo ur 
househo lds in Fort McKay, s ix in Fort McMurray, and six at Fort Chipewyan.6 
Justus and Simonetta c ited e ight major negative impacts that fo llowed the 
estab lishment of the oil sands industry: deterioration of socia l fabric , ev idenced by 
increased a lcohol abuse, v iolence, less security, increased family breakdown, loss of kin 
6 Justus and Simonetta, "Major Resource Impact Evaluation, Prepared for the Cold Lake Band and The 
Indian and Inuit A ffairs Program," 2 1. 
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support and a lack of solidarity; lack of improvement in living standards in terms of 
infrastructure, health or transportation; degradation of the region 's physical environment 
and natural resource base; deterioration of economic stabil ity with loss of access to, and 
reduced yields from, hunting, trapping, fishing and gathering, and resulting increased 
debt loads; minimal participation and work opportunities in the oil sands industry; and 
overall decline in the ability of Indigenous communities to manage themselves and 
provide for the basic and essential needs of residents.7 The survey data revealed that 
97.7% of the total sample felt that the oil sands plants had had some impact on the 
wild life and natural resources ofthe area. In Fort McKay, 100% of respondents stated 
that the Suncor and Syncrude plants had affected wildlife. Respondents in Fort 
Ch ipewyan felt that the main environmental impact had been the pollution of Lake 
Athabasca, though they also reported a decline in the numbers of migratory birds. Thirty-
eight per cent of respondents reported that fish from the Athabasca River and Lake 
Athabasca were unhealthy, smelled like oil and were inedible. Pinecone growth was also 
reported to have become poor and bushes and trees were unhealthy, due to emissions. 
Moose were scarcer, deer were gone, and tai lings ponds were continual ly kil lings birds, 
including 400 that died in 1978 after landing on the Syncrude tail ings pond. In addition to 
these losses was the pressure on wi ldlife from increasing numbers of southern hunters.8 
The most significant environmental concern recorded by Justus and Simonetta 
was the quality of drinking water from Lake Gregoire, Lake Athabasca and the Athabasca 
River. Water was polluted by oi l sands operations but a lso by sewage discharge from Fort 
McMurray. Of tota l respondents, 97.8% agreed that water quality had sign ificantly 
7 Justus and Simonetta, "Major Resource Impact Evaluation, Prepared for the Cold Lake Band and The 
Indian and Inuit Affairs Program," 24. 
8 Ibid., 3 1. 
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deteriorated since the establishment of the oil sands industry. Fort Chipewyan residents 
reported having been told by a nurse to boil water before drinking it. Gregoire Lake 
residents told Justus and Simonetta that the lake was extremely polluted. Justus and 
Simonetta concluded that: 
Overall, the Indian [sic] communities in the Athabasca tar sands regions 
have become or are destined to become the net losers in the resource 
development of the region. Attempts to identify, avoid, ameliorate or 
mitigate significant socio-economic and environmental impacts of these 
major resource developments have been, from the communities' points of 
view, uneven and unsuccessful.9 
Justus and Simonetta's consultation of Indigenous communities in the oil sands region 
produced a narrative that differed greatly from the government and Industry position that 
no significant environmental damage had occurred. 
The issues plaguing the community were recorded in depth in the 1985 interview 
based report by Graeme Bethell. It primarily highlighted the direct physical impact of 
human and mechanical destruction of wildlife habitat. The Athabasca River valley was a 
rich ecosystem that sustained large populations of moose, caribou, birds and fur bearing 
mammals. By strip mining thousands of acres of forests and creating huge tailings ponds, 
the impact of the oil sands plants destroyed s ignificant wildlife habitat. The community 
also reported that the influx of people to the region was compounding pressures on 
wildlife. Bethell reported a decline in lynx along with squirrels and other small game, and 
a subsequent decline in wolves and other predators. The community described a broad 
scale decline in the abundance and hea lth of wild animals. The Bethell report confirmed 
9 Justus and Simonetta, "Major Resource Impact Evaluation, Prepared for the Cold Lake Band and The 
Indian and Inuit Affai rs Program," 129. 
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that recreationa l hunters were shooting more moose than the population could sustain, 
further compromising Fort McKay's subsistence resource base. 10 
By 1985 the Fort McKay community reported that they were seeing far fewer birds 
and fewer species, especially in summer months. 11 They specifically noted that the 
thousands of mud hens had a ll but disappeared from McLean Lake and Sellar Lakes. 
Mud hen eggs were a food source for the community and the loss was significant. Fort 
McKay hunters remembered be ing able to shoot 50 or more grouse a day before the 
GCOS plant became a signi ficant destructive force in the area. After the start up of the 
plant it became hard for hunters to shoot more than three or four in a day. The community 
linked a para lle l decline in squirrels to the decline in coniferous cones. Bethell repo rted 
that hunters had been able to shoot I 00 squirrels in a day, but by the 1980s a good hunter 
could only get ten. Squirre ls were important both as a food and fur source. Bethe ll 
reported that hunters would shoot around 2200 squirre ls between 15 November and 20 
December and sell the skins. This practice had become a ll but impossible, and the meat 
of the remaining squirrels was poor and the fur worthless. They noted that muskrats were 
disappearing from the McKay River, and also became an unre liable resource for Fort 
McKay. 12 
The community noted significant declines in water quality and in the abundance 
and health of wild animals after the oil sands plants began production. Bears were not as 
healthy and the ir meat did not taste as good. They suggested that this was because 
po llutants had contaminated buds, shoots and the red willow berries that grew beside 
10 Bethell , "Pre liminary Inventory of the Envrionmental Issues and Concerns Affecting the People of Fort 
MacKay Alberta," 25. 
II Ibid. , 23 . 
12 Ibid ., 24. 
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Athabasca river. The community also maintained that moose became much less 
abundant after the mid-late 1970s, and that they had stopped eating red willow shoots. 13 
The Bethell Report did not identify specific contaminants but it did note a decline in 
squirrels and other small game, and a subsequent decline in lynx, wolves and other 
predators. Water pollution had a significant impact on fish, a major food source for 
communities. Prior to the pollution of the Athabasca River, each Fort McKay family 
would catch over 2000 fi sh each fall to dry and store for winter months. Fish were an 
important subsistence resource and the autumn fish catch was an important cultural event. 
Both were eliminated by the oil sands industry. Dead fish were regularly seen floating in 
the river by the early 1980s. Fish were no longer used for bait in trapping, as animals 
would not eat them. By the early 1980s fish from the Muskeg River began to taste like oil 
and were subsequently abandoned as a food source by the community .14 
The Bethell report noted that residents smelled odours from the oil sands plants 
constantly since the opening of GCOS in 1967 that were more prevalent in cold weather. 
They reported eye irritation and irregular exhaustion, that guns and metals rusted faster 
out of doors, that an oily film, smell, taste and black particles appeared in water melted 
from snow, that clothes left to dry outside would adopt an oily sulphur like smell, and 
that rain water would stain buckets and utensils black. 15 The Fort McKay community 
associated atmospheric emissions from oil sands operations with a decline in the health of 
regional vegetation, though they did not specify any pollutants by name.16 They noted 
that jack-pine needles were drying and falling off and that all coniferous trees were 
13 Bethell , "Pre I iminary Inventory of the Envrionmental Issues and Concerns Affecting the People of Fort 
MacKay Alberta," 25. 
14 Ibid., 16. 
IS Ibid., 18. 
16 1bid., 17. 
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producing fewer cones and nuts, a significant food supplement for Fort McKay. Soon 
after the GCOS plant began operations they observed that berries had decreased in 
abundance. Saskatoon and blueberries had almost completely disappeared and cranberries 
had declined significantly. The community mentioned that they used to be able to pick 
300-400 pounds of cranberries in a season, but now could never get more than thirty. 
Edible plants, herbs and medicinal plants became more scarce, and what could be 
collected was less trusted by the community. 17 
The dire circumstances described in the Bethell report prompted the ERCB 
commission the 1986 Fort McKay report to consolidate information on the environmental 
impacts of oil sands activities. The report, discussed in depth in chapter two, blended the 
observations and indigenous knowledge of Fort McKay residents with available scientific 
data, reports and findings. 18 The report was funded by the ERCB at the encouragement of 
Chairman Vern Millard, with contributions from Syncrude Canada Ltd. and Suncor Inc. 
The project was directed and the report compiled by Dr. Ron Wallace of Dominion 
Ecological Consulting Ltd., with contributions from several other scientists and 
community leaders. Wallace' s team highlighted four major impact areas of direct 
relevance to the subsistence needs of the Fort McKay community: wildlife, vegetation 
and soils, and aquatics and air quality that were recorded in the Bethell report. It is 
unclear what steps Alberta authorities took to prevent further impacts of environmental 
degradation on Fort McKay following the publication of these two reports. 
17 Bethell , "Pre! iminary Inventory of the Envrionmental Issues and Concerns Affecting the People of F ort 
MacKay Alberta," 27. 
18 Fort McKay Community, "An Issues Assessment for Concerns Regarding Ongoing Oil Sands 
Developments and the Community of Fort McKay." 
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During the first development phase of the oil sands industry, Indigenous peoples 
suffered the brunt of environmental, social and economic impacts, but they were also 
largely excluded from employment and participation opportunities. The views of 
Indigenous peoples in the oil sands region were not homogeneous. Most people, 
especially those most engaged with hunting and trapping opposed the negative 
environmental impacts of the industry, as for them its impacts were most devastating. But 
for others, especially younger people who had been born into settled communities and 
had lost much of their Indigenous language and culture in residential schools, the arrival 
of the oil sands industry was welcome for its promise of new employment opportunities. 
This was a promise that could not be discounted, even by those who sought to continue 
the contact-traditional lifestyle, where collapsing fur prices and increased integration in 
the southern economy meant that wage labour provided a welcome income supplement. 
Thus, for the majority, especially in Fort McKay, a poor community that was for many of 
its inhabitants a recent permanent settlement where the subsistence resource base had 
been undermined, the pursuit of employment and participation was not a choice but a 
necessity if they were to feed and clothe their families. 
Alberta government approaches to Indigenous peoples in north-eastern Alberta 
were characterized by indifference loosely couched in terms of ass imilating Indigenous 
people into mainstream society through economic means. Legally, Treaty signatories and 
Status Indians were the responsibility of the federal government under the British North 
America Act and the Indian Act. However, the federal government did not adequately 
protect the well being of Indigenous peoples in the oil sands region in the 1960s and 
1970s. The Alberta Conservation and Utilization Committee' s 1972 "Tar Sands 
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Development Strategy" advocated that the Alberta government create a " multi-purpose 
public awareness program which would emphasize the prospective developments and 
condition of the local population, and place special attention on the native people in order 
to encourage assimilation into the work force and overcome alienation." 19 Peter 
Lougheed speaking in parliament in 1973 presented Indigenous subsistence hunting, 
fishing and trapping as vanishing practices, stating that 
We have to keep in mind in this area that we, as a provincial government, 
cannot interfere, unless there are ways in which we are asked to, with the 
treaty rights of our Native people. We are all well aware that trapping and 
fishing is a phasing-out situation to some extent, and we are faced with 
ski lied jobs in areas such as tar sands plants - and there is great transition 
going to be required in that, considerable patience and not too much false 
expectation. The progress will be slow and let no one pretend otherwise.20 
The Lougheed government's perception of Indigenous subsistence practices as vanishing 
worked to just ify the establishment of the oil sands industry by validating the assimilation 
of Indigenous communities. Broad examination of debates in the Alberta Legislative 
Assembly reveals that the Alberta government was primarily interested in oil production 
and economic development in the oil sands reg ion and did not register much concern for 
Indigenous communities. The Alberta government was minimally concerned with issues 
of Indigenous employment, yet they largely devolved employment responsibilities to the 
goodwill of o il sands operators.21 
In the Alberta Legislature in 1974, opposition leader Bob Clark asked Dr Albert 
Hohol, Minister of Manpower and Labour, what assurances had been given by the 
government to Indigenous communities regarding employment on the Syncrude project. 
19 Conservation and Utilization Committee, "Fort McMurray Athabasca Tar Sands Development Strategy," 
Policy Paper prepared for the Executive Council, government of Alberta, Edmonton, August 1972, 2, in 
RGI 9 vol. 5238 file 9628- 15- l pt.l , LAC. 
20 Peter Lougheed, 18 April 1973 , Alberta Hansard. 1973, vol.45 , p.24 10, PAA. 
2 1 Ex. Bob Bog le 's response to Grant Notley, Alberta Hansard. 3 May 1976, p.l014. 
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Minister Hohol responded that Indigenous people had been given "reasonable, practical 
and sensible assurances" that they would be included in the development of the industry. 
Clark then asked if these assurances had been put in writing and given to the affected 
communities. The question prompted an exchange between Albert Hohol and Albert 
Ludwig, which illustrates the perspective of opposition MLAs to the Lougheed 
government's inaction on Indigenous employment: 
Dr Hohol: No, Mr. Speaker. l would take the view that the nature of these 
kinds of assurances .. . 
Mr. Ludwig: B.S. 
Dr Hohol : . .. are shaken down by discussions with the Native Association 
of Alberta, the Metis Association of Alberta .. . the federa l government 
through its Manpower and Immigration Department and various 
departments of this government, including Industry and Commerce, 
Advanced Education and Manpower and Labour. 
Mr. Ludwig: You faked that one beautifully .22 
The Alberta government did not act to ensure Indigenous participation in the oi l sands 
industry, but acted on the assumption that industrial projects inev itably benefit local 
populations. 
Two years later, in 1976, the federal government, Syncrude, and the IAA signed 
an agreement on the hiring of Indigenous people. The agreement read that "Syncrude 
shall , during the development recruit and offer employment to Indians who hold the 
necessary educationa l and technical qualifications and meet Syncrude's normal standards 
of employment."23 The agreement a lso set out plans for training programs, and 
institutional a lliances to better the employment potential of Indigenous peoples. The 
22 Albert Hoho l and A lbert Ludwig, Alberta Hansard, I 0 May 1974, p. 1968, PAA. 
23 Her Majesty The Queen in Right of Canada, and Syncrude Canada Ltd., and the Indian Association of 
Alberta, "Syncrude Indian Employment Agreement," 3 July 1976, in 82.165 fi le. 273 pt. I , PAA . 
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Syncrude agreement stated that efforts would be made to hire Indigenous peoples, but it 
did not contain any provisions for guaranteeing that they would actually be hired. By the 
end of September 1976, Syncrude claimed to have received over 400 submissions from 
Indigenous applicants, but the report stated that "some trouble is being experienced with 
the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development in that their portrayal of the 
Syncrude job situation for natives is g iving rise to unrealistic expectations on the part of 
Northern Alberta lndians."24 The Alberta government did not sign the agreement. 
For Indigenous peoples, employment in the o il sands industry proved to be a 
significant disappointment in the 1970s. The Justus-Simonetta " Resource Impact 
Evaluation" report paints a detailed picture of Indigenous employment in the o il sands 
industry by 1979. They found that 60.5% of total respondents and 74% of Fort McKay 
respondents expected to get jobs from the o il sands industry, that over 76% of 
respondents highly desired jobs and had appl ied for them despite most people not hearing 
of o il sands projects, or potential jobs prior to the commencement of construction.25 Only 
thirty Indigenous people in total, including twenty-four from Fort McKay, had ever been 
employed, and only seven people were still employed. Of those no longer employed 
33.3% had been la id off, 16.7% had left to go trapping, 16.7% had left because of illness. 
In terms of duration, 4 1.7% worked for less than s ix months, and only 23.6% had worked 
for more than e ighteen months. The majority of jobs were in menial labour, paying $6.50 
per hour or less ($ 19.65 per hour in 20 12 dollars), or about $ 13,000 per year.26 For most 
this was not a viable option as fam ily relocation to Fort McMurray cost eas ily $ 1000 per 
24 T om Chambers, P. Eng., M.L.A. to Don Getty, 30 September 1976, in 82 .165 tile. 285, PAA. 
25 Justus and Simonetta, "Major Resource Impact Eva luation, Prepared for the Cold Lake Band and The 
Indian and Inuit A ffairs Program," 40 . 
26 
"Inflation Calculator," Bank of Canada, Statistics Canada Consumer Price Indexes for Canada, 
http://www .bankofcanada.ca/rates/related/in tlation-calc u lator/ . 
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month. Even for people liv ing in Fort McKay, expenses were prohibitively high because 
there was no bus to the GCOS or Syncrude plants. This required employees to take a tax i, 
which consumed a substantial portion of their income. Respondents also reported that 
there were only minimal salary increases, and only 13.3% of respondents ever received a 
promotion. In regards to the Syncrude hiring agreement, the report stated that " it can be 
said that Syncrude has made some effort to employ Ind ian people in a ll job categories. 
However, the number of Indian [sic] employees, particularly from the immediate ly local 
area, has remained re latively low."27 The pilot training program was seen as a complete 
fa ilure by Indigenous people, Syncrude and the IAA. Justus-Simonetta reported that 
The Syncrude Agreement represents a well-intentioned attempt by a ll 
parties to ensure Indian [s ic] participation in employment training and 
bus iness opportunities in the oil sands area. However, exploratory research 
in the communities and an analysis of the available documentation reveals 
a gap between the original intents of the Agreement and the results of 
implementation efforts, by all parties, to date.28 
Indigenous peoples were unable to find work in the oil sands industry for numerous 
reasons. Most of the jobs were in skilled labour, and required training and education that 
most Indigenous peoples in the region did not have. Another problem was that 
employment infrastructure was planned around work camps and bussing workers in and 
out of Fort McMurray. There was no bus serv ice to Fort McKay, which automatica lly 
made it more difficult for people from that community to get to a job. Work was often not 
advertised in Indigenous communities, and there were no Indigenous-specific hiring and 
training programs. Also, full-time employment was incompatible with the hunting and 
trapping lifesty le of Indigenous peoples. They could not work full time, as well as pursue 
27 Justus and S imonetta, "Major Resource Impact Evaluation, Prepared for the Cold Lake Band and T he 
Indian and Inuit Affairs Program," 73. 
28 Ibid ., 76. 
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the diminished but still essential practices of hunting and trapping. The unwillingness of 
many Indigenous employees to commit to full-time employment was not acceptable in 
the oi l sands industry.29 
Advocacy and conflict 
In response to resource degradation and employment exclusion, Fort McKay 
community leaders began extensive advocacy for env ironmental protection and 
participation as residents became more dependent on government welfare and 
participation in the oi l sands industry. As early as 6 May 1971 , the Fort McKay Metis 
population wrote to Stan Daniels, President of the Metis association of Alberta asking 
him to appeal to government to improve drinking water infrastructure followi ng the 
pollution of the Athabasca River from sewage from Fort McMurray, writing "please do 
something about water in McKay because, our chi ldren are suffering .. . "30 A 1974 appeal 
from the ECA Public Advisory Committee advocated that oil sands plant authorization be 
stopped until the need for tai lings ponds could be e liminated and for the c reat ion of an 
Indigenous advisory board to be inc luded in policy decisions to help manage the 
environmental impacts of the industry on the ir communities.31 
The first major statement of the negative environmental impacts on Fort McKay 
was the community's intervention at the ERCB hearing for the GCOS application to 
expand its plant from 45,000 to 60,000 bbl./d, in January 1979.32 The community 
29 Justus and Simonetta, "Major Resource Impact Evaluation, Prepared for the Cold Lake Band and The 
Indian and Inuit Affairs Program," 73. 
3° Fort McKay Local # 122, to Stan Danie ls, 6 May 197 1, in M4755 File .470, GA. 
3 1 Bernice Leaver, Supervisor, PAC Secretariat, to Stan Daniels, President, Metis Association of Alberta, 4 
December 1974, in M4755 tile.709, GA. 
32 
"Intervention tiled with The Energy Resources Conservation Board by The Fort McKay Community 
Committee in re lation to the proposed GCOS Expansion Application 780318." Energy Resources 
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expressed concern that plant expansion would worsen the problem of sulphur dioxide 
emissions, which had had a negative impact on wildlife and fish, and that the emissions 
were presenting a direct health hazard in winter to the many people who melted snow for 
water. One of the most immediate impacts on the Fort McKay community's hunting and 
trapping practices was the construction of the GCOS plant on Tar Island, one of the prime 
hunting grounds in the region, and the site of the much of the community's summer hunt 
camps and trap lines: 
Before 1960, Fort McKay was a relatively isolated settlement having little 
contact with the 'outside world'. The building ofthe Great Canadian Oil 
Sands plant in the 1960s marked the beginning of the encroachment of 
major resource development upon the settlement. The plant was 
constructed on the summer residence for many families from Fort McKay. 
The construction of the plant provided the first major conflict between the 
traditional lifestyle of the community and an industrialized way of life. In 
such a conflict, the 'old way' can not win [sic]. A giant like the GCOS has 
not changed its way because of Fort McKay. But certainly our community 
has had to turn ' upside down' for GCOS and other specific resource 
developments. 33 
The destruction of trap lines was poorly compensated. Trappers were given $20, a menial 
sum that did not cover the cost of cabins and traps needed to run the line. A man from 
Fort McKay who lost his trap line, interviewed by Michael Fox said, 
Money doesn ' t mean anything to a person losing a trap line. If they 
offered me enough to start another living, there would be no problem. 
Offering money for a trap line is not the point. Not much a guy can do. 
Try to get money. The developer should pay for cabins and traps.34 
The major issue for many trappers was not exclusively the destruction of trap lines, but 
also the lack of replacement jobs to earn a living in lieu of the traditional economy. The 
Conservation Board, Application No. 7803 18, 19 January 1979, ERCB Archives. 
33 
"Intervention filed with The Energy Resources Conservation Board by The Fort McKay Community 
Committee in relation to the proposed GCOS Expansion Application 7803 18." Energy Resources 
Conservation Board, Application No. 780318, 19 January 1979, ERCB Archives. 
34 Michae l G . Fox, "The Impact of Oil Sands Development on Trapping with Management Implications" 
(Master's Thesis, University of Calgary, 1977), 136. 
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community perceived GCOS and the Alberta government as circumventing the 
environmental issues associated with the plant. They told the ERCB that "GCOS has not 
made any attempt to explain to the residents of Fort McKay the resu lts of environmental 
monitoring by the company and by the Alberta Oil Sands Environmental Research 
Program." The community decried the impact on water which they said had "deteriorated 
significantly since the construction of the GCOS plant." The community committee 
concluded that, 
in the present application for expansion, GCOS appears to once again 
adopt the stance that environmental social and economic impacts upon the 
settlement of Fort McKay are not the responsibility of the company, and 
consequently are not relevant to company interests. Yet this company was 
the first to change our way of life. We can not go back to the old way of 
life which has been destroyed.35 
For Fort McKay the ERCB approval of the GCOS expansion, after such testimony about 
the impacts of the project, was devastating. 
Shortly after the expansion of the Suncor plant, in December 1981 , unusually 
extreme cold weather came through the Athabasca River valley and equ ipment 
throughout the region struggled. In Fort McKay the propane heater on the south water 
tank malfunctioned and the entire structure burnt down. The heater on the north tank 
fa iled and the tank froze, turning the remainder of the town ' s water into ice, which 
cracked and destroyed the tank as it expanded. The fa ilure of the water system caused a 
crisis. Melted snow was reportedly "disgusting and undrinkable," causing nausea and 
vomiting. Residents were forced to take water from the contaminated river because they 
had no other option. At the recently expanded Suncor plant, cold temperatures caused 
35 
"Intervention filed with The Energy Resources Conservation Board by The Fort McKay Community 
Committee in relation to the proposed GCOS Expansion Application 7803 18." Energy Resources 
Conservation Board, Application No. 780318, 19 January 1979, ERCB Archives. 
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equipment failures in late December 1981 , that were compounded by fires in January 
1982, which caused major spills of oil, grease and phenols into the Athabasca River that 
continued until the end of February. In the course of a few days more than forty tonnes of 
toxic waste and chemicals were spilled into the river.36 Suncor did not inform Fort 
McKay that a spill had occurred unti123 February, despite having been told to do so by 
Alberta Environment on 26 January. Suncor did not send anyone to the community to 
explain the problem, but invited Chief Dorothy MacDonald for a plant tour, during which 
she was told that the plant was having problems and an oil spill had occurred. As news of 
the Suncor spill became widely known, an emergency water delivery system was 
established that was relied on by the community into the late 1980s.37 
Figure 8 : A Fort McKay residence pictured in, "Northern Natives Frustrated," The Red Deer Advocate, I 
February 19 80, Alsands Press C lippings Vo l. 3, GA. Used wi th permission. 
36 Bethell , "Pre liminary Invento ry of the Envrionmentall ssues and Concerns Affecting the People of Fort 
MacKay Alberta," 39 .. 
37 Ibid., 40 
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Environment Minister John Cookson told Ken Nelson from Fort McMurray 
Today that " Both the ERCB and my department are concerned why this happened. The 
company has to tell us why machines failed, what staff was on duty to manage, and 
submit recommendations."38 Chief Dorothy MacDonald was furious about the situation, 
asking in a press conference, " Where the hell was the government when all this was 
going on? Why didn't the Department of the Environment tell us what was going on and 
why didn ' t they conduct testing themselves?"39 MacDonald asked the Alberta 
government about the system in which oil sands plants were required to monitor their 
own pollution and report to the province, "How foolish can you be to allow a company 
like Suncor to conduct its own monitoring? Do bank robbers turn themselves in after 
they ' ve done the job?" In response to the oil spill and pending inquiry, Alberta MLA 
Grant Notley pointed to regulatory issues, stating in parliament, " we know Suncor has 
violated the law, what an inquiry needs to find out is why the department allowed them to 
violate the law."4° Commenting on Cookson ' s announcement of an investigation that 
" It's a whitewash when they don ' t include an investigation of the department's 
performance. l think one thing that now is quite common throughout the province is 
we ' ve got a Department of the Environment that is badly managed and incompetently 
led." Jackie Macdonald of Fort McMurray Today reported that " provincial tests on fou l-
tasting fish downstream from the Suncor oil sands plant have revealed the fi sh are 
po lluted, a spokesman in associate Wildlife Minister Bud Miller's office said 
38 Ken Nelson, "Charges probable against Suncor during waste-water probe," Fort McMurray Today, 17 
March 1982, in Alsands Press Clippings M-6328 Box. 2, GA. 
39 
"Suncor faces spill inquiry," Fort McMurray Today, 18 March 1982, Alsands Press C lippings M-6328 
Box. 2, GA . 
~0 Ibid. 
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Wednesday."41 Bill Diachuk Minister for Workers Health, Safety and Compensation 
reported that testing of Suncor effluents revealed an abundance of polychlorinated 
bipheny ls (PCBs), toxic aromatic compounds.42 The fo llowing week Fort McMurray 
Today repo rted that samples of pickere l taken from Lake Athabasca near Fort Chipewyan 
had an o ily taste and that the Lake had high levels of PCBs. The Assoc iate Minster of 
Public Lands and Wildlife Bud Miller warned people downstream of Fort McM urray not 
to eat fi sh from the lake or the river and delayed the commercial fishing season to June 
pending the results of testing.43 
In the Legislative Assembly, Grant Notley critic ized the response of the Alberta 
government, condemning the inaction of Environment Minister John Cookson in his 
fa ilure to info rm the community of the spill and his d ismissal of the seriousness of 
Suncor' s Clean Water Act violations. Notley drew attention to the A lberta Department of 
Envi ronment po llution control division ' s "Summary of Suncor Inc. Wastewater 
Treatment System Perfo rmance, June 1978 to Date," w hich stated that Suncor had 
exceeded its water po llution allowances in 36 of the preceding 43 months. He decried the 
government' s inaction and highlighted the change in po licy of the Lougheed government 
after ten years of invo lvement in the oil sands industry, te lling the Legislative Assembly: 
I well remember w hen we had an o il spill on the Athabasca River in 1970, 
and the now Premier was Leader of the Opposit ion .. . the now prov inc ial 
Treasurer (Wi lliam Yurko) and the now Premier raised the roof over this 
oil spill .. . One of the most searing indictments the now Premier ... made 
about the fo rmer government was that they had an interdepartmental 
inqui ry into what happened on that o il spill. The now Premier. .. said, 
-I I Jackie MacDona ld, "Fish from Athabasca po lluted," Fort McMurray Today, 6 May 1982, in Alsands 
Press Cli ppings M-6328 box . 5, GA. 
-1
2 Ken Nelson, "PC Bs fo und in Suncor fluid," Fort McMurray Today, 5 May 1982, in Alsands Press 
C li ppings M-6328 box. 5, GA. 
-IJ Ken Nelson, "More fou l fish taken from river," Fort McMurray Today, 14 May 1982, Alsands Press 
Clippings M-6328 box. 5, GA. 
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' how in heaven's name can you investigate yourself; we should have some 
kind of independent investigation ... ' 44 
Notely called on government to have an independent investigation of the Suncor 
violations and for an open approach to environmental regulation. Edd Uluschak parodied 
Lougheed's inaction on the Syncrude and Suncor violations with a cartoon published in 
the Edmonton Journal that equated him with the three wise monkeys, 'hear no evil, see no 
evil, say no evil, smell no evil' (Figure 13). 
Figure 13: Edd Uluschak, "Syncrude violations, Suncor violations," political cartoon, The Edmonton 
Journal ( 1982), in 1988-025 0 I 003, LAC. Used with permission. 
44 Grant Notley, Alberta Hansard, 5 April 1982, p. 498. 
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Suncor was charged with seven violations of the federal Fisheries Act, and two 
charges of violations of the Alberta Clean Water Act. Five of the Fisheries Act charges 
were brought directly by Dorothy MacDonald and Fort McKay, but the charges were 
taken over by the Attorney General. MacDonald expressed disappointment, being unab le 
to fight her community's battle in court. She told Fort McMurray Today that " I have no 
choice but to accept it," and that the band was considering other legal options.45 In court, 
Suncor argued that it had exercised due diligence in attempting to prevent effluent flow 
into the Athabasca River, plead not guilty, and was acquitted. The Crown appealed the 
decision in the Alberta Court of Appeal. The charges were limited to four counts of 
unlawful deposit of a deleterious substance in water frequented by fish under section 
33(2) of the Fisheries Act, as the judge in the trial of the charges under the Clean Water 
Act found that the respondent had "exercised due diligence in attempting to prevent the 
flow of effluent into the Athabasca River. " The court's preliminary ruling was that the 
case drawn by the Crown was "defective in many respects, and the whole procedure by 
which the ordinary summary conviction appeal process is short-circuited cannot be 
commended."46 The court stated that " Had the Crown proceeded in the usual way, the 
appeal would have had the advantage of proceeding in the community where the offence 
was a lleged to have occurred." The court noted unnecessary disorganization as the 
charges were all brought separate ly, which lead to a repetition of ev idence. The court 
maintained Justice M. Horrocks's acceptance of the defence of due diligence during the 
initial trial, and dismissed the appeals.47 For the residents of Fort McKay, and also Fort 
45 Jackie MacDonald, "Fish from Athabasca polluted," Fort McMurray Today, 6 May 1982, in Alsands 
Press C lippings M-6328 box. 5, GA. 
46 R. v. Suncor Inc., 1983 , A lberta Court of Appeal, 2 19, Appeal # 16352, 15 September 1983 . 
47 Ibid. 
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Chipewyan, the legal process failed to bring Suncor to justice for polluting the Athabasca 
River. The ruling of R. v. Suncor Inc. suggests that the Crown poorly managed the case. 
On a broader level, the case is an example of the difficulties faced by Indigenous 
communities seeking legal recourse for the environmental impacts of industrial projects. 
In spite significant environmental degradation, Indigenous people fought hard for 
participation in the oi l sands industry. While Chief Dorothy MacDonald primarily sought 
environmental protection, the young secretary treasurer, Jim Boucher, focused on 
participation and employment. For Indigenous communities, the two issues were equally 
important. It was important for Indigenous communities to protect their natural resource 
base, but considering the increase in permanent settlement and greater involvement of 
many ofthese communities in the southern economy, they also needed money. This was 
especially important in Indigenous communities such as Fort McKay, where subsistence 
resources had been devastated. Age twenty-three in 1979, Boucher represented the 
generation that had grown up in a settled community and been educated in residential 
schools. While people of his generation continued to be highly dependent on the land for 
subsistence, they a lso had a greater connection to the industrial world. In an interview 
with the Edmonton Journal, Boucher stated that resource development in the area had 
made it impossible for community members to maintain a traditional way of life, and that 
within less than two decades the once isolated community had been complete ly upset.48 
From Boucher's perspective, there was no choice but to work with government and 
industry to seek participation. He to ld the Edmonton Journal that Fort McKay supported 
the A lsands project and the proposal to build a new town. Boucher despised hand-outs, 
~8 Tom Campbe ll , " nion word needed in native hiring," Edmonton Journal, 5 July 1979, in Alsands Press 
Clippings 5, GA. 
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and sought autonomy, a guarantee of the town 's existence, infrastructure improvements, 
land tenure, a reduction of pollution impacts, and affirmative action hiring programs.49 
The Alberta government did work to ensure that Indigenous peoples would be able 
to benefit from the employment opportunities in oil sands development. A policy paper 
from the federal Department of Energy, Mines and Resources from September 1980 
assessed the Alberta government pos ition on Indigenous participation. The report 
maintained that 
There is no ev idence of provincial concern for native partic ipation in the 
Alsands project. The government has not yet applied the September 1980 
amendment to the Alberta Individual Rights Protection Act which 
provides for special affirmative action programs by Order-in-Council, and 
it is not clear whether the Cabinet is willing to do so. 
The report continued, pointing out that Alberta had not signed the Syncrude hiring 
agreement, and had "generally taken the position that specia l programs wh ich operate in 
favour of status Indians (as proposed by the federal government) discriminate against 
non-status Indians and Metis."50 A lthough local people and the federal government 
recognized that the hiring of Indigenous peoples was more or less a fa ilure, MLAs in the 
Alberta government maintained as late as the 1980s that the hiring of Indigenous peoples 
had been a success. Norm Weiss, MLA for Lac La Biche-McMurray, championed the 
efforts of the private sector, stating that "the employment of natives by Syncrude and 
Great Canadian Oil Sands has shown a dedication to equal ity and human rights that our 
government can be proud of."5 1 In response to a question from Grant Notley about the 
poverty of the Alberta government' s Indigenous hiring policy in 198 1, Dr Don 
49 Bobbi Lambright, "Fort McKay res idents seek assurances from government," Fort McMurray Today. 5 
July 1979, in A lsands Press C lippings 5, GA. 
50 
"A !sands Project Po licy Paper," federal Department of Energy, Mines and Resources, September 19 80, 
RG 13 1 vol. J64 fil e .4300-1 2 (vol.J ) EMR- ALSAN DS, LAC. 
51 Norm We iss Alberta Hansard, 28 May 1979. 
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McCrimmon replied that " the history of Syncrude disproves what the Hon. Member is 
saying. When these megaprojects go ahead, I think the companies have been pretty 
conscientious and pretty good about try ing to get the native people work ing in them as 
much as possible."52 The Alberta government operated on the presumption that 
Indigenous peoples were benefitting from the development of the o il sands industry, 
while doing little to ensure that this was actually the case. 
In response to the disappointing hiring situation, Indigenous communities from Fort 
McMurray, Anzac, Janvier, Fort McKay and Fort Chipewyan formed the Athabasca 
Tribal Council to unify their voice on o il sands industry matters, especially employment 
and participation. As interveners in the AI sands ERCB hearings, the A TC sought the 
implementation of an affirmative action hiring program as a condition of approval for the 
Alsands project.53 The program would have legally bound Alsands to hiring Indigenous 
workers. The ERCB determined that though it was sympathetic to the Indigenous hiring 
situation, it did not have power under section 43 of the Oil and Gas Conservation Act to 
prescribe the implementation of such a program. 54 T he ATC appealed the decision to the 
Alberta Court of Appeal , which dismissed the case, ruling that the affirmative action 
program was out ofthe ERCB 'sjurisdiction, and that such a program might be in breach 
of the Individual Rights Protection Act, as a form of reverse discrimination. The Supreme 
Court of Canada dismissed a fu1ther appeal, but ruled that affirmative action programs 
did not breach the Individual Rights Protection Act, as ·'the plan was not to displace non-
Indians from their employment, but rather to advance the lot of Indians so that they could 
52 Don McCrimmon reply to Grant Notley, Alberta Hansard. 6 April 198 1. 
53 Athabasca Tribal Council , "Presentation to the Energy Resources Conservation Board," ERCB Hearings 
on the AI sands Project Group- Oil Sands M ining Project- Application # 780724, June 1979, in RG 13 1 
vo1.1 64 fi le .4300- 12 (vol.S) EM R- ALSA DS 4, LAC. 
54 Athabasca Tribal Council v. Amoco Petroleum Co. Supreme Court of Canada, 4-5 December 1980 and 
22 June 198 1. 
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be in a competitive position to obtain employment without regard to the handicaps w hich 
their race inherited."55 The ruling was a disappointment for the A TC, but the Supreme 
Court's declaration that affirmative action programs do not constitute reverse 
discrimination established an important legal precedent that was seen as a victory in that 
developers could not cite the Individual Rights Protection Act to prevent the tabling of 
future affirmative action programs, as had been done in the Alsands case. 56 
In response to the defeat in court, A TC Chairman Lawrence Courteoreille told the 
Red Deer Advocate that " the province should replace the ERCB if it has no actual 
authority to rule on the social needs of Albertans .. . the provincial government has been 
telling us our concerns can only be heard through the ERCB. The province is just paying 
for a public relations job for industry.''57 In 1980 both the ATC and the IAA appealed to 
the highest levels of the federal government to seek improved participation in the o il 
sands industry. Joe Dion, President of the IAA wrote to Prime Minister Pierre Elliot 
Trudeau, 
Development of Canada's resources has not been in partnership with 
Canada's Native people. Rather, it has occurred to the detriment of the 
traditional economies and lifestyles of Indian peoples. Being isolated from 
participation has caused no significant rise in income of Indian 
communities, and, as a result, Indian people do not have the capacity to 
finance their future developments. It is fundamental in our v iew, that the 
need for aid should eventually subside and this can only be accomplished 
with the growth in the capacity of Indians to he lp themselves. 58 
55 Athabasca Tribal Council v. Amoco Petroleum Co. Supreme Court of Canada, 4-5 December 1980 and 
22 June 198 1. 
56 Farrell Crook, "Alberta Indians win a big one- by losing: A high court ru ling means special programs to 
help Indians are not legally reverse discrimination," Toronto Star, 4 July 198 1, in Alsands Press Clippings 
I, GA. 
57 
"Supreme Court denies native-hiring program appeal," Red Deer Advocate, 23 June 1981, in Alsands 
Press Clippings I, GA. 
58 Joe Dion to Pierre Ell iot Trudeau, 6 February 1980, in RG 13 1 vol.l64 file.4300- 12 (vol.7) EMR 
ALSANDS, LAC. 
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Dion advocated affirmative action and equity participation in the Alsands project. 
Lawrence Cowteorielle wrote to Marc Lalonde, Lloyd Axworthy, John Munro and Jean 
Chretien seeking a greater share of participation in the AI sands project, specifically the 
establishment of affirmative action hiring programs, infrastructure spending, housing and 
greater efforts to minimize the social impacts of industrialization.59 The IAA and the 
A TC were able to influence the federal government to aid their interests by helping to 
encourage affirmative action programs. The National Energy Program explicitly required 
that Alsands implement a preferential hiring program for Indigenous people as a 
condition of preferential oil pricing.60 
During the planning of the Alsands project, Indigenous communities fought hard 
to ensure environmental protection and even to stop the project. At the Alsands ERCB 
hearings in 1979, the Fort McKay community presented an intervention of similar 
intensity to that presented at the GCOS expansion hearing. Chief Dorothy MacDonald 
sought three objectives in negotiating the AI sands project: protection of the traditional 
lifestyles of hunters and trappers by expanding a separate land base under band control, 
establishing an economic development base for the community, and the establishment of 
better training and employment for Fort McKay residents who wanted to work.61 These 
concerns were largely disregarded. On 5 June 1979, Alberta Energy Minister Mervin 
Leitch announced that there would not be public hearings in Fort McKay, and that he was 
unaware of any major local concerns about the plant.62 He maintained that the major 
59 Lawrence Courteori elle to Marc Lalonde, John Munro, Jean Chretien, Lloyd Axworthy, 25 April 1980, in 
RG 13 1 vol.l 64 file.4300-1 2 (vol.3) EMR- ALSAN DS, LAC. 
60 Lalonde, "The Nationa l Energy Program." 
6 1 Ken Nelson, "Tiny McKay battles a mega-project," Fort McMurray Today. II February 1982, in Alsands 
Press C lippings 2, GA. 
62 
"No public hearings be ing planned on Fort McKay oil sands plant," Edmonton Journa l, 5 June 1979, in 
Alsands Press C lippings M-6328 Box. I , GA. 
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consideration in building the Alsands project was the economy. Other than the 
opportunity to intervene at the ERCB hearing, the Fort McKay community was largely 
excluded from the environmental review of the Alsands project. A review of the Alsands 
EIA by the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development stated that 
It appears no effort has been taken to include or obtain the oral history of 
Indian elders in the area. It also appears that the Indian Association of 
Alberta and the Individual Indian Bands were not consulted, and this is a 
pity g iven the LA.A. has completed band histories jointly with several 
Bands in the area.63 
Such omissions reflect persistent diffe rences between scientific research and indigenous 
knowledge and the subsequent marginalization of Indigenous perspectives on 
environmental issues. 
In 1981, as Chief of Fort McKay and Chair of the Athabasca Tribal Council , 
Dorothy MacDonald wrote to Bud Olson, Alberta Minister of State For Economic 
Development to express that the Fort McKay Indian Band and the ATC's requests for 
affirmative action hiring programs, environmental protection, and the protection of 
Treaty and Indigenous rights had been omitted from the Alsands Agreement. She wrote 
that 
We understand that a number of very important elements will not be 
inc luded in this agreement and we are completely opposed to the signing 
of this agreement until these elements have been worked out. lfthis does 
not happen we will be left out the same way we were w hen the Suncor and 
Syncrude plants opened. We suffered a ll the impacts and someone e lse 
received all the benefits.64 
McDonald proposed that A lsands be required to negotiate separate socio-economic 
benefit agreements in each impacted community. 
63 Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, "General and Specific Comments on A lsands 
EIA," May 1979, in RG 13 1 vo1.1 64 file.4300-1 2 (vol.5) EMR- ALSAN DS 4, LAC. 
64 Dorothy MacDona ld to Bud O lson, 4 December 198 1, in RG 13 1 vol.l 64 file.4300-1 2 (vol.2), EM R -
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The Fort McKay community fought hard to have their vo ices heard in Alsands 
planning processes but were consistently rejected by the Alberta government. ERCB 
chairman Vern Millard wrote to Chief Dorothy MacDonald stat ing that Fort McKay' s 
c la ims of long-term hea lth problems and neg ligent management of toxic effluents by oi l 
sands companies did not justify further hearings, " the a lleged long-term environmental 
and hea lth impacts from o il sands development are, in the board's v iew, not 
substantiated. If they should be proven, the Board and Alberta Environment would 
undoubtedly take the appropriate action." He maintained that research into the ability of 
the new plant to deal with possible chemical and oil spills would not " serve any useful 
purpose." He also wrote off compensation and hous ing issues as not part of the ERCB' s 
jurisdiction.65 Chief MacDonald told Fort McMurray Today that " the response of the 
board is an absolute outrage." She criticized the review process, stating: 
The board says it won ' t act until there is ev idence but it refuses to re-open 
the hearings to hear the ev idence. They never considered health impacts at 
the hearings in 1979. It ' s fa irly obvious that the ERCB is j ust a pol itical 
body with absolutely no interest in human health.66 
She continued, "the only acceptable evidence to them is if we rolled in with a wheel 
barrow with someone dead in it. The province is so intent on resource development that 
they don ' t care what impact it has on people. They just don ' t care what the public health 
cost is."67 The efforts of Fort McKay to gain serious recognition of thei r envi ronmental 
concerns were not successful. Though the community took significant steps to participate 
in the planning and regulation of the o il sands industry, the community never achieved 
65 Ed Struzik, "Indians' demand rejected," Edmon/on Journal, 18 February 1982, in Alsands Press 
C lippings 2, GA. 
66 Jackie MacDonald, "Indian demand for A lsands ta lks nixed," Fort McMurray Today, 19 February 1982, 
in A lsands Press C li ppings 2, GA. 
67 Struzik, "Indians' demand rejected ." 
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the power to meaningfully influence government or industry . The Alsands plant was 
eventually cancelled following the collapse of the consortium, after the drop in oi l prices 
beginning in 1982. 
Following the failure of the Alsands project the people of Fort McKay were spared 
from a further increase in the rate of environmental destruction from a third oil sands 
plant designed to produce 125,00 bbl./d. By 1985 Fort McKay maintained that the o il 
sands industry had still not delivered jobs. For example, A lsands had promised that 
during construction of the bridge, all who sought work could have it, but only one man 
was hired.68 Although the Alsands project failed, the important gains made by the efforts 
of the lA A and the A TC were not a complete loss. Despite the failure of the Syncrude 
hiring agreement of 1976, Syncrude became a more proactive industry employer of 
Indigenous peoples at the end of the 1980s. Progress began with the hiring of Eric Newell 
as CEO and Chairman in 1989. In a 201 2 interview he to ld the Calgary Herald, regarding 
the hiring of Indigenous peoples in the 1980s, that Syncrude 
.. . made every mistake in the book . .. We thought we were in a hiring 
program, but as fast as we could hire young aboriginal workers, we would 
let them go. We realized that taking some person from a little community 
of250 people and throwing them into an industria l complex like Syncrude 
was not a formula for success. 
Under Newell , Syncrude pursued Indigenous education and development programs that 
eventua lly led the company to become one of the foremost employers of Indigenous 
peoples in Canada . Efforts of Indigenous peoples to challenge the env ironmental impacts 
68 Bethell , "Preliminary Inventory of the Envrionmental Issues and Concerns Affecting the People of Fort 
MacKay Alberta," 44. 
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of the oil sands industry failed , but their efforts to gain increased participation were the 
slow and painful beginning of what would eventually become a success story.69 
Conclusion 
The process of treaty making, surveying and mapping was a form of colonization 
that imposed a southern framework of resource development on the oil sands region 
before supply pressures mobilized the construction of the commercial oil sands industry 
in the 1960s. The Alberta Government had minimal concern for Indigenous peoples, 
since it considered them to be a federal responsibility. The environmental impacts of the 
oil sands industry, especially in Fort McKay, undermined the ability of the community to 
subsist from the contact-traditional economy. Despite extensive efforts, the community 
had no effective recourse to deal with the industry's environmental impacts. As the 
resource base of Fort McKay was destroyed, the community was forced to participate in 
the oil sands industry for its survival. However, Indigenous peoples throughout the first 
development phase of the oil sands industry were largely excluded from employment. 
The Syncrude hiring agreement of 1976 was an almost complete failure. Efforts of the 
A TC to secure an affirmative action program were defeated in the Supreme Court but 
were successful in persuading the federal government to make Indigenous hiring a 
requirement of pricing allowances for Alsands. As that project failed , the participation of 
Indigenous peoples was delayed. 
69 Robert Remington, "Remington: 'Syncrude solution' may tap potentia l of aborig inals," The Ca/gmy 
Herald 8 June 2012. 
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CONCLUSION 
The industrial colonization of the oil sands region began as a legal process in which 
the Dominion of Canada purchased the Hudson' s Bay Company's lands in 1870 and 
signed Treaty 8 with the region 's Indigenous communities in 1899 to extinguish their 
land rights and secure sole ownership of the region 's resources. Speculative knowledge 
from the reports of the Geological Survey, rather than the proven viability of oil sands 
development, prompted exploration efforts by the Department of Mines in the first 
decades of the 201h century . Drawing on Bridge's observations of the social construction 
of global extractive spaces, combined with the colonizing powers of Canadian resource 
maps, shows that Canadian government officials rebranded the Athabasca region as a 
future industrial hinterland long before the physical construction of the industry. In terms 
advocated by scholars including Coates and Morrison, Quiring, and Tough, the 
development of the oil sands industry between the mid-1960s and the mid-1980s was a 
prime case of intra-provincial colonization. The physical construction of the industry 
involved the appropriation of Indigenous territory, its population by settlers, and the 
extraction of bitumen for economic gain. 
Zaslow' s emphasis on the importance of government institutions is valuable to the 
analysis of oil sands exploration as a colonial force in the early 1900s. As synthetic o il 
production was for so long an uneconomic endeavour, the efforts of the Alberta and 
federal governments figured prominently in development efforts, such as in funding the 
explorations of Sidney Ells, the research of Karl Clark, and the operation of the Abasand 
and Bitumount plants. Following the 1930 NRTA and the exodus of the of federal 
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government following the conclusion of the Second World War, the Alberta government 
became the dominant government player in the oil sands industry. As the primary 
financiers of the B itumount plant, the Social Credit government took the first steps 
towards promoting the success of bitumen production by exempting the resource from the 
ERCB's pro-rationing regulations in the 1950s. 
In the 1960s and 1970s the Alberta synthetic oi l industry came to prominence as a 
crisis fuel funded largely by investments from the United States oil industry. Sun Oil's 
investments in Great Canadian Oil Sands Limited resulted in the construction of the first 
commercial plant in 1967. Following the election of Peter Lougheed in 1971 , the Alberta 
government sought to promote the oil sands industry, but a lso to carefully regulate it to 
ensure the maximum accrual of socio-economic benefits to Albertans, and to minimize 
social and environmental impacts by profiting from the investments of fore ign 
companies. Lougheed was well aware ofthe historical reliance of the national and 
Alberta economies on resource extraction. He was wary of avoiding rapid explo itation 
and the boom and bust of Alberta conventional o il production. He sought to exercise 
government dominance over the industry to prevent the explo itation of A lberta oi l by 
U.S. producers. To a significant degree the efforts of the Lougheed government resonate 
with the efforts of the Ontario government to preserve the manufacturing condition in the 
timber industry in the years surrounding the turn of the 191h century described by Nelles. 1 
In 1890s Ontario, the provincial government could not escape the staples trap despite 
imposing timber milling requirements rather than the export of raw logs to big U.S. mills, 
1 Nelles, The Politics of Development: Forests, Mines and Hydro-Electric Power in 
Ontario, 1849-194 1. 
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to maximize the domestic accrual of economic benefi ts from primary resource 
production. 
With the OPEC crisis, the stakes changed as domestic energy security emerged as a 
new governing factor in the planning of oil sands projects. In response, the Alberta 
government regulato ry approach was side-lined in favour of a more aggressive position. 
Unlike the Ontario governments described by Nelles that became clients of the bus iness 
community through dealing with resource development proj ects, Lougheed ' s 
Conservative government emerged by the middle of the decade as a developer of the o il 
sands industry, financially invested in the Syncrude project. However, similar to the 
dynamics described by Nelles, A lberta's investments produced a degree of regu latory 
capture in Alberta in that oil sands production was prioritized above a ll e lse by the m id-
1970s. As a member of the o il sands industry, A lberta's provincial government morphed 
into a corporate player committed to the success of its investments. By investing in the 
industry, the A lberta government blurred the line between business and government. As 
the O PEC crisis worsened towards the end of the 1970s and synthetic oi l production 
became profitable, the federa l government sought an unprecedented level of intervention 
in the o il industry to protect Canadian consumers and to balance the accrua l of resource 
rents with interventionist po lic ies that culminated wi th the NEP. The complex struggle 
between the federal and prov incia l governments and industry shaped the development of 
the o il sands industry in a way that marginalized the environmental, social and economic 
impacts associated w ith the production of synthetic oil. 
The 1970s were fo rmative years fo r env ironmental pol icy and management at the 
federal and provincia l levels. T he env ironmental concerns of the federal and A lberta 
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governments transformed from a focus on wildlife conservation in the 1950s and 60s, to 
the writing of laws oriented towards pollution prevention such as the Alberta Clean Air 
and Clean Water Acts, the formation of the ECA, and the creation of the federal and 
Alberta Departments of Environment. The OPEC price increases and Alberta and 
Canada's investment in Syncrude created a development imperative that conflicted with 
Alberta' s intention to closely control the growth of the industry. The emergence ofthe 
contradictory government priorities of industrial development produced the regulatory 
struggle foreshadowed by Zaslow. Weak environmental requirements facilitated 
regulatory concessions granted to GCOS and to Syncrude, especially higher permissible 
sulphur dioxide emissions. The result was that environmental regulations were reduced 
and overlooked in proj ect negotiations dominated by supply security concerns. The 
AOSERP program, though at first independent, well funded and progressive, struggled 
with government co-optation before re-organization and eventual collapse fo llowing the 
withdrawal of the federal government in 1979. Though Alberta set precedent as the first 
Canadian province to develop serious env ironmental policy, further investment in and 
empowerment of environmental regulation trailed behind the rapid deve lopment of the oi l 
sands industry. Reports and assertions by the AOSERP program, the o il sands industry 
and government towards the end of the 1970s stated that synthetic oi l production 
activities had not had significant adverse environmenta l impacts. Other s ignificant 
research including from A lberta Environment and the observations of Indigenous 
communities indicated that serious damage was taking place. 
Based on the very nature of the bitumen, as a large scale, low-grade hydrocarbon 
deposit that requires massive land disturbance to extract and huge water and energy 
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inputs to turn into a marketable product, it may not have been possible for the oil sands 
industry to have had less of an impact on the Athabasca environment. Perhaps, as various 
forms of unconventional oil such as shale oil, deep sea and arctic oil , and upgraded 
bitumen become the standard sources of petroleum, the price will not just be a higher 
economic cost, but a higher environmental cost inherent in the way unconventional 
hydrocarbon resources are extracted and upgraded regardless of the care, independence 
and empowerment g iven to environmental research and regulation. 
The first development phase of the oil sands industry, in conjunction with the 
broader industrial colonization of the Peace-Athabasca Delta, had significant adverse 
environmental, social and economic consequences for proximate Indigenous 
communities. The environmental impacts of the oil sands industry, especially in Fort 
McKay, undermined the ability of the community to subsist from the contact-traditional 
economy which had sustained them before the influx of industrial development. Despite 
extensive efforts, the community had no effective recourse to deal with the industry ' s 
environmental impact. As Brownlie and Keirn have suggested, looking at both the impact 
on and agency of Indigenous peoples faced with colonialism is essential so as to more 
accurately evaluate the history of the oil sands industry. The Fort McKay community in 
the 1970s and 80s was forced to challenge the Alberta government and the oi l sands 
industry in the settler venues of law and media. While the community was able to 
competently navigate the imposed system, they were completely unable to prevent the 
environmental degradation that destroyed their natural resources. Similar to what Tough 
has argued in reference to Indigenous participation in Manitoba industrial labour, that the 
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Fort McKay community was able to make certain choices and actively navigate the new 
social and legal system imposed around them, it was not a significant measure of power. 
The environmental impacts of the oi l sands industry contributed to the industrial 
colonization of the o i I sands region, as the destruction of natural resources forced 
Indigenous peoples to adapt to the southern economy. Yet indigenous peoples were 
largely excluded from employment in the oil sands industry during the fi rst phase of 
development. Negligible numbers of people were employed, only for short and 
inconsistent periods of time, and almost exclusively in menial labour. To combat the lack 
of employment opportunities, the region' s Indigenous communities formed the ATC to 
lobby industry and government for preferential hiring schemes to improve employment. 
Although the efforts of the ATC to secure an affirmative action program failed in the 
Supreme Court, more success was achieved in lobbying the federa l government to make 
Indigenous hiring a requirement of pricing a llowances for Alsands. Following the 
collapse of oi l prices in the mid 1980s, the failure of the Alsands and Canstar projects, the 
defeat of the Trudeau government and stepping as ide of Peter Lougheed, no new o il 
sands plants were built until the late 1990s. 
The first development phase of the oi l sands industry can teach some significant 
lessons about resource dependence and regulation in Canada. As Alberta had for so long 
been re liant on resource export for much of its economic health, when conventional o il 
declined it became economically dependent on the successful establishment of the oi l 
sands industry. Lougheed recognized the importance of the resource, but was also wary 
of it being hi-jacked by foreign investors and markets hungry fo r cheap Canad ian energy 
exports. By becoming involved in the industry as a financial player, the Alberta 
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government entered a state/capital partnership in which it became trapped in a position 
that prevented it from impos ing environmental regulations that would increase the costs 
of development. Were the province less dependent and not financially invested, they may 
have been at greater liberty to regulate the industry according to criteria beyond the 
bottom line. 
In the prevailing regulatory dynamic, the environmental, social and economic 
impacts of the industry were downloaded to proximate communities who relied on the 
health of their environment for income and sustenance, yet publicly funded 
environmental research failed to reveal many of the impacts on these communities. The 
A lberta government neglected their well-being as a federa l responsibility, while assuming 
that industrial development would bear employment and other benefits. The notion that 
local people invariably benefit from resource development, an argument regularly put 
forth as conventional wisdom by extractive industries, was in this case and many others a 
fallacy. As resource extraction becomes more sophisticated, so too do employment 
requirements. For indigenous communities to benefit, they need better education systems 
and early training and hiring programs that w ill actively seek their engagement in 
industrial development. 
The Canad ian economy has a lways been largely dependent on resource 
extraction, and as global energy and resource needs are rapidly increasing it seems 
unlikely that this economic dependence is going change. But w ith better and more honest 
regulation, the avoidance of state-capita l partnerships, and earlier, more proactive 
consultation and collaboration w ith Indigenous communities faced with development, 
perhaps some of the adverse consequences of industria l development can be prevented 
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and the benefits can be more equitably distributed . Canada is currently experiencing 
another resource boom, with many new oil sands projects being established in the last 
few years and mining companies spending millions on exploration and new development. 
If the current Alberta Conservative government of Premier Alison Redford can 
successfully establish the independent monitoring and regulatory agencies it seeks to 
develop, there is hope that future oil sands projects will be more equitably assessed and 
have fewer adverse environmental impacts.2 However, if Indigenous peoples continue to 
be neglected in the planning, development, operation and closure of extractive projects, 
Canada' s legacy of industrial colonization will continue to have significant consequences 
for Indigenous communities. 
2 
"Joint Canada-A lberta Implementation Plan for Oil Sands Monitoring," Government of Canada and 
Government of Alberta, http ://environment.gov.ab.ca/info/ library/8704.pdf., and "Regulatory Enhancement 
Project," Government of Alberta, http://www.energy.alberta .ca/initiatives/regulatoryenhancement.asp. 
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